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Bonae Fidei Iudicia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

C. C. Turpin
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Extract

The purpose of this article is to discuss problems of the origin and of the structure of bonae fidei iudicia (formulae), and to consider some of the attempts that have been made to resolve these problems. This will necessitate inquiry into the origins of the formulary system of procedure itself. In the early history of Roman civil procedure there is much that remains uncertain or obscure, and the inquirer must often be content with solutions which, on the evidence, are no more than probable. Yet research continues to map out the terrain, and the map is gradually acquiring more reliability as well as more detail.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , November 1965 , pp. 260 - 270
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1965

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References

1 Usually ascribed to about 120 B.C., but there are arguments in favour of an earlier date. See Lévy-Bruhl, Recherches sur les Actions de la Loi, pp. 337–338, and Kaser, “Die Lex Aebutia,” Studi in Memoria di Emilio Albertario, 1, 27, at p. 50.

2 Cf. works cited by Monier, Manuel Elémentaire de Droit Romain, 1, 6th ed., p. 153, note 2.

3 Cf. D.1.2.2.28; and see Biscardi, JURA 2 (1951), pp. 295–296.

4 Cf. Horvat, “Osservazioni sulla ‘bona fides’ nel Diritto Romano Obbligatorio,” Studi in Onore di Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, 1, 423, and Kunkel, “Fides als Schöpferisches Element im Römischen Schuldrecht,” Festschrift Koschaker, 2, 1, at p. 12.

5 It is likely, though, that early proceedings between citizens and foreigners were not contentious but directed to the assessment of what was due on an undisputed transaction. In this case there would be not claim and denial, but a recital of the agreed facts and a request for assessment. See Arangio-Ruiz. Cours de Droit Romain (Les Actions), p. 35, note 1.

6 Cf. Gioffredi, “Ius, Lex, Praetor,” S.D.H.I., 13–14 (1947–48) 7, at pp. 114–116.

7 Kunkel, op. cit., note 4, supra; Kaser, Das Altrömische Ius, pp. 90–92, 261–262, 338; Frezza, “Ius Gentium,” RIDA 2 (1949) 259.

8 Cf. Kaser, Das Altrömische Ius, p. 293.

9 “Lie Formule con Demönstratio e la loro Origin.” Studi Economico-Giuridici Università di Cagliari 4, 2 (1912) 75, reprinted in Rariora, Storia e Litteratura 11 (1946) 25.

10 It is not indeed certain, though it is likely, that the arbitrium liti aestimandae took the form of the legis actio per iudicis postulationem. Cf. Arangio-Ruiz; Istituzioni di Diritto Romano, 14th ed., p. 117, note 2.

11 e.g., Frezza, op. cit., note 7, supra, at pp. 279–280; Kaser Römische Rechtsgeschichte, p. 118, Kunkel, op. cit., note 4, supra, at p. 8.

12 Cf. Wieacker, “Zum Drsprung der Bonae Fidei Iudicia,” ZSS 80 (1963) 1, at p. 12; Kaser, Das Altrömische Ius, p. 297.

13 Cf. Kaser, Das Altrömische Ius, pp. 296–298.

14 Op. cit., note 12, supra.

15 See Wieacker, op. cit., pp. 29–31; Kaser, Das Altrömische Ius, pp. 296–298.

16 German jurists distinguish between Verpflichtungsgrundlage and Ermessensmasstab.

17 See Kunkel, op. cit., note 4, supra, pp. 12–13; Horvat, op. cit., note 4, supra, p. 442; Kaser, Das Altrömische Ius, pp. 296–298.

18 Cf. Kaser, “Die Anfänge der Manumissio and das Fiduziarisch Gebundene Eigentum,” ZSS 61 (1941) 153 at pp. 182–184.

19 Cicero, De Officiis, 3.17.70.

20 The actio tutelae applied originally to tutela dativa, and was brought at the end of the guardianship for the rendering of an account of the administration. The earlier remedies applied to the older forms of tutela, and probably terminated the exercise of the guardianship. See Talamanca, Labeo 6 (1960), p. 282.

21 Kaser, Das Altrömische Ius, pp.292–294.

22 Cf. Philonenko, “‘Intentio’ dans les Formules ‘in Factum Conceptae,’” RIDA 3 (1949) 231.

23 Cf. the formula in bonum et aequum concepta. Wieacker, it is suggested, dismisses too lightly the significance of this point: op. cit., note 12, supra, p. 35 note 117. The oportere ex fide bona of the intentio embraced not only a dare but also a facere. The condemnation, however, was always to pay: dare. This seems to show that fides was once the foundation of the liability (it might be to give or to do something), and only secondarily the measure of the condemnation.

24 See on this development Horvat, op. cit., note 4, supra, and Frezza, op. cit., note 7, supra.

25 G.4.47.

26 See Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum, 3rd ed., p. 253; Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p. 513.

27 Lenel, op. cit., p. 255; Schwarz, “Die Konträrklagen,” ZSS 71 (1954) 111, at p. 206.

28 G.4.104.

29 Op. cit., note 1, supra.

30 It is not proposed to consider Kaser's arguments here. Although they are of varying weight, the case presented is a formidable one, and has won quite wide acceptance.

31 Magdelain, Les Actions Civiles, p. 54 et seq., assigns it to the early Principate. Cf. Pugliese, S.D.H.I. 20 (1954) 373, at pp. 381–382.

32 This is the answer to the criticisms of Koschaker, ZSS 34 (1913) 433. See Arangio-Ruiz, op.cit., note 10, supra, p. 122, note 1.

33 “Demonstratio”[ 1960]Google Scholar C.L.J. 81.

34 G.4.58.

35 G.4.60.

36 [1960] C.L.J. at pp. 85–86.

37 The existence of an actio in factum for negotiorum gestio is disputed by Magdelain, Le Consensualisme dans I'Edit du Prétur, pp. 181–195.

38 Koschaker, ZSS 41 (1920) 334, at p. 338.

39 Koschaker, op. cit.; Wlassak, “Praescriptio and Bedingter Prozess,” ZSS 33 (1912) 81, at pp. 87–98.

40 Wlassak, op. cit., p. 104, note 1.

41 Cf. the illuminating remarks of Daube, Forms of Roman Legislation, p. 35.