¹ See [1934] W. N. 830.

² E.g. Pinnel's Case (1602) 5 Co. Rep. 117.

³ (1809) 2 Camp. 317.

⁴ See also Deacon v. Gridley (1854) 15 C. B. 295.

⁵ Principles of Contract, 10th ed. p. 181.

⁶ Different considerations, which are not discussed in the present article,-arise when the legal bond has been imposed extra-contractually.

⁷ Cf. Williston, ‘Successive Promises of the Same Performance’ (1894) 8 Harvard Law Beview 27, and Langdell, ‘Mutual Promises as a Consideration for Each Other’ (1901) 14 Harvard Law Review 496.

⁸ Compare, for example, Salmond & Winfield, Law of Contracts, p. 85, with Anson, Law of Contract, 17th ed. pp. 103 et seq.

⁹ Certain readings of these cases, which are discussed infra, suggest that they were actually cases of promise for promise: but the consideration pleaded in each case was performance.

¹⁰ Currie v. Misa (1875) L. R. 10 Ex. at p. 162.

¹¹ (1600) Cro. Eliz. 755, pi. 20. Sir Wm. Holdsworth (H. E. L. vol. viii, p. 18) deals with this case solely as authority for the principle that natural love and affection does not constitute good consideration. But the Court laid down in the words quoted a very definite statement of its view of the law. I do not agree with Sir William (ibid, at p. 23) that Sherwood v. Woodward (1600) Cro. Eliz. 700, is an authority on this point. The plaintiff in that case undertook to do what he was not previously under an obligation to do: viz. actually to deliver the cheeses and, it appears, at another place.

¹² (1616) 3 Bulst. 162.

¹³ This case was decided many years before the equitable doctrine of contribution between co-sureties was established.

¹⁴ (1631) 1 Vin. Abr. 312, pl. 36.

¹⁵ (1633) 1 Vin. Abr. 310, pl. 31

¹⁶ (1860) 9 C. B. (N.S.) 159; 30 L. J. C. P. 145; 7 Jur. (N.S.) 311; 3 L. T. 628; 9 W. E. 163. The judgments are reported equally well in all the Reports, but the Jurist reports the arguments better than the others.

¹⁷ (1809) 2 Camp. 817.

¹⁸ (1842) 3 Man. & G. 842.

¹⁹ 9 C. B. (N.s.) at p. 175.

²⁰ (1840) 8 Dowl. P. C. 604.

²¹ (1744) Willis 482.

²² (1861) 6 H. & N. 295; 30 L. J. Ex. 225; 9 W. B. 280; 3 L. T. 753.

²³ (1860) 9 C. B. (N.S.) 159.

²⁴ This statement appears in the Law Times report only.

²⁵ Cf. Corbin, ‘Does a Pre-existing Duty defeat Consideration?’ (1918) 27 Yale Law Journ. 362. Salmond & Winfield, op. cit. p. 85.

²⁶ These words. appear in the Law Times report.only.

²⁷ (1866) 14 L. T. 433.

²⁸ (1860) 9 C. B. (N.S.) 159.

²⁹ In Skeete v. Silberberg (1895) 11 T. L. R. 491, there was ample consideration in that the plaintiff, in reliance on the defendant's promise, married sooner than she had intended to. Moreover, it was one of the terms on which payment was to be made by the defendant that the marriage should take place within three months.

³⁰ (1895) 163 Mass. 433.

³¹ Ibid, at p. 435.

³² (1917 N. Y.) 117 N. E. 807.

³³ Ibid, at p. 809.

³⁴ (1918) 27 Yale Law Journal 362.

³⁵ Compare, American Law Institute, ‘Restatement of Contracts’ (1932) 84(d).

³⁶ Op. cit. pp. 183 et seq.

³⁷ (1616) 3 Buls. 162.

³⁸ (1860) 9 C. B. (N.S.) 159.

³⁹ (1861) 6 H. & N. 295.

⁴⁰ See p. 207, supra.

⁴¹ E.g. Anson, op. cit. p. 105; Williston, loc. Cit. at p. 35.

⁴² Op. cit. p. 106.

⁴³ 9 C. B. (N.S.) at p. 170.

⁴⁴ Op. cit. vol. viii, pp. 40—41

⁴⁵ Ibid. pp. 23—24, 40—41.

⁴⁶ (1616). 3 Bulst. 162.

⁴⁷ See 3 Bulst. at p. 163: ‘The plaintiff [in the writ of error] said: pay you all the debt and I will pay you the moiety of this again and which he paid accordingly and eo made a request to have repayment.’ Cf. also Coke, C.J., at p. 164: ‘If a man pays unto him.£500 … this is a good and sufficient consideration.’

⁴⁸ (1860) 9 C. B. (N.S.) 159.

⁴⁹ Op. cit. p. 199, n. {q). On the facts of the case as reported, the marriage could hardly have taken place at once for obviously the uncle had an opportunity of revoking his offer. See 9 C. B. (N.S.) at p. 173.

⁵⁰ (1895) 11 T. L. R. 491.

⁵¹ (1861) 6 H. & N. 295.

⁵² If the learned author's reading of Sherwood v. Woodward (1600) Cro. Eliz. 700 ia correct, then that case is undoubtedly an authority for the proposition stated by him. But for the reasons given in note 11, I do not agree with his reading.

⁵³ Op. cit. p. 85.

⁵⁴ This is the alleged argument in a circle to which Williston (loc. cit.) objected.

⁵⁵ Principles of the Law of Contracts, 8th ed. p. 464.

⁵⁶ (1837) 7 L. J. Q. B. 104.

⁵⁷ See (1906) 22 L. Q. R. 323.

⁵⁸ Op. cit. p. 314.

⁵⁹ ‘Successive Promises of the Same Performance’ (1894) 8 Harvard Law Rev. 27.

⁶⁰ ‘Consideration in Bilateral Contracts’ (1914) 27 Harvard Law Rev. 472.

⁶¹ Professor Williston's arguments based on what was not said accord Strangely with his statement earlier in the article that to seek for another basis to support a decision, when the ground on which the Court rested its decision is not shown to be inadequate, is to treat the rulings of the Courts’ as the utterings of Balaam's ass, absolutely true, but not presupposing any conscious intelligence in the creatures from which they proceed,’ a quotation from Professor Gray in 7 Harvard Law Rev. 406. It is often difficult enough to appreciate the meaning of the utterings, but to go further and seek support-from what has not been said, is hardly to strengthen an argument.

⁶² (1914) 27 Harvard Law Rev. 503.

⁶³ ‘Two Theories of Consideration’ (1899) 12 Harvard Law Rev. 515; 18 ibid. 29.

⁶⁴ (1895) 163 Mass. 438.

⁶⁵ (1918) 27 Yale Law Journal 362, ‘Pre-existing Duty as Consideration’. Reference may also be made to Langdell, ‘Mutual Promises as a Consideration for Each Other’, (1901) 14 Harvard Law Rev. 496, and Morgan, ‘Benefit to the Promisor as Consideration for a Second Promise for the Same Act’ (1917) 1 Minnesota LAW Rev. 383.

⁶⁶ (1917, N. Y.) 117 N. E. 807.

⁶⁷ (1616) 3 Buls. 162.

⁶⁸ For the ‘state of the polls’ in 1904, see 20 L. Q. R. 9. To the ‘ayes’ there must now be added Professor Corbin; and Professor Williston's vote must be treated as invalid.

⁶⁹ (1860) 9 C. B. (N.S.) 159.

⁷⁰ (1861) 6 H. & N. 295.

⁷¹ (1866) 14 L. T. 433.

⁷² By Lord Dunedin in Dunlop v. Selfridge [1915] A. C. 847, at p. 855.