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Voluntary Euthanasia and the Logical Slippery Slope Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2003

Hallvard Lillehammer
Hallvard Lillehammer*
Affiliation:
King’s College Cambridge, University of Cambridge
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Abstract

In his recent book “Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy”, John Keown puts forward two slippery slope arguments against the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. One of these arguments claims that a defender of voluntary euthanasia is logically committed to the permissibility of non-voluntary euthanasia. This paper seeks to show that Keown’s argument either rests on a logical confusion or on a misunderstanding of the value of autonomy.

Type
Shorter Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 61 , Issue 3 , 11 December 2002 , pp. 545 - 550
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2002

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References

1 Keown, J., Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002)Google Scholar.

2 Where I say “permissible”, Keown says “acceptable”. Nothing below hinges on this change of terminology.

3 By “non-voluntary euthanasia” I mean euthanasia without consent where the patient is incapable of consenting. By “involuntary euthanasia”, I mean euthanasia without consent where the patient is capable of consenting, but where the patient's consent has either not been elicited, or the patient has explicitly refused to consent.

4 Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1977)Google Scholar; Singer, P. and Kuhse, H., Should the Baby Live? The Problem of the Handicapped Newborn (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985)Google Scholar; Harris, J., The Value of Life (London: Routledge 1992)Google Scholar.

5 Keown, p. 77.

6 Keown draws no parallel conclusion for involuntary euthanasia. Presumably this is because of the essentially coercive character of involuntary euthanasia. I shall ignore this issue in what follows.

7 Keown, p. 78.

8 Keown, p. 79.

9 Keown, p. 53.