¹ For a recent survey see Campbell and Wiles, “The Study of Law in Society in Britain” (1976) 10 Law & Soc. Rev. 547.

² e.g., Hughes-Party, “Economic Theories in English Case Law” (1931) 47 L.Q.R. 183; Swann et al., Legislation Regulating Industry (1975).Google Scholar

³ e.g., Peacock (ed.), Income Redistribution and Social Policy (1954)Google Scholar; Titmuss, Income Redistribution and Social Change (1962); Culyer, The Economics of Social Policy (1971).

⁴ The one important area where the influence has been felt is that of accident and personal injury law: see, e.g., Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law (2nd ed.), Chap. 24; Phillips, “Economic Deterrence and the Prevention of Industrial Accidents” (1976) 5 I.L.J. 148; Phillips and Hawkins, “Some Economic Aspects of the Settlements Process: A Study of Personal Injury Claims” (1976) 39 M.L.R. 497.

⁵ Williams, “Collaboration between Economists and Lawyers in Policy Research,” Paper delivered at the Ford Foundation Workshop on Law and the Social Sciences 1973. The whole paper illuminates the relationship between the two disciplines.

⁶ The theory of efficiency is described in the standard economics tests. For a modern critical survey see, especially, Rowley and Peacock, Welfare Economics (1975), Part I.

⁷ Cf. Symposium on “Products Liability: Economic Analysis and the Law” (1971) 38 U.Chi.L.R. 8. See also Goldberg v. Kollsman Instruments Corp., 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963), for a judicial discussion of the problem.

⁸ Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970).

⁹ For an account of the law in this area see Jolowicz, “The Protection of the Consumer and Purchaser of Goods under English Law” (1969) 32 M.L.R. 1 and the Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection, Cmnd. 1781, (1962), para. 417. In the U.S.A., there have been considerable developments, a clear account of which is provided in Pasley, “The Protection of the Purchaser and Consumer under the Law of the U.S.A.” (1969) 32 M.L.R. 241.

¹⁰ Froom v. Butcher [1976]Google Scholar Q.B. 286.

¹¹ Housing Act 1961, ss. 32–33 and Defective Premises Act 1972, s. 4.

¹² For historical accounts see Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty” (1927) 13 Cornell L.R. 8, and Philbrick, “Changing Concepts of Property in Law” (1938) 86 U.Pa.L.R. 691.

¹³ See infra p. 309. The principle and its theoretical foundations are analysed in depth in Michelman, “Property, Utility and Fairness: Limits on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law” (1967) 80 Harv.L.R. 1165.

¹⁴ Cf. Atiyah, op. cit., supra note 4, Chap. 24, criticising Calabresi, op. cit., supra note 8. See also Tune, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. XI, Chap. 1 and Horn, “Zur ökonomischen Rationalität des Privatrechts” (1976) 176 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 307.

¹⁵ Atiyah, op. cit., supra, note 4, pp. 456–464.

¹⁶ Horn, supra, note 14, pp. 332–333; Michelman, supra, note 13; Fletcher, “Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory” (1972) 85 Harv.L.R. 537; Polinsky, “Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of the Law” (1974) 87 Harv.L.R. 1655; Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), esp. pp. 66–75 and 157–175.

¹⁷ For discussions of the implications of the alternative instruments see Kneese and Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions (1968), Part III; Krier, Environmental Law and Policy (1971), Chap. 3; Freeman, Haveman and Kneese, The Economics of Environmental Policy (1973), Chaps. 4–5; Thompson, The Economics of Environmental Protection (1973), Chaps. 5–6; Pearce, Environmental Economics (1976), Chap. 5; Hagevik, “Legislating for Air Quality Management: Reducing Theory to Practice” (1968) 33 Law & Contemp.Prob. 369; Walde, “Umweltschutz und Recht” (1974) 99 Archiv für öffentlichen Rechts 585; Lutz, “Environmental Management Laws” (1976) 24 Am.J.Comp.L. 447.

¹⁸ For a comparative survey of the private law actions for environmental harm in England, France and Germany see Lang “Grundfragen des privatrechtlichen Immissionschutzes in rechtvergleichender Sicht” (1974) 174 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 381.

¹⁹ The application of these torts to a pollution problem was briefly described in our article “The Role of the Private Law in the Protection of the Pollution Victim” (1976)Google Scholar 40 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 449. See also Juergensmeyer “Common Law Remedies and Protection of the Environment” (1971) 6 U.B.C. Law R. 215 and Elder, “Environmental Protection through the Common Law” (1973) 12 W.Ont.L.R. 107.

²⁰ In 1273 an Act was passed by Edward I to prohibit the use of coal as being detrimental to human health. See Chas & Feldman, “Tears for John Doe” (1954) 27 S.Calif.L.R. 349.

²¹ For an account of the emergence of legislation designed to safeguard health from the increasing pollution in the mid-nineteenth century see Brenner, “Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution” (1974) 3 J. Legal Studies 403, 424–431. He cites Nuisances Removal Act 1846 as the first statute with national scope.

²² Cf. Alkali Act 1863; Public Health Act 1875; Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876.

²³ Cf. Philbrick, supra, note 12. For an account of the modern use of consensual instruments see Ellickson, “Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Control” (1972) 40 U.Chi.L.R. 681, 711–718.

²⁴ Ellickson, ibid., andmore generally, Simpson, An Introduction to the History of Land Law (1961), pp. 109–111, 238–243.

²⁵ Newark, “The Boundaries of the Law of Nuisance” (1949) 65 L.Q.R. 480. For the medieval development of the action see Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law (1949), Chaps. 1, 5 and for the nineteenth century, Brenner, supra, note 21.

²⁶ Cf. Salmond, Law of Torts 16th ed., pp. 51–52.

²⁷ Ellickson, supra, note 23, pp. 725–728.

²⁸ Cf. Report of the Committee on Safety and Health at Work (“Robens Report”) Cmnd. 5034 (1972), and the resulting Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

²⁹ In 1970 a standing Royal Commission was appointed to “advise on matters, both national and international, concerning the pollution of the environment.” Cf. its First Report, Cmnd. 4585 (1971). On an international level see Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment (1972) Internat. Legal Mat. 1416, and for European developments. Booth and Green, “The European Community Environmental Programme and United Kingdom Law” (1976) 1 Eur.L.R. 444. For a general account of the emergence of concern for the environment see Gunningham, Pollution, Social Interest and the Law (1974).

³⁰ First Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, supra, note 29, para. 12.

³¹ For texts on the economics of pollution control see: Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (1968); Kneese and Bower, op. cit., supra, note 17; Bohm and Kneese (ed.), The Economics of the Environment (1971); Dorfman and Dorfman (ed.), Economics of the Environment (1971); Victor, Economics of Pollution (1972); Freeman, Haveman and Kneese, op. cit, supra, note 17; Thompson, op. cit., supra, note 17; Kohn, Air Pollution Control (1975); Walters, Noise and Prices (1975); Pearce, op. cit., supra, note 17.

³² Kneese and Bower, op. cit., supra, note 17, Chap. 5; Victor, op. cit., supra, note 31, pp. 17–23; Freeman, Haveman and Kneese, op. cit., supra, note 17, Chap. 4; Culyer, op. cit., supra, note 3, pp. 25–41.

³³ For an extended analysis of the “polluter-pay principle” see Rehbinder, Politische und Rechtliche Probleme des Verursacherprinzips (1973), and for its general political acceptance, Lutz, supra, note 17, pp. 473–477.

³⁴ Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed.

³⁵ “The power of the courts to issue an injunction for nuisance has proved itself to be the best method so far devised of securing the cleanliness of our rivers,” per Denning, L.J., Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Assoc. v. British Celanese Ltd. [1953] 1 Ch. 149, 192.Google Scholar For other advocates see Katz, “The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Development” (1969) 38 U.Cin.L.R. 587; McLaren, “The Common Law Nuisance Action and the Environmental Battle” (1972) 10 Osg. Hall L.J. 505; Juergensmeyer, supra, note 19; Elder, supra, note 19.

³⁶ “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J. Law & Econ. 1.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 2

³⁸ “Transaction costs” are the total costs incurred in the processes of bargaining, negotiating and litigating. Coase does not ignore them. At pp. 15–19 he recognises that they may be sufficient to outweigh the anticipated benefits of the transaction. In such circumstances, therefore, the initial location is important.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴⁰ An Economic Analysis of the Law (1972).Google Scholar Two periodicals, both based in Chicago, contain many expositions of this form of analysis: Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Legal Studies. In a recent article, Posner has described the history of the movement, reformulated its objectives, and defended it against its critics: “The Economic Approach to Law” (1975) 53 Tex.L.R. 757.

⁴¹ “The Economics of Water Pollution Control: An Application of Posner's Law?” (1976) 3 B.Jo. Law & Soc. 76 was contributed by an economist, D. J. Storey. The Germans appear to have been more receptive: see Horn, supra, note 14 and Wälde, supra, note 17. For a more recent British appraisal see now Cranston, “Creeping Economism” (1977) B.Jo. Law & Soc. 103.

⁴² See particularly: Symposium on Coase Theorem in (1973) 13 Nat.Res.J. 507 and (1974) 14, ibid. 1; Demnetz, “When does the Rule of Liability Matter?” (1972) 1 J.Leg. Studies 13; Ellickson, supra, note 23; Michelman, “Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs” (1971) 80 Yale L.J. 647; Regan, “The Problem of Social Costs Revisited” (1972) 15 J. Law & Econ. 427; Johnson, “Meade, Bees and Externalities” (1973) 16 ibid. 35; Freeman, “Give and Take: Distributing Local Environmental Control Through Land-Use Regulation” (1976) 60 Minn.L.R. 883.

⁴³ “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability—One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv.L.R. 1089. The model is based in part on the analysis of Michelman, supra, note 42.

⁴⁴ A useful review of the criticisms is to be found in Dick, “The Voluntary Approach to Externality Problems: A Survey of the Critics” (1976) 2 J.Environ. Economics and Management 185.

⁴⁵ Infra, pp. 314–317.

⁴⁶ Michelman, supra, note 42, pp. 673–674; Wälde, supra, note 17, pp. 610–612; Ellickson, supra, note 23, pp. 743–748; Note “The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions” (1969) 21 Stan.L.R. 383.

⁴⁷ Michelman, supra, note 42, pp. 673–674; Wälde, supra, note 17, pp. 606–608; Note supra, note 46; Ellickson, supra, note 23, pp. 725–742.

⁴⁸ Ellickson, supra, note 23, p. 725.

⁴⁹ Michelman, supra, note 42, pp. 649–658; Ellickson, supra, note 23, p. 725.

⁵⁰ See, generally, Thompson, “Injunction Negotiations—an Economic, Moral and Legal Analysis” (1975) 27 Stan.L.R. 1563.

⁵¹ The situation which Michelman, supra, note 42, p. 671, describes as a “holdout.” This is the reverse of a “free–loader” which may occur when a number of parties are affected but one benefits from the transaction without having contributed. Calabresi and Melamed discuss the impact of both hold–outs and free–loaders, supra, note 43, pp. 1107 and 1119. See also Thompson, supra, note 50, p. 1568.

⁵² Michelman, supra, note 42, p. 670; Calabresi and Melamed, supra, note 43, pp. 1115–1116.

⁵³ Calabresi and Melamed, supra, note 43, p. 1116.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 1120.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 1121.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 1093–1094; Posner, op. cit., supra, note 40, pp. 4–8.

⁵⁷ Cf. Ellickson, supra, note 23, pp. 719–761, and Freeman, supra, note 42.

⁵⁸ Supra, pp. 292–293.

⁵⁹ Clerk and Lindsell, Torts, 14th ed. (1975), para. 1391.

⁶⁰ Ibid., paras, 1393 and 1403. See also Newark, supra, note 25.

⁶¹ Cf. Salmond, op. cit., supra, note 26, p. 53; Friedmann “Incidence of Liability in Nuisance” (1947) 63 L.Q.R. 59; Juergensmeyer, supra, note 19.

⁶² The point is made by implication, in Jolowicz “Law of Tort and Non–Physical Loss” (1972) 12 J.S.P.T.L. 91. See also Ehrlich and Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking” (1974) 3 J.Leg. Studies 257.

⁶³ Green, Judge and Jury (1930), Chaps. 3–4; Atiyah, op. cit., supra, note 4, pp. 64–68.

⁶⁴ Newark, “Non–Natural User and Rylands v. Fletcher” (1961) 24 M.L.R. 557.

⁶⁵ West, “Nuisance or Rylands v. Fletcher” (1966) 30 Conv. 95.

⁶⁶ [1907] 2 K.B. 141.

⁶⁷ Clerk and Lindsell, op. cit., supra, note 59, para. 1455; Fleming, Law of Torts, 4th ed. (1971), pp. 344–345.

⁶⁸ Note, “Aesthetic Nuisances: An Emerging Cause of Action” (1970) 45 N.Y.U.L.R. 1075; Silverstone, “Visual Pollution: unaesthetic use of land as a nuisance” (1974) 12 Alberta L.R. 542.

⁶⁹ A recent example is Coventry C.C. v. Cartwright [1975] 1 W.L.R. 845Google Scholar, where Lord Widgery C.J. summarily dismissed the Coventry Justices' implication that visual impact could constitute a nuisance. See also Dalton v. Angus (1881) 6 App.Cas. 740.

⁷⁰ Aldred's case (1610) 9 Co.Rep. 57b, at 58b.

⁷¹ Bridlington Relay Ltd. v. Yorkshire Electricity Board [1965]Google Scholar Ch. 436.

⁷² Ellickson, supra, note 23, pp. 733–735.

⁷³ Silverstone, supra, note 68, p. 544; Noel, “Unattractive Sights as Nuisance” (1939) 25 Cornell L.Q. 1, 2.

⁷⁴ Cf. Bigham, Law and Administration Relating to Protection of the Environment (1973), Chap. 12.

⁷⁵ Ellickson, supra, note 23, pp. 734–735; and see Morris v. Dominion Foundries and Steel [1947] 2 D.L.R. 840, 844.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Clerk and Lindsell, op. cit., note 59, paras. 1404–1405; Ellickson, supra, note 23, p. 737.

⁷⁷ “Every riparian proprietor is entitled to the water of his stream, in its natural flow, without sensible diminution or increase and without sensible alteration in its character or quality,” per Lord MacNaghten, Young v. Bankier Distillery [1893] A.C. 691, 698. See, generally, Elder, supra, note 19, pp. 127–142, and Storey, supra, note 41.

⁷⁸ See Halsey v. Esso Petroleum [1961] 2 All E.R. 145Google Scholar for an example of “damage” resulting from fumes, smell and noise. The distinction between material and amenity damage is discussed under (iv) infra. See also Ellickson, supra, note 23, pp. 737–738.

⁷⁹ See infra, pp. 315–316.

⁸⁰ Clerk and Lindsell, op. cit., supra, note 59, para. 1395. For judicial discussion see e.g., Rushmer v. Polsue Alfieri [1906] 1 Ch. 234Google Scholar and Sturges v. Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852. See also Ellickson, supra, note 23, pp. 728–733.

⁸¹ For discussion of these issues see Friedmann, supra, note 61; Eekelaar, “Nuisance and Strict Liability” (1973) 8 Ir.Jur. (n.s.) 191; Juergensmeyer, supra, note 19.

⁸² On problems of assessing the costs of pollution see Burrows, “Nuisance: the Law and Economics” (1970) Lloyds Bank Review 36. See also Michelman, supra, note 42, pp. 1193–1196.

⁸³ (1865) 11 H.L.C. 642.

⁸⁴ Clerk and Lindsell, op. cit., supra, note 59, para. 1397. See also McAuslan, Land, Law and Planning (1975), esp. pp. 48–51; Comment “The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air Pollution” (1968) 10 Ariz.L.R. 107; McLaren, supra, note 35, pp. 533–536; Freeman, supra, note 42, pp. 923–924.

⁸⁵ Per Pollock C. B., Bamford v. Turnley (1862) 3 B. & S. 66, 79.

⁸⁶ [1913] 1 Ch. 269. This case is quoted by Coase, supra, note 36, pp. 21–22 as an illustration of the court's understanding (albeit inexplicit) of the reciprocal nature of the problem.

⁸⁷ See statement of facts [1913] 1 Ch. 269, 270.

⁸⁸ Per Swinfen Eady J., ibid., p. 271.

⁸⁹ [1906] 1 Ch. 234.

⁹⁰ Freeman, supra, note 42, pp. 893–899, however argues that residential amenities should generally outweigh efficiency considerations.

⁹¹ [1938] Ch. 1. This case is quoted extensively by Coase, supra, note 36, pp. 22–23. He draws attention to the economic factors considered by the court in their determination of what was “reasonable.”

⁹² [1938] Ch. 1, 10, per Sir Wilfrid Greene M.R.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 6.

⁹⁴ (1865) 11 H.L.C. 642, 651. For a full discussion of the St. Helens case see Brenner, supra, note 21. See also McAuslan, op. cit., supra, note 84, pp. 71–73; cf. Hammersmith Railway v. Brand (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 171 where it was held that vibration, noise and smoke did depreciate the selling value of land.

⁹⁵ Cf. Michelman, supra, note 13, p. 1202.

⁹⁶ The point made by Lord Wensleydale in St. Helens case, supra, note 94, p. 653. As Brenner has discovered (supra, note 21, pp. 415–420) the judicial view is hardly compatible with that of the House of Lords Select Committee on Noxious Vapours (Parl. Papers 1862, 14) which two years previously had investigated the town of St. Helens.

⁹⁷ Cf. supra, p. 288.

⁹⁸ Supra, p. 288.

⁹⁹ Infra, pp. 315–316.

¹ Clerk and Lindsell, op. cit., supra, note 59, paras. 1411, 1418. See also Dias, “Trouble on Oiled Waters” [1967] C.L.J. 62 and Friedmann, supra, note 61.

² Brenner, supra, note 21, gives this as one of the reasons for legislative intervention in the mid-nineteenth century. See also infra, note 78, p. 315.

³ Clark v. Newman (1847) 1 Ex. 131.

⁴ Clerk and Lindsell, op. cit., supra, note 59, paras. 203–208.

⁵ Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law (1959) Chap. 5.

⁶ Clerk and Lindsell, op. cit., supra, note 59, para. 317 and the cases there cited.

⁷ Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Assoc. v. British Celanese [1952] 1 All E.R. 1326Google Scholar, affirmed on other grounds [1953] Ch. 149.

⁸ Clerk and Lindsell, op. cit., supra, note 59, para. 1469. See also Jones v. Pritchard [1908] 1 Ch. 630.Google Scholar

⁹ Clerk and Lindsell, loc. cit. See Hulley v. Silversprings Bleaching Co. [1922] 2 Ch. 268.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Clerk and Lindsell, loc. cit.

¹¹ Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Ltd. [1961] 2 All E.R. 145, 154–155.Google Scholar

¹² Infra, p. 320.

¹³ Cf. Attwood, “An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts” (1968) 21 Stan. L.R. 293; Freeman, supra, note 41, pp. 899–903.

¹⁴ (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852.

¹⁵ Per Thesiger L.J., ibid., p. 865.

¹⁶ Supra, note 36, pp. 8–13.

¹⁷ In the very recent decision of Miller v. Jackson and Another [1977] 3 W.L.R. 20Google Scholar, the Court of Appeal has resurrected the possibility of “coming to a nuisance” as a defence, at least to a claim for an injunction. The majority appears not to have approved of the decision in Sturges v. Bridgman, Lord Denning M.R. explicitly referring to the “different approach” of nineteenth-century judges. Damages for past and future losses were however granted and so the importance of the case is in relation to the question of remedy rather than liability, on which see infra, pp. 305–314.

¹⁸ Though a fixed period does have the advantage of certainty: cf. infra, pp. 315–316.

¹⁹ Clerk and Lindsell. op. cit., supra, note 59, para. 1396. See also Robinson v. Kilvert (1889) 41 Ch.D. 88 and Heath v. Brighton (Mayor of) (1908) 98 L.T. 718.Google Scholar

²⁰ Cf. Ellickson, supra, note 23, pp. 751–757.

²¹ Coase, supra, note 36, pp. 2–6; Calabresi and Melamed, supra, note 43, p. 1102; Posner, op. cit., supra, n. 40, pp. 16–17.

²² Ellickson, supra, note 23, p. 725.

²³ Clerk and Lindsell, op. cit, supra, note 59, para. 1471. See also Geddis v. Proprietors of Bann Reservoir (1878) 3 App.Cas. 430. Even in the absence of express statutory authority to create a nuisance such authority may be inferred if nuisance must inevitably result from the performance of the statutory duty: London & Brighton Ry. Co. v. Truman (1885) 11 App.Cas. 45.

²⁴ Cross, Statutory Interpretation (1976), pp. 26, 28, 31, 145.

²⁵ See, e.g., Smeaton v. Ilford Corp. [1954] Ch. 450 where Upjohn J. refused to hold the local authority liable for the overflow of sewage on to the plaintiff's property.

²⁶ Infra, p. 311.

²⁷ McGregor, Damages, 13th ed. (1972), paras. 276–277.

²⁸ Tunnicliffe v. West Leigh Colliery [1906] 2 Ch. 22.Google Scholar

²⁹ Hole v. Chard Union [1894] 1 Ch. 293; Chapman, Morsons & Co. v. Guardians of Auckland Union (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 294.

³⁰ For a discussion of the deterrent effect of damages awards see Calabresi, op. cit., supra, note 8, p. 285, Michelman. supra, note 43, pp. 652–658, and Atiyah, op. cit., supra, note 4, p. 284, Chap. 24.

³¹ See Kerr, Treatise on the Law and Practice of Injunctions, 6th ed. (1927), Lawson, Remedies of English Law (1972), pp. 211–226 and the standard textbooks on equity. For a comparative survey of the common and civil law systems see Kötz, “Vorbeugender Rechtsschutz im Zivilrecht” (1974) 174 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 145. For comments on the use of the injunction within the pollution field see: Comment, “Equity and the ECO-System: Can Injunctions Clean the Air?” (1970) 68 Mich.L.R. 1254; McLaren, supra, note 35; and Juergensmeyer, supra, note 19, p. 287.

³² Jolowicz, “Damages in Equity—A Study of Lord Cairns' Act” [1975] C.L.J. 224.

³³ Kerr, op. cit., supra, note 31, p. 306, Chap. 2 and Lawson, op. cit., supra, note 31, p. 306, at pp. 222–227.

³⁴ Allen, Law in the Making, 7th ed. (1964), pp. 415–421.

³⁵ 494 P. 2d 700 (1972), noted in (1973) 26 Vand.L.R. 193.

³⁶ Armstrong v. Sheppard and Short [1959] 2 Q.B. 384.Google Scholar

³⁷ Moss v. Christchurch R.D.C. [1925] 2 K.B. 750.Google Scholar

³⁸ e.g. Ellickson, supra, note 23, p. 288, at pp. 735–737.

³⁹ Pearce, op. cit., note 17, p. 287, at pp. 2–6; Freeman, Haveman and Kneese, op. cit., supra, note 17, p. 287, at pp. 73–76; Culyer, op. cit., supra, note 3, p. 284, at pp. 28–30.

⁴⁰ e.g., Ellickson, supra, note 23, p. 288.

⁴¹ Ogus, Law of Damages (1973), pp. 122–135 and on damage to land, pp. 162–165.

⁴² Darbishire v. Warren [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1067.Google Scholar

⁴³ O'Grady v. Westminster Scaffolding [1962] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Cf. Bone v. Seal [1975] 1 W.L.R. 797.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ [1953] Ch. 149, 181. See also Cozens-Hardy M.R. in Price's Patent Candle Co. v. L.C.C. [1908] 2 Ch. 526, 544, quoted infra, note 60.

⁴⁶ Per A. L. Smith L.J., Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. [1895] 1 Ch. 287, 322.

⁴⁷ Supra, note 45, p. 308, at pp. 180 (Evershed M.R.), 192 (Denning L.J.), 194 (Romer L.J.).

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 182.

⁴⁹ Morris v. Redland Bricks [1970]Google Scholar A.C. 652, 664.

⁵⁰ (1858) 4 K. & J. 528, 539–540.

⁵¹ Supra, note 46, p. 309.

⁵² Ibid., p. 316.

⁵³ [1977] 3 W.L.R. 20.

^53a Per Lord Denning M.R. at p. 30.

⁵⁴ McLaren, supra, note 35, p. 290, at pp. 552–556 and Comment, supra, note 31, p. 306.

⁵⁵ See, e.g., Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realty, 135 A. 2d 204 (1957).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ In Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Cooper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (1904)Google Scholar, an injunction was refused on the ground that the resulting loss to the community in terms of unemployment would have been unreasonable. See also the Canadian case Black v. Canadian Copper [1917] O.W.N. 243, per Middleton J., p. 244.

⁵⁷ 257 N.E. 2d 870 (1970). The case has met with severe criticism, e.g. (1970) 16 N.Y.L. Forum 666, (1970) 45 N.Y.U.L.R. 919, (1971) 43 U.Col.L.R. 225.

⁵⁸ Supra, p. 310.

⁵⁹ [1961] 2 All E.R. 145.

⁶⁰ See Price's Patent Candle Co. v. L.C.C. [1908] 2 Ch. 526 and Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Assoc. v. British Celanese [1953] Ch. 149, where suspended injunctions were granted against sewage authorities. “Considerations of public welfare may justify the suspension of an injunction upon terms, but they do not justify the denial of relief to the private person whose rights have been affected,” per Cozens-Hardy M.R., the Price case, p. 544. See also Manchester Corp. v. Farnworth [1930]Google Scholar A.C. 171 where a suspended injunction was granted against the corporation with reference to its operation of an electricity generating station.

⁶¹ Supra, p. 309.

⁶² [1895] 1 Ch. 287.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 300.

⁶⁴ Ibid., per Lindley L.J., p. 313.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 316.

⁶⁶ Supra, p. 309.

⁶⁷ [1918] A.C. 498n.

⁶⁸ Ibid., per Lord Sumner, pp. 499–500.

⁶⁹ Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Coal Co. (1877) 5 Ch.D. 769.

⁷⁰ Cf. Stollmeyer v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co. [1918Google Scholar ] A.C. 485, 497 and Stollmeyer v. Petroleum Development Co., ibid., 498n., 500.

⁷¹ Cf. Frost v. King Edward VII Welsh & Assoc. [1918] 2 Ch. 180Google Scholar and Reinhardt v. Mentasti (1889) 42 Ch.D. 685.

⁷² In Jones v. Llanrwst Urban District Council [1911] 1 Ch. 393Google Scholar, 411, it is clear that the plaintiff did not ask for damages.

⁷³ Cf. Mishan, “Pangloss on Pollution,” in Bohm and Kneese (eds.), op. cit., supra, note 31, p. 290, at p. 66; Leff, “Economic Analysis of Law—Some Realism about Nominalism” (1974) 60 Virg.L.R. 451; Horn, supra, note 14, p. 286, at pp. 314–315.

⁷⁴ Freeman, Haveman and Kneese, op. cit., supra, note 31, p. 290, Chap. 4; Johnson, supra, note 42, p. 292; Dales, op. cit., supra, note 31, p. 290, Chap. 4; Hamill, “The Process of Making Good Decisions About the Use of the Environment of Man” (1968) 8 Nat.Res.J. 279.

⁷⁵ Ogus and Richardson, supra, note 19, p. 287, at pp. 467–472.

⁷⁶ Calabresi and Melamed, supra, note 43, p. 292, at p. 119.

⁷⁷ Ibid. pp. 119–120.

⁷⁸ A problem recognised by the House of Lords Select Committee on Noxious Vapours 1862 (supra, note 96), which reported that nuisance actions were difficult “partly in consequence of the expense such actions occasion, partly from the fact that where several works are in immediate juxtaposition, the difficulty of tracing the damage to any one, or of apportioning it among several, is too great as to be all but insuperable.…” See also Ogus and Richardson, supra, note 19, p. 287, at p. 469.

⁷⁹ The system is not likely to be adopted in the U.K.; cf. Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [1975] 1 All E.R. 849.Google Scholar Another device used in the U.S.A. to circumvent the problem of a plurality of victims each suffering minor damage has been the class action. As regards federal actions, however, fundamental procedural difficulties have recently been encountered: see Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 94 S.Ct. 2140 (1974)Google Scholar, where the Supreme Court held that there was an obligation on the plaintiff to contact the estimated two million members of the class. More generally on class actions, see Krier, op. cit., supra, note 17, p. 287, at pp. 226–230; Note, supra, note 46, p. 292; Homburger, “Private Suits in the Public Interest in the U.S.A.” (1974) 23 Buff.L.R. 343; Note, “Managing the Large Class Actions” (1974) 87 Harv.L.R. 426. In the U.K. the closest analogy is the representative action but a combination of the Rules of the Supreme Court (Ords. 12 and 15) and common law principles has effectively restricted its potential by insisting on common relief: Smith v. Cardiff Corp. [1954] 1 Q.B. 210.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Legal aid applicants must satisfy the rigorous means test, and substantial contributions may be required. For current limits, see the Legal Aid (Financial Conditions) Regulations 1976, S.I. 1976 No. 1895. Each application is also scrutinised by a local committee who may dismiss it on the grounds that there is no probability that the action will succeed: Legal Aid Act 1974, s. 7 (5).

⁸¹ Generally the winner is awarded “costs” against the loser, but these are usually on the “party and party” basis which typically accounts for only two-thirds to three-quarters of actual legal fees and excludes all other disbursements: Rules of the Supreme Court, Ord. 62, r. 28 (2).

⁸² Epstein, “A Theory of Strict Liability” (1973) 2 J.Leg. Studies 151 and “Defences and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability” (1974) 3 ibid. 165, though Posner himself is sceptical: “Strict Liability, A Comment” (1973) 2 ibid. 205. An effort has been made to calculate the savings in judicial resources by substituting a strict liability on manufacturers of defective products in place of negligence: Steeg, Ver, “Strict Liability and Judicial Resources” (1974)Google Scholar 3 ibid. 217.

⁸³ Cf. Ogus and Richardson, supra, note 19, p. 287, at pp. 471–472, and Pearce, op. cit., supra, note 17, p. 287, at pp. 84–93. For a penetrating sociological analysis, see Gessner, “Soziale Voraussetzungen des Selbstschutzes gegen Umweltschäden” (1976) 40 Rabels Zeitschrift 430. Questionnaires sent to all Landgerichten and Oberlandgerichten revealed details of only 73 civil suits against polluters in 1970. The plaintiffs in only 47 of the cases were individuals, and of these only one was a tenant: 14 of the actions were brought by anglers' associations.

⁸⁴ The problem is fully documented in Winter, Das Vollzugdefizit im Wasserrecht (1975). See also Ellickson, supra, note 23, p. 288, at p. 725.

⁸⁵ Mill, Utilitarianism (Fontana edition, 1962), pp. 256–321; Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (1965), Chaps. 4–5; Rawls, op. cit., supra, note 16, p. 287, § 30.

⁸⁶ Rawls, ibid. §§ 27–28; Lyons, The Forms and Limitations of Utilitarianism (1965); Miller, Social Justice (1976), pp. 31–40.

⁸⁷ e.g. Allen, Aspects of Justice (1958); Hart, Concept of Law (1961), Chap. 8; Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (1963); Ginsberg, On Justice in Society (1965); Honoré, “Social Justice,” in Summers (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy (1968); Rawls, op. cit., supra, note 16, p. 287; Miller, op. cit., supra, note 86, p. 317; Eckhoff, Justice (1974).

⁸⁸ These issues are fully considered in Eckhoff, ibid., Part III.

⁸⁹ Atiyah, op. cit., supra, note 4, p. 284, at pp. 492–494; Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88 Harv.L.R. 1057, infra, p. 322.

⁹⁰ Op. cit., supra, note 16, p. 287, at p. 75.

⁹¹ Cunningham, op. cit., supra, note 29, p. 289.

⁹² Freeman, Haveman and Kneese, op. cit., supra, note 17, p. 287, at pp. 143–148.

⁹³ Rehbinder, supra, note 33, p. 290, Lutz, supra, note 17, p. 287; Baxter, “The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours” (1968) 21 Stan.L.R. 1, 39–43; Roberts, “The Right to a Decent Environment” (1970) 55 Cornell L.Q. 674. The U.K. Government is giving wide publicity to the view: see “Pollution, Nuisance or Nemesis,” a Report on the Control of Pollution (1972), paras. 47–50, and the Third Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Cmnd. 5054 (1972), para. 16.

⁹⁴ Lipsey, An Introduction to Positive Economics, 4th ed. (1975), Chap. 7.

⁹⁵ Cf. McAuslan, op. cit., supra, note 84, p. 297, at p. 73.

⁹⁶ [1965] Ch. 436.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 447.

⁹⁸ [1930] 1 Ch. 138. See also Miller v. Jackson and Another [1977] 3 W.L.R. 20Google Scholar, supra, p. 310.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 165.

¹ Ibid., p. 167.

² Supra, p. 289 and see Hart, op. cit., supra, note 87, p. 317, at pp. 159–161.

³ Ellickson, supra, note 23, p. 288, at pp. 758–761; Posner, op. cit., supra, note 40, p. 291, at pp. 20–21; Michelman, supra, note 13, p. 286, at pp. 1229–1234.

⁴ Supra, p. 297.

⁵ Supra, p. 301.

⁶ Supra, p. 303.

⁷ Cf. McAuslan, op. cit., supra, note 84, p. 297, at pp. 48–73.

⁸ Fletcher, supra, note 16, p. 287; Burrows, “Justice and Efficiency in Pollution Control: A Different View of the Cathedral” (unpublished).

⁹ Supra, p. 288.

¹⁰ Supra, p. 306.

¹¹ Rawls, op. cit., supra, p. 60.

¹² Ibid., pp. 75–80.

¹³ Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964).

¹⁴ Stein and Shand, Legal Values in Western Society (1974), pp. 89–90.

¹⁵ Supra, note 89, p. 318.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 1074–1078.

¹⁷ [1952] 1 All E.R. 1326, supra, note 7, p. 301.

¹⁸ Cf. supra, note 44, p. 292.

¹⁹ For surveys of existing legislation see Bigham, op. cit., supra, note 74, p. 296 and McLoughlin, Law and Practice Relating to Pollution Control in the United Kingdom (1976).

²⁰ In Japan there is a compensation fund for victims of environmentally harmful activities: Japan Environment Agency, Quality of the Environment in Japan (1972), pp. 110–113. The Dutch Air Pollution Act 1970, art. 64, established a similar fund for the victims of air pollution who are unable to obtain compensation elsewhere.

²¹ Linden, “Tort Law as Ombudsman” (1973) 51 Can. Bar Rev. 155. See also Sax, Defending the Environment: A Study of Citizen Action (1971), p. 115.

²² Although in theory any person may institute criminal proceedings in the case of regulatory offences, it is in practice undertaken by the relevant enforcement authority which alone may possess access to the necessary information and to the required powers of entry. In some instances the public may even be prohibited from bringing prosecutions without the consent of the Attorney-General: see, e.g., Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1961, s. 11 and Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971, s. 19 (1). The Control of Pollution Act 1974 will alter the position as regards rivers but at the time of writing is not fully in force.

²³ Linden, “Is Tort Relevant to the Automobile Accident Compensation Problem?” (1969) 47 Tex.L.R. 1012, 1021.