The apparently straightforward definition of redundancy contained in section 139 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 has generated a disproportionate and confused body of case law. In essence, redundancy pay is payable in three situations: the business disappears (s. 139(1)(a)(i)); the workplace disappears (s. 139(1)(a)(ii)); the job disappears (s. 139(1)(b)). As far as the disappearing workplace is concerned, recent cases have shown the courts taking a more pragmatic approach. The old contractual test laid down in UK Atomic Energy Authority v. Claydon [1974] I.C.R. 128 (where, by my contract, can I be required to work?) has been replaced by the geographic approach (where, in practice, do I work?): Bass Leisure Ltd v. Thomas [1994] I.R.L.R. 104 (E.A.T.) and High Table v. Horst [1997] I.R.L.R. 513 (C.A.). A similar pragmatism can be detected in the House of Lords' ruling in Murray v. Foyle Meats Ltd. [1999] I.R.L.R. 562 concerning the third aspect of the definition of redundancy, the disappearing job (s. 139(1)(b)).