^{page 238 note 1} [1969] 2 Ch. 149.

^{page 238 note 2} These are the most important decisions in English courts (including the Privy Council): Breen v. AEU [1971] 2 Q.B. 175Google Scholar; R. v. Liverpool Corporation, ex pane Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association [1972] 2 Q.B. 299Google Scholar; R. v. Barnsley M.B.C.. ex p. Hook [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1052Google Scholar (C.A.); McLnnes v. Onslow Fane [1978] I W.L.R. 1520Google Scholar (Ch.); Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [1980] 1 W.L.R. 582Google Scholar (C.A.); A.-G. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 A.C. 629Google Scholar (P.C.); Findlay v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1985] A.C. 318Google Scholar (H.L.); O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237Google Scholar (H.L.); C.C.S.U. v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374Google Scholar (H.L.); R. v. Secretary of Stale for the Home Department, ex p. Kahn [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337Google Scholar (C.A.); R. v. Brent London Borough Council, ex p. Gunning [1986] 84 L.G.R. 186Google Scholar; and R. v. Secretary of Slate for Transport, ex p. Greater London Council [1986] Q.B. 556Google Scholar and most recently R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Ruddock [1987] 2 All E.R. 518Google Scholar. The most important Commonwealth decisions have been: Salemi v. MacKellar (No. 2) [1977] 137 C.L.R. 396Google Scholar; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Haj Ismail [1982] 40 A.L.R. 341Google Scholar; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission [1977] 137 C.L.R. 487Google Scholar; R. v. MacKellar. ex p. Ratu and others [1977] 137 C.L.R. 461Google Scholar; Forbes v. New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd [1979] 53 A.L.J.R. 536Google Scholar; and Kioa v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1985] 62 A.L.R. 321Google Scholar.

^{page 238 note 3} Supra.

^{page 239 note 4} Although the respondent had been interviewed before the order had been made, he had not been given an opportunity to explain the humanitarian grounds in support of his desire to stay.

^{page 239 note 5} The ways in which legitimate expectation could arise were set out by Lord Fraser in C.C.S.U. v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374Google Scholar where he said (at 401) “Legitimate … expectation may arise either from an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue.” (See also Lord Diplock at 408.) Legitimate expectations arc thus “founded upon some act practice or situation prior to the decision … [and thus] a ‘legitimate expectation’ [docs not arise] simply because of the decision maker's power to decide in a way adverse to the person” (Caldwell, J. L. (1983) 2 Canterbury Law Review 45 at 48 relying upon Nashua v. Cannon (1981) 36 A.L.R. 215Google Scholar). Hlophe, John (1987) 104 S.A.L.J. 165Google Scholar disagrees. He links legitimate expectations with fairness and argues that it would be unfair to deny expectations not founded upon past facts but simply upon the decision maker's power (at 178–179). Although there may be cases in which a legitimate expectation may be founded simply upon a decision maker's power to decide adversely to an applicant (as Hlophe points out, in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149Google Scholar itself there was no mention of undertakings or prior practice leading to the legitimate expectation), such cases would in the light of the approach of the House of Lords in C.C.S.U. v. Minister for the Civil Service be dealt with as concerned with the duty to act fairly simplicter without the gloss of legitimate expectation. We shall consider the relationship between the duty to act fairly and legitimate expectations below.

^{page 239 note 6} In A.-G. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu it is not entirely clear to what extent Ng relied upon the undertaking: he made his first visit to the immigration authorities before he learnt of the undertaking, but learnt of the undertaking from television before his voluntary return to the authorities for a second visit. Presumably the undertaking fortified his intention to return.

^{page 240 note 7} See, for instance, H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law, 5th ed.. Chapter 11, “Retention of Discretion.”

^{page 240 note 8} In cases such as Lever Finance Ltd. v. Westminister (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 Q.B. 222Google Scholar. Estoppel is discussed more fully below in section 6.

^{page 240 note 9} Western Fish Products Ltd. v. Penwith District Council [1981] 2 All E.R. 204Google Scholar (C.A.) and Pootkin v. Kent County Council [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1186Google Scholar (C.A.).

^{page 240 note 10} See. for instance, Lord Greene M.R. in Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries v. Hulkin (unreported but cited at length in Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries v. Mathews [1950] 1 K.B. 148Google Scholar at 153–4). See also Craig, P. P., Administrative Law (1983), at 559, 567Google Scholar.

^{page 240 note 11} [1969] 2 Ch. 149.

^{page 240 note 12} See Caldwell, op. cit., n.5, supra, 48–9; Hlophe, op. cit., n.5, supra, 17–20.

^{page 240 note 13} Provided, of course, that such an exercise of its powers was consistent with its duty. See the dictum from Lord Fraser's advice in A.-G. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yeun Shiu cited above (text following n.4).

^{page 240 note 14} R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex pane Kahn [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337Google Scholar (C.A.) and R. V. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex pane Ruddock and others, [1987] 2 All E.R. 518Google Scholar. Both these decisions are discussed in full below.

^{page 241 note 15} Save to the extent that the expectation must be legitimate. In Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [1980] 1 W.L.R. 582Google Scholar (C.A.) Lord Denning held that because the mini cab drivers who were denied a hearing were of bad character they had no legitimate expectation of a hearing. It seems quite wrong to allow the conduct of the drivers to colour the nature of their expectation. See, Hlophe, op. cit., n.5, supra, 179–181.

^{page 241 note 16} [1969] 2 Ch. 149.

^{page 241 note 17} In a letter to me dated 19th January 1987.

^{page 242 note 18} [1973] E.C.R. 575, [1973] C.M.L.R. 639.

^{page 242 note 19} See Usher, J., “The Influence of National Concepts on Decisions of the European Court” (1976) 1 European Law Review 359 at 363Google Scholar, n.28.

^{page 242 note 20} See, for instance, the discussion of the principle by Advocate General Lagrangc in Algera v. Assembly (1957) 3 E.C.R. 85Google Scholar.

^{page 242 note 21} [1969] 2 Ch. 149.

^{page 242 note 22} Indeed, Schmidt v. Secretary of State for the Home Affairs was cited to the court but in support of the argument that legem patere quam fecisti formed no part of English law! Lord Denning's dictum upon which the concept rests in English law was not cited. It is likely though, that the name “legitimate expectation” was subsequently borrowed from English law by commentators to describe the concept before the European Court.

^{page 242 note 23} See Usher, op. cit., n.17, supra, 364 relying in the main upon Schmidt-Bleibtrau and Klein, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz.

^{page 243 note 24} See, for example, Hans-Uwe Erichsen and Wolfgang Martens, Allgemeines Verwallungsrechl (Walter de Gruyler, 5th ed.) 214–215. Although at this point the learned authors are dealing with the provisions of the Verwaltungsverfahrensgeselz (Administrative Procedure Statute) it is plain that the point applies generally.

^{page 243 note 25} Wade, Administrative Law, 225–228. Many cases establish this principle. See, for instance. Re 56 Demon Road [1953] Ch. 51 where Vaisey J. said (at 56–57) “…where Parliament confers on a body … the duty of deciding or determining any question … which affects the rights of the subject, such decision or determination made and communicated in terms which are not expressly preliminary or provisional is final and conclusive, and cannot, in the absence of express statutory power or the consent of the persons or persons affected, be altered or withdrawn by that body.”

^{page 243 note 26} The various Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetze. See Erichsen and Martens, op. cit., n.21, supra, 215–226.

^{page 243 note 27} The case is discussed in Erichsen and Martens, op. cit., n.21, supra, at 227.

^{page 243 note 28} This seems a poor translation of the potent idea of the Rechtsstaat. The idea is not of any constitutional order but of a constitutional order of a certain quality. Perhaps the “Rule of Law” comes closer.

^{page 244 note 29} This conclusion may be compared, for instance, with Maritime Electric Company v. General Dairies Ltd. [1937] A.C. 610Google Scholar where an electricity authority which had misread a meter and therefore undercharged its customer for a period of two years was able to recover payment in full.

^{page 244 note 30} See, Erichsen and Martens, op. cit., n.21, supra, 228–230.

^{page 244 note 31} Erichsen and Martens, op. cit., n.21, Supra, 231.

^{page 244 note 32} Sec, for instance. Wade, Administrative Law, 345–346.

^{page 245 note 33} [1983] 2 A.C. 629 (P.C.).

^{page 245 note 34} [1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.).

^{page 245 note 35} This is the principle that the obligations imposed upon citizens in the public interest should be proportionate to the object in view, i.e. an inordinately heavy burden should not be imposed upon a citizen in order to attain a trivial public good. The principle has frequently been invoked before the European Court and forms part of the administrative law of many member states. See, Usher, op. cit., n. 17, supra, 362–363. See, also, Bell, J., “The Expansion of Judicial Review over Discretionary Powers in France” [1986] Public Law 99 at 113Google Scholar.

^{page 245 note 36} The principle of proportionality was in effect applied in R. v. Barnsley Metropolitan Council, ex pane Hook [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1052Google Scholar (C.A.), where Lord Denning said “the court can interfere by certiorari if a punishment is altogether excessive and out of proportion to the occasion …”. And Sir John Pennycuick spoke of “the disproportionately drastic step of depriving Mr Hook of his licence…”. See also Woolf, L.J. in R. v. Brent London Borough Council, ex p. Assegai, The Times, 29 06 1987Google Scholar.

^{page 245 note 37} 379 H.L. Deb. 993 and 994 (3 February 1977).

^{page 245 note 38} The other significant point of difference was over the principle of proportionality.

^{page 246 note 39} [1969] 2 Ch. 149.

^{page 246 note 40} Of course a legitimate expectation of some boon does not necessarily entitle the person entertaining that expectation to have that expectation fulfilled; it may only entitle him to be heard before his expectation is dashed. This indeed is the question discussed elsewhere of whether legitimate expectations should be substantively as well as procedurally protected. None the less, however the expectation may be protected, the person entertaining it may (like the students in Schmidt) expect the boon rather than the hearing.

^{page 246 note 41} [1980] 1 W.L.R. 582.

^{page 246 note 42} After disapproving of Barwick, C.J.'s suggestion in Salemi v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) (1977) 14 A.L.R. 1Google Scholar that the concept of “legitimate expectation” “adds, little, if anything, to the concept of a right.”

^{page 246 note 43} [1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.).

^{page 246 note 44} Ibid., at 415.

^{page 246 note 45} See, for example, Hlophe, John, “Legitimate Expectation and Natural Justice: English Australian and South African Law” (1987) 104 S.A.L.J. 165 at 176Google Scholar.

^{page 246 note 46} Administrative Law (1983), 260Google Scholar.

^{page 246 note 47} Elsewhere he refers to “legitimate expectation” as the “notion of privilege” in a “new garb” (op. cit., n.41, supra, 284).

^{page 246 note 48} Op. cit., n.41, supra, 260.

^{page 246 note 49} [1964] A.C. 40.

^{page 247 note 50} Which is still potent in South African law.

^{page 247 note 51} Hlophe, op. cit., n.5, supra, 176–177.

^{page 247 note 52} Regarding Craig's point, although there are rare cases in which the absence of a “legitimate expectation” has been used to deny a hearing (for example, Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [1980] 1 W.L.R. 582Google Scholar) the general trend of the decisions has been to extend rather than to deny judicial review (for example, A. G. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 A.C. 629Google Scholar (P.C.) and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Kahn [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337Google Scholar (C.A.) (to be discussed more fully below). There is merit in Hlophe's point but he chooses the wrong case (Cinnamond) to support it. It is without doubt true that there was an improper intrusion by Lord Denning into the merits of the decision. But Lord Denning did so because he considered the applicant's expectation was not legitimate. Insofar as the question under discussion was addressed at all Lord Denning seems to have been of the opinion that he was dealing with the “legitimate expectation of being heard.”

^{page 247 note 53} [1983] 2 A.C. 629 (P.C).

^{page 247 note 54} [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337 (C.A.).

^{page 247 note 55} This discretion is a common law (possibly a prerogative) power and was not statutory at all.

^{page 247 note 56} The criteria were that: the intention to adopt was genuine and not a device for gaining entry, the welfare of the child in the United Kingdom was assured, a U.K. court was likely to grant an adoption order, and at least one of the adoptive parents was domiciled in the United Kingdom.

^{page 248 note 57} These criteria required “a genuine transfer of parental authority on the ground of the original parents' inability to care for the child” and that “there arc serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion undesirable …”

^{page 248 note 58} In the description of the procedure to be adopted it was said that the Department of Health and Social Security would be asked to if there were “any apparent reasons why a court would refuse to grant an adoption order.” No such inquiries were made of the D.H.S.S.

^{page 248 note 59} It has been a matter of some debate whether there is a distinction between reasonable expectations and legitimate expectations. In C.C.S.U. v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374Google Scholar (H.L.) Lord Diplock (at 408) expressed his preference for the use of “legitimate” on the ground that there might be reasonable expectations which were not legitimate and hence unprotected. See also Lord Frascr in the same case (at 401) retracting the use of “reasonable” in Attorney General of Hong Kong. See further Lord Roskill (at 415). This usage will be followed here.

^{page 248 note 60} And they had no reason to doubt that they would. Watkins L.J.'s dissent in ex p. Kahn is based upon a different analysis of the Home Office letter. He had “I take it to be clear from the [first paragraph of the letter] that the Secretary of State was informing the intending adopted that, once those conditions were demonstrated to him to have been satisfied, he would then proceed to exercise his discretion and in an exceptional case allow a child to be brought here for adoption.”

^{page 248 note 61} [1987] 2 All E.R. 518.

^{page 248 note 62} In fact there were three applicants. Mr. J. I. Cox (whose phone was tapped). Mrs. J. Ruddock and Mgr. D. B. Kent (who had both phoned Mr. Cox). Taylor J., however, held that only Mr. Cox had “sufficient interest to apply for any relief …” if “a warrant was lawfully issued to tap Mr. Cox's phone, no judicial review … could be available to any of those with whom he spoke.”

^{page 249 note 63} The contested interception took place before the Interception of Communications Act 1985 came into force, so the Act was irrelevant to the present case. And Taylor J. refused the invitation of counsel for the Secretary of State to deny relief to the applicants on the ground that the Act, which ousts the jurisdiction of the courts, had rendered the present application simply of “academic or historical interest” (at 527–528).

^{page 249 note 64} The criteria were set out in the following official reports: the Birkett Report of October 1957 (Cmnd 283), the Interception of Communications in Great Britain White Paper 1980 (Cmnd 7873) and Lord Diplock's Report on the Interception of Communications in Great Britain in 1981 (Cmnd 8191).

^{page 249 note 65} This description is Taylor, J.'s in ex p. Ruddock [1987] 2 All E.R. 518 at 522Google Scholar.

^{page 249 note 66} Ex p. Ruddock at 528.

^{page 249 note 67} [1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.).

^{page 250 note 68} [1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.) at 401.

^{page 250 note 69} Moreover, Fraser, Lord reached this view in reliance on the somewhat wider view of legitimate expectations expressed by Diplock, Lord himself in O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237 (H.L.) at 275Google Scholar.

^{page 250 note 70} [1987] 2 All E.R. 518.

^{page 250 note 71} Fraser, Lord did so in A.-G. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 A.C. 629 (P.C.) at 636/7Google Scholar as did Roskill, Lord in C.C.S.U. [1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.) at 415Google Scholar and Diplock, Lord in O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237 (H.L.) at 275Google Scholar.

^{page 250 note 72} [1973] A.C. 660 (P.C.) at 679.

^{page 251 note 73} In Re H.K. (An Infant) [1967] 2 Q.B. 617Google Scholar.

^{page 251 note 74} Unnecessarily, in fact, since Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40Google Scholar had rendered reliance upon the categorisation of functions into judicial/quasi-judicial and administrative redundant. However, the court was not referred to Ridge v. Baldwin and did not refer to that case suo motu. See Wade, Administrative Law, 5th ed., 466.

^{page 251 note 75} See Wade, op. cit., n.74, supra, 465–467.

^{page 251 note 76} Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed., by J. E. Evans) at 346.

^{page 251 note 77} Wade, op. cit., n.74, supra, 468.

^{page 251 note 78} [1985] A.C. 837 (H.L.).

^{page 251 note 79} Ibid., at 864.

^{page 251 note 80} Ibid., at 866–7.

^{page 251 note 81} [1982] A.C. 617 at 651. Note, however, that Lord Diplock in that case had said that judicial review was not available for “acts done lawfully in the exercise of an administrative discretion which are complained of only as being unfair or unwise …” But in Preston (at 852) Lord Scarman said of this passage: “I do not understand Lord Diplock to have been saying that the unfairness of what has been done can in no circumstances become relevant in determining whether what was done was ultra vires or unlawful.”

^{page 252 note 82} [1985] A.C. 835 (H.L.).

^{page 252 note 83} [1982] A.C. 617 (H.L.).

^{page 252 note 84} At any rate prior to ex p. Kahn [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337Google Scholar (C.A.) and ex p. Ruddock [1987] 2 All E.R. 518Google Scholar.

^{page 252 note 85} See, for example, the latest decisions in both those countries: in Kioa v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 62 A.L.R. 321Google Scholar, although Brennan J. thought that the notion of a “legitimate expectation” bore an “uncertain connotation and … it may be misleading if it be treated as a criterion for determining the application or contents of natural justice” (at 371), the learned judge plainly considered that, whatever role the concept might have, it was in the field of natural justice. Similarly in Boesak v. Minister of Home Affairs [1987] 3 S.A. 665(C)Google Scholar although Friedman J. held that “the phrase ‘legitimate expectation’ does not constitute an additional ground for the application of the audi alteram partem principle” (at 684) he plainly thought that, if the concept was part of South African law, its role was in the field of natural justice.

^{page 253 note 86} [1983] 2 A.C. 629 (P.C.).

^{page 253 note 87} (1977) 137 C.L.R. 396. Although Stephen J. was dissenting in Salemi's case, his view has been very widely accepted as correct. See Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing Commission (1977) 137 C.L.R. 487 at 507–508Google Scholar.

^{page 253 note 88} (1977) 137 C.L.R. 396 at 439.

^{page 253 note 89} [1971] 2 Q.B. 1975 at 191.

^{page 253 note 90} This argument was discussed above, text at note 12.

^{page 253 note 91} [1969] 2 Ch. 149.

^{page 254 note 92} Ibid., at 191. But note that even here Lord Denning saw the concept as having a role beyond the strict confines of natural justice.

^{page 254 note 93} Hlophe, op. cit., n.5, supra.

^{page 254 note 94} Ex p. Kahn [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337Google Scholar (C.A.) and ex p. Ruddock [1987] 2 All E.R. 518Google Scholar.

^{page 254 note 95} [1972] 2 Q.B. 299.

^{page 254 note 96} [1983] 2 A.C. 629 (P.C.). There are in fact other cases where there have been suggestions of substantive protection in the context of “legitimate expectations.” A good example of this (prior to ex p. Kahn discussed below) is to be found in Breen v. A.E.U. There Lord Denning analysed Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] A.C. 997Google Scholar in terms of “legitimate expectations.” He said: “The dairy farmers had no right to have their complaint referred to a committee of investigation, but they had a legitimate expectation that it would be. ” Plainly the farmers did not expect a hearing, they expected that the Minister would order an investigation. A hearing would be of no avail (indeed, the Minister seems to have listened to what they had to say); they wanted their expectation fulfilled.

^{page 255 note 97} See, for example, Lord Denning's judgment at 307–308.

^{page 255 note 98} Ibid., at 308. Immediately, thereafter, Denning, Lord refers to Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 K.B. 227Google Scholar and Lever Finance Ltd. v. Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 QB. 222Google Scholar. In these two cases Lord Denning sought to hold public bodies estopped from departing from their prior representations.

^{page 255 note 99} A reminder note: substantive and procedural protection need not be in conflict with each other or with the balancing approach of Vertrauenschutz. See, for example, in Breen [1971] 2 Q.B. 175Google Scholar where Lord Denning says (at 191F) that Breen “had been elected to this office by democratic process … [and] had a legitimate expectation that he would be approved by the district committee, unless there were good reasons against him.” The suggestion that is here made isthat the substantive protection means that if an “overriding public interest” is not demonstrated then the decision must be in favour of the claimant.

^{page 256 note 1} [1972] 2 Q.B. 299.

^{page 256 note 2} [1976] I.C.R. 170.

^{page 256 note 3} This dictum was approved by Templeman, Lord (speaking for a unanimous House of Lords) in Preston v. I.R.C. [1985] 1 A.C. 835 (H.L.) at 865Google Scholar.

^{page 256 note 4} [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337 (C.A.).

^{page 256 note 5} Ibid., at 1350.

^{page 256 note 6} Or in German terms where der Grundsalz der Geselzmãssigkeit der Verwaltung is outweighed by der Grundsalz der Rechlssicherheit und des Rechtsfriedens.

^{page 257 note 7} [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1186 at 1195.

^{page 257 note 8} These exceptions, discussed fully in Western Fish Products Ltd. v. Penwith D.C. [1981] 2 All E.R. 204Google Scholar, were, first, that if a planning authority delegates to its officers powers to determine specific questions decisions which those offices make cannot be revoked. This exception is based upon Lever (Finance) Ltd. v. Westminster Corporation [1971] 1 Q.B. 222Google Scholar. Secondly, if a planning authority waives a procedural requirement relating to the exercise of its statutory powers, it will usually be estopped from relying upon lack of formality. This exception is based upon Wells v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1000Google Scholar.

^{page 257 note 9} The same principle obviously applies to other authorities too.

^{page 257 note 10} See Craig, P. P., “Representations by Public Bodies” (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 398Google Scholar. At 420 the learned author says “the basis of the jurisdictional principle [viz., that estoppel does not operate] is scrutinised it is found to be wanting. The objective of preventing expansion of power by public officials is obviously correct, but the operation of the doctrine in practice is misdirected. In the rare cases of intentional extension of power it strikes at the wrong person, the innocent representee, rather than the public official. In the more common case of careless, or inadvertent, extension of power any deterrent effect upon the public officer will be minimal. The unspoken hypothesis must be that whenever, in fact, the powers of the body are extended any hardship to the representee must be outweighed by the harm to the public, who are the beneficiaries of the ultra vires principle, were estoppel to operate.”

^{page 257 note 11} [1981] 2 All E.R. 204.

^{page 258 note 12} [1987] 2 All E.R. 518.

^{page 258 note 13} [1976] I.C.R. 170.

^{page 258 note 14} See also Denning, Lord in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade [1977] Q.B. 643 at 660Google Scholar, where he says that the Crown can “be estopped when it is not properly exercising its powers, but is misusing them; and it docs misuse them if it exercises them in circumstances which work injustice to the individual without any countervailing benefit to the public.”

^{page 258 note 15} Op. cit., n.45, supra at 103.

^{page 258 note 16} [1983] 2 A.C. 237(H.L.).

^{page 259 note 17} Ibid., at 275.

^{page 259 note 18} See Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] A.C. 617Google Scholar.

^{page 259 note 19} [1982] A.C. 617.

^{page 259 note 20} It is difficult to see how legitimate expectations were relevant in C.C.S.U. v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374Google Scholar (H.L.) if they were limited to the law of standing.

^{page 259 note 21} See Wade, H. W. R. (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 199Google Scholar, (1985) 101 L.Q.R. 180 for accounts of the case and its significance.

^{page 259 note 22} [1983] 2 A.C. 237 (H.L.).

^{page 260 note 23} See Forsyth, C. F. [1985] C.L.J. 415Google Scholar.

^{page 260 note 24} Which is reinforced by the treatment of legitimate expectation in Lord Diplock's dictum cited above.

^{page 260 note 25} This example is based upon Cocks v. Thanet District Council [1983] 2 A.C. 282Google Scholar. See Wade, H. W. R., (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 199Google Scholar.

^{page 260 note 26} And O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237Google Scholar (H.L.) has found few defenders.

^{page 260 note 27} [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1337 (C.A.). The same point was made clear in H.T.V. v. Price Commission [1976] I.C.R. 170Google Scholar and ex p. Ruddock [1987] 2 All E.R. 518Google Scholar.