THE issue of whaling has been the subject of considerable controversy in recent years, as the international community remains divided as to how the world's marine resources should be managed: some states prioritise conservation, while others favour sustainable exploitation. Against this background, Australia initiated proceedings against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in May 2010, claiming that Japan's continuing whaling activities, carried out under the guise of scientific research, were in breach of its various obligations under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). New Zealand later intervened in the proceedings, exercising its right under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute, and oral pleadings involving the three states were held in June and July 2013. On 31 March 2014, the ICJ delivered its judgment in Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan, New Zealand Intervening), finding that Japan had violated three provisions of the ICRW – the moratorium on commercial whaling, the ban on factory ships, and the prohibition on whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary – by authorising the killing of certain whale species as part of its JARPA II research programme. The decision has largely been welcomed, especially by environmental activists, for offering a measure of protection to endangered marine life, but the judgment carries broader significance for its treatment of a number of points of international law, including the standard of review exercised by international courts, the role of scientific reasoning in international dispute settlement, and the interpretation of treaties.