¹ [2005] UKHL 56; [2006] 1 A.C. 262; noted M. Elliott, “The Sovereignty of Parliament, the Hunting Ban, and the Parliament Acts” [2006] C.L.J. 1.

² See especially A. Young, “Hunting Sovereignty: Jackson v. Her Majesty's Attorney-General” [2006] P.L. 187; and Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Hart, Oxford, 2009). The terminology of “continuing” and “self-embracing” legislative supremacy is that of H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1994), pp.145–146.

³ The position may apply to Scotland and Northern Ireland as well, but because of the different constitutional settlements in those regions the submissions here should be taken to apply only to England and Wales unless specifically stated. Lord Hope of Craighead suggested in Jackson, n.1 above, that the Scottish conception of sovereignty had never been quite the same as the English Diceyan approach, at [106], and referred to “absolute legislative sovereignty” as an “English principle”, at [104].

⁴ T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford 1993); Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford 2001).

⁵ S. Lakin, “Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Controlling Factor of Legality in the British Constitution” (2008) 28 O.J.L.S. 709.

⁶ Lord Irvine L.C. was the last Lord Chancellor to sit as a judge in the House of Lords.

⁷ C.f. D. Woodhouse, The Office of Lord Chancellor (Oxford 2001).

⁸ Lord Irvine L.C. before the Commons Select Committee, 2 April 2003.

⁹ On which see: Lord Windlesham, “The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: Ministers, Judges and Constitutional Change” [2005] P.L. 806; “The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: The Politics of Constitutional Reform” [2006] P.L. 35.

¹⁰ Section 3 of the 2005 Act.

¹¹ M. Freedland, “Privatising Carltona: Part II of the Deregulation and Contracting-Out Act 1994” [1995] P.L. 21.

¹² See e.g.: McDonald, L., “The Rule of Law in the ‘New Regulatory State’” (2004) 33 Common Law World Review 197CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A.C.L. Davies, Accountability: A Public Law Analysis of Government by Contract (Oxford 2001) Ch. 1.

¹³ R. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Buckingham 1997).

¹⁴ Whether such an approach in respect of the banking sector can be maintained remains to be seen in the light of the economic downturn.

¹⁵ R. Brazier, Constitutional Reform: Reshaping the British Political System, 3rd ed. (Oxford 2008), Ch. 7.

¹⁶ R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. ex p. Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115.

¹⁷ R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. ex p. Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 W.L.R. 464; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. ex p. Venables [1998] A.C. 407.

¹⁸ (1608) 12 Co. Rep. 63.

¹⁹ Sir Stephen Sedley, “The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law Without a Constitution” (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 270, 282.

²⁰ See also, A. Tomkins, “What is Parliament For?” in N. Bamforth & P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford 2003), p.53.

²¹ Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy (London 1978), pp.9–11.

²² Sir Stephen Sedley, “Human Rights: a Twenty-First Century Agenda” [1995] P.L. 386, 389.

²³ Lord Woolf, “Droit-Public – English Style” [1995] P.L. 57, 67–71; J. Laws, “Law and Democracy” [1995] P.L. 72, 81–93; R. Cooke, “Fundamentals” (1988) N.Z.L.Rev. 158. It should probably be noted that the extra-judicial statements have largely disappeared since the Human Rights Act 1998, answering the fear of the judiciary that a sovereign Parliament could easily override any supposed fundamental rights. Note for instance the reluctance of Lord Woolf to directly repeat his claim in the face of distinct provocation: Lord Woolf C.J., “The Rule of Law and a Change in the Constitution” [2004] C.L.J. 317.

²⁴ Lord Irvine, “Judges and Decision-Makers” [1996] P.L. 59, 75–78.

²⁵ P.P. Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law” [1997] P.L. 467; T.R.S. Allan, “The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism” (1999) 115 L.Q.R. 221.

²⁶ Subject, of course, to the Parliament Acts 1911–49.

²⁷ X Ltd v. Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) Ltd [1991] 1 A.C. 1, 48.

²⁸ [1999] 3 All E.R. 317, 320.

²⁹ Sir Stephen Sedley, “The Common Law and the Constitution”, in Lord Nolan and Sir Stephen Sedley, The Making and Remaking of the British Constitution (London 1997), p.26.

³⁰ J.A.G. Griffith, “The Common Law and the Political Constitution” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 42. See, though, the response: Sir Stephen Sedley, “The Common Law and the Political Constitution: A Reply” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 68.

³¹ J.A.G. Griffith, “The Brave New World of Sir John Laws” (2000) 63 M.L.R. 159.

³² Sedley, note 19 above, 289.

³³ Griffith, note 30 above, 48–49.

³⁴ R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p. Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864.

³⁵ Sedley, note 19 above, 289–290.

³⁶ Griffith, note 30 above, 59.

³⁷ W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (London 1945), p.9.

³⁸ Griffith certainly believes that he does: note 30 above, 44.

³⁹ The difficulty of defining the executive power is described in A. Tomkins, “The Struggle to Delimit Executive Power in Britain” in P.P. Craig & A. Tomkins (eds.), The Executive and Public Law: Power and Accountability in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 2006), p.16.

⁴⁰ W.J. Rees, “The Theory of Sovereignty Restated” (1950) 59 Mind 495.

⁴¹ Ibid., 508.

⁴² Ibid., 511.

⁴³ M. Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans. and eds.), Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York 1946), p.77; L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford 1990), Ch.3.

⁴⁴ Rees, n.40 above, 509–510.

⁴⁵ G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford 1971), pp.37–38.

⁴⁶ Rees, n.40 above, 509.

⁴⁷ L.T.C. Harms, J.A., “Judging Under a Bill of Rights”, 2007 Ebsworth Memorial Lecture, delivered 24 January 2007.

⁴⁸ Marshall, n.45 above, p.38.

⁴⁹ [1992] 1 A.C. 599. M v. Home Office [1994] 1 A.C. 377 is another example where the House of Lords permitted the injunction of a Minister of the Crown; and see S. Sedley, “The Crown in its Own Courts” in C. Forsyth and I. Hare (eds.), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays in Honour of Sir William Wade (Oxford 1998), p.253.

⁵⁰ Lord Reid, “The Judge as Law Maker” (1972) 12 J.S.P.T.L. 22.

⁵¹ [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142.

⁵² P.M. North & J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private International Law (Oxford 1999), Preface to the First Edition, by G. Cheshire, p.vii.

⁵³ Co. Inst. I, 109b.

⁵⁴ Article 9, Bill of Rights 1689.

⁵⁵ (1840) 11 A. & E. 273; K. & L. 140.

⁵⁶ (1839) 9 A. & E. 1; K. & L. 127.

⁵⁷ And it is suggested here that he has.

⁵⁸ Although it can play an important role in the execution of the judicial functions of the branches.

⁵⁹ A statement made by the Chief Justice Hughes of the US Supreme Court, before his judicial tenure in the 1930's and quoted in: Sedley, note 22 above, 390. See also, H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 8th ed. (Oxford 2000), p.29 (the sentence does not seem to appear in the 9th ed. published in 2004).

⁶⁰ Below note 103ff.

⁶¹ Sedley, note 22 above, 389.

⁶² (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 107, 118a.

⁶³ S.E. Thorne, “Dr Bonham's Case” (1938) 54 L.Q.R. 542.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 548.

⁶⁵ At least on a contemporary understanding of “void”. For an argument that the term meant something closer to an interpretative meaning at the time, see I. Williams, “Dr. Bonham's Case and ‘Void’ Statutes” (2006) 27 Journal of Legal History 111.

⁶⁶ R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame (No.2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603.

⁶⁷ J. Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford 1999), Ch.5.

⁶⁸ Co. Inst. IV, 36.

⁶⁹ Rowles v. Mason (1612) 2 Brownl 192, 198.

⁷⁰ (1608) 12 Co. Rep. 63.

⁷¹ De Legibus 5b. S.E. Thorne (ed. and tr.), Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England (Cambridge, Mass. 1968), Vol. II, p.33.

⁷² For this reason Hobbes was unable to contemplate a system of mixed sovereignty: T. Hobbes, “De Corpore Politico”, Ch.20 in Human Nature and De Corpore Politico (Oxford 1994), pp.114–118.

⁷³ J.W.F. Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and European Effects (Cambridge 2007), pp.216–221. Reviewed Knight (2008) 124 L.Q.R. 336.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.218.

⁷⁵ Fuller, L.L., “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harvard L. Rev. 353CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁶ Allison, n.73 above, p.218.

⁷⁷ The metaphor is not quite accurate, as the courts' legislative role is greater than the legislature's judicial role.

⁷⁸ Allison, n.73 above, p.218.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.214.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.219.

⁸¹ For the qualifications required to be a Justice of the new Supreme Court see s.25 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Other judicial appointments are carried out by the Judicial Appointments Commission.

⁸² V. Bogdanor, Power and the People (London 1997), p.15.

⁸³ Lord Hailsham, above note 21 above, p.34.

⁸⁴ Hirst v. UK (No.2), App. No. 74025/01, Decision of 30 March 2004, at para. [51].

⁸⁵ A.V. Dicey, Law and Opinion in England, 2nd ed. (London 1930), pp.369–370. For an interesting challenge to Dicey's approach to democracy see: P.P. Craig, “Dicey: Unitary, Self-Correcting Democracy and Public Law” (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 105; and for a limited defence of Dicey see: A. Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Oxford 2009).

⁸⁶ It is worth noting that the High Court of New Zealand has stated that it interprets legislative in light of “a background of societal norms and values that influence the meaning of the statutory words used” which suggests a slightly different approach to public opinion than that of Dicey: Savril Contractors Ltd. v. Bank of New Zealand [2002] N.Z.A.R. 699, 705.

⁸⁷ Although, of course, the new Supreme Court will be.

⁸⁸ R. v. Bedwellty Justices, ex p. Williams [1997] A.C. 225.

⁸⁹ J.A.C. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam 1976), p.26.

⁹⁰ Sir Stephen Sedley, “Governments, Constitutions, and Judges” in G. Richardson & H. Glenn (eds.), Administrative Law and Government Action: The Courts and Alternative Mechanisms of Review (Oxford 1994), p.36.

⁹¹ Ibid., p.41.

⁹² Sedley, note 22 above.

⁹³ A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London 1961), p.73.

⁹⁴ One might see the executive taking a greater role in the share of legitimacy than sovereignty. Such an approach would be fair for precisely the same reason as bi-polar sovereignty working between the courts and Parliament. There is an overlap of political legitimacy for the executive through its leading members being elected officials, and legal legitimacy through the executive's law-making role. But sharing in the legitimacy does not itself qualify a body for a role as sovereign, particularly where the political legitimacy of the executive is derived purely from that of Parliament.

⁹⁵ Sedley, note 90 above, p.43.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ I am indebted to Sir Stephen Sedley for this point.

⁹⁸ It is for this reason that there ought not to be any concern about compliance with Article 6 of the ECHR. A court being able to overturn legislation in narrow circumstances is not incompatible with the need for independence and impartiality. If anything, it provides a stronger compliance with Article 13 and the need for an effective remedy in national courts.

⁹⁹ T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford 1993); Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford 2001).

¹⁰⁰ See also: T.R.S. Allan, “Parliament's Will and the Justice of the Common Law: The Human Rights Act in Constitutional Perspective” [2006] C.L.P. 27.

¹⁰¹ Allan, Constitutional Justice, p.207 (original italics).

¹⁰² Ibid., pp.216–221, 232–242.

¹⁰³ Goldsworthy, note 67 above, pp.259–272.

¹⁰⁴ A (FC) and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68.

¹⁰⁵ J. Beatson et al., Human Rights: Judicial Protection in the United Kingdom (London 2008), pp.522–533; I. Leigh & R. Masterman, Making Rights Real: The Human Rights Act in its First Decade (Oxford 2008), Ch.5.

¹⁰⁶ J. Laws, “Law and Democracy” [1995] P.L. 72, 84.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 82.

¹⁰⁸ A [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68; Khawaja v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. [1984] A.C. 74.

¹⁰⁹ R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. ex p. Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. ex p. Leech (No. 2) [1994] Q.B. 198.

¹¹⁰ Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers [1993] A.C. 534.

¹¹¹ A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71; [2006] 2 A.C. 221; R. (Binyam Mohamed) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No.4) [2009] EWHC 152 (Admin).

¹¹² Sedley, note 22 above, 391.

¹¹³ Ibid., 395.

¹¹⁴ Allison, note 73 above, p.218.

¹¹⁵ Philip A. Joseph, “Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise” (2004) 15 K.C.L.J. 321. See also: Joseph, “The Demise of Ultra Vires – Judicial Review in the New Zealand Courts” [2001] P.L. 354.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 323.

¹¹⁷ Lord Cooke of Thorndon, “The Road Ahead for the Common Law” [2004] I.C.L.Q. 273, 275.

¹¹⁸ Lord Woolf, “Droit-Public – English Style” [1995] P.L. 57, 69.

¹¹⁹ Joseph, note 115 above, 333.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 334 (original emphasis).

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid., 321.

¹²³ Ibid., 335.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 345.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ There is a wealth of literature on dialogue, but for useful introductions see: L. Tremblay, “The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (2005) 3 ICON 617; R. Clayton, “Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention under the Human Rights Act” [2004] PL 33; T. Hickman, “Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act” [2005] P.L. 306.

¹²⁷ Lord Woolf C.J., “The Rule of Law and a Change in the Constitution” [2004] C.L.J. 317.

¹²⁸ A. Le Sueur, “Three Strikes and it's Out? The UK Government's Strategy to Oust Judicial Review from Immigration and Asylum Decision-Making” [2004] P.L. 225.

¹²⁹ International Transport Roth GmbH v. Home Secretary [2003] Q.B. 728 at [71].

¹³⁰ M. Elliott, “United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty under Pressure” (2004) 2 ICON 545, 554.

¹³¹ Sedley, note 19 above, 291.