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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2018
The role of the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) as conventionally understood is to give effect to, and not to challenge, the will of Parliament. At the same time, the UK's constitution forces the UKSC to develop a constitutional jurisprudence to resolve clashes of higher-order principles, for instance between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This development puts the legitimacy of unelected and unaccountable judges invalidating legislation under the spotlight. Instead of arguing for US-style strike-down powers, I argue that cautious and corrective judicial intervention is constitutionally mandated and democratically legitimate.
I am grateful to Conor Gearty, Eric Heinze, Roger Masterman, and Gavin Phillipson for their comments. All errors are mine.
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68 Ibid., at pp. 140–41.
69 Ibid., at pp. 130–31, 140.
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90 Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] A.C. 262; decided by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords as the predecessor of the UKSC.
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96 AXA General Insurance Limited v The Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 A.C. 868, at [51], per Lord Hope and at [149], per Lord Reed. The comments were made in the context of Acts of the Scottish Parliament, but were sufficiently abstract to apply to the Westminster Parliament as well.
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99 Freedom of Information Act 2000, section 53(2).
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101 Ibid., at para. [69].
102 Lord Mance, with whom Lady Hale agreed, took an orthodox administrative law approach to an executive decision, which I do not discuss here.
103 R. (Evans) [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] 1 A.C. 1787, at [154].
104 Ibid., at para. [168].
105 T.R.S. Allan, “Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism: Reflections on Evans v Attorney General ” [2016] C.L.J. 38, at 39. For criticism even of Lord Mance's moderate and administrative law based approach (it “does not attend to the importance of the political constitution”), see Ekins, R. and Forsyth, C., Judging the Public Interest (London 2015), 20Google Scholar.
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110 R. (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.
111 Ibid., at para. [65].
112 Ibid., at para. [66].
113 Ibid., at para. [68].
114 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562.
115 R. (Unison) [2017] UKSC 51, at [69].
116 Ibid., at para. [70]
117 Ibid., at para. [74]: “We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.”
118 Ibid., at paras. [74], [75].
119 Ibid., at para. [65].
120 Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61, [2014] 1 A.C. 1115; A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25, [2015] 1 A.C. 588.
121 R. (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd.) v The Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 2 All E.R. 109; R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583.
122 S. Stephenson, “The Supreme Court's Renewed Interest in Autochthonous Constitutionalism” [2015] P.L. 394; see also Masterman, R. and Wheatle, S., “A Common Law Resurgence in Rights Protection?” (2015) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 57Google Scholar.
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126 R. (Unison) [2017] UKSC 51, at [80], [88].
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128 R. (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd.) [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 2 All E.R. 109.
129 Ibid., at para. [208], per Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance.
130 R. (Unison) [2017] UKSC 51, at [68], [71].
131 R. (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657.
132 Ibid., at paras. [76], [191], [299], [326].
133 At [120], per Lord Neuberger; at [188], per Lord Mance.
134 At [118], per Lord Neuberger; at [190], per Lord Mance; at [202], per Lord Wilson.
135 One factor that helps explain why no declaration was issued in the current proceedings is Lord Falconer's Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2013, which was being actively considered by Parliament at the time of the UKSC's decision.
136 See generally E. Wicks, “The Supreme Court Judgment in Nicklinson: One Step Forward on Assisted Dying; Two Steps Back on Human Rights” (2014) 23 Med.L.Rev. 144, at 145.
137 R. (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657, at [114], per Lord Neuberger and at [202], per Lord Wilson.
138 Wicks, “The Supreme Court Judgment in Nicklinson”, p. 155; See also R. English, “‘No Precedent? Then Set One!’ – Nicklinson Right to Die Case’, UK Human Rights Blog, 20 August 2012.”
139 R. (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657, at [232].
140 Ibid., at para. [230].
141 At [259], [267], per Lord Hughes.
142 J. Sumption, “Judicial and Political Decision-Making: The Uncertain Boundary – the FA Mann Lecture” (2011) 16 J.R. 301. See also Lord Sumption, “The Limits of Law”, 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur, 20 November 2013; Lord Sumption, “Anxious Scrutiny”, Administrative Law Bar Association Annual Lecture, 4 November 2014.
143 See also the contributions made by Policy Exchange and the Judicial Power Project.
144 Sumption, “Judicial and Political Decision-Making”, p. 309.
145 Ibid., at pp. 312–13.
146 Osborn [2013] UKSC 61, [2014] 1 A.C. 1115; Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [2015] A.C. 455.
147 R. (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657, at [70]–[76].
148 Ibid., at paras. [94]–[97].
149 Ibid., at para. [98].
150 Ibid., at para. [100].
151 Ibid., at para. [104].
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., at para. [111].
154 Ibid., at para. [116].
155 At the time of writing the High Court had begun to hear Mr. Noel Conway's challenge to the blanket ban on assisted suicide.
156 In re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) [2008] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 A.C. 173, at [130].
157 R. (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657, at [163], per Lord Mance.
158 Ibid., at para. [164], per Lord Mance.
159 Wicks, “The Supreme Court Judgement in Nicklinson”, p. 152.
160 R. (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657, at [191].
161 Lord Mance cites with approval Lord Bingham's dicta in A. v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 A.C. 68, at [42]: “the function of independent judges charged to interpret and apply the law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some way undemocratic.”
162 R. (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657, at [267].
163 Ibid., at para. [112].
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165 Ibid.