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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FOR “LIVING PEOPLE”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2009

Sian Elias
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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 68 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 47 - 66
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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2009

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References

1 D.G.T. Williams, “Justiciability and Discretionary Power” in M. Taggart (ed.), Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s (Auckland 1986) 103, 122.

2 W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (1867) in M. Taylor (ed.), Oxford World's Classic Edition (Oxford 2001).

3 Frankfurter, F., “The Task of Administrative Law” (1926) 75 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 614, 619.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Williams, D.G.T., “Bias, the Judges and the Separation of Powers” [2000] Public Law 45, 51.Google Scholar

5 D.G.T. Williams, above note 1, p. 122.

6 Constitution Act 1986, s. 15(1).

7 Official Information Act 1982, s. 23.

8 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

9 Supreme Court Act 2003, s. 3(2).

10 See discussion by the Justice and Electoral Committee in their Report on the Supreme Court Bill (16-2) (16 September 2003), 22–23.

11 See, for example, Lord Cooke, “The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law” in M. Taggart (ed.), above note 1, p. 1.

12 Davis, K.C., “The Future of Judge-Made Law in England: A Problem of Practical Jurisprudence” (1961) 61 Columbia Law Review 201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Ibid., p. 213.

14 W. Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (London 1980), 78.

15 [1951] A.C. 66.

16 [1928] 1 K.B. 411, 415. Lord Hewart, purportedly applying Lord Atkin in R v. Electricity Commissioners, ex p. London Electricity Joint Committee Co. [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at 205, thought it was not enough that a body had the legal authority to determine questions affecting individual rights; the duty to act judicially required something more. This view was rejected by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40, 75.

17 New Zealand Dairy Board v. Okitu Co-operative Dairy Company Limited [1953] N.Z.L.R. 366.

18 Northcroft and Cooke JJ.

19 At p. 407.

20 “Bludger” is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of New Zealand English (1997) as “a useless person; one who avoids responsibility or (fig.) ‘lives on the back’ of deserving people; a loafer, an idler.”

21 W. Wade, above note 14, p. 78.

22 See Lord Woolf, J.L. Jowell and A. Le Sueur (eds.), De Smith's Judicial Review, 6th ed. (London 2007), 339–340.

23 Denton v Auckland City [1969] N.Z.L.R. 256 (SC).

24 C. Forsyth and I. Hare (eds.), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade QC (Oxford 1998), v.

25 As stated in R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p National Federation of Self-employed and Small Businesses [1982] A.C. 617, 641.

26 Above note 24, p. v.

27 [1964] A.C. 40. This is referred to by D.G.T. Williams in his essay in honour of Sir William Wade, “Sir William Wade QC” in C. Forsyth and I. Hare (eds.), above note 24, 1, p. 2.

28 See, for example, R (ProLife Alliance) v. BBC [2004] 1 A.C. 185 at 234 per Lord Hoffmann and R v. Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 A.C. 100, 115 per Lord Bingham.

29 Williams, D.G.T., “The Constitution of the United Kingdom” [1972A] C.L.J. 266, 292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30 [1991] 1 A.C. 603.

31 F. Frankfurter, above note 3, p. 618.

32 D.C. Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (Melbourne 1974), 148.

33 As Sir David Williams accepts, citing Freund, in “Statute Law and Administrative Law” [1984] Statute Law Review 157, 163.

34 Ibid., p. 161.

35 Sir David Williams cites for expression of this value Cooke P. in a New Zealand case Bulk Gas Users Group v. Attorney General [1983] N.Z.L.R. 129 (CA).

36 F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge 1908), 526.

37 Ibid., pp. 526–527.

38 D.G.T. Williams, “Criminal Law and Administrative Law: Problems of Procedure and Reasonableness” in P. Smith (ed.), Criminal Law, Essays in Honour of J C Smith (London 1987), 170, 171.

39 [1898] 2 Q.B. 91, 99.

40 D.G.T. Williams, above note 33, p. 179.

41 D.G.T. Williams, “Police Accountability” in D. Butler, V. Bogdanor and R. Summers (eds.), The Law, Politics and the Constitution: Essays in Honour of Geoffrey Marshall (Oxford 1999), 273, 294.

42 Ibid., pp. 293–294.

43 R v. Chief Constable of North Wales Police ex p AB [1999] Q.B. 396, 414.

44 D.G.T Williams, “Freedom of Information: The British Experience” in V. Iyer (ed.), Constitutional Perspectives: Essays in Honour and Memory of H M Seervai (Delhi 2001), 242, 249–250.

45 D.G.T. Williams, Not in the Public Interest (London 1965), 216.

46 For example, by F.W. Maitland, above note 36, W. Bagehot, above note 2, and W.S. Holdsworth, Some Lessons from Our Legal History (New York 1928).

47 M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford 2003), 120.

48 P.J. Fitzgerald (ed.), J. Salmond, Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th ed. (London 1966), 112.

49 W.S. Holdsworth, above note 46, p. 9.

50 As recognised, for example, by SirDixon, Owen in “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation” (1957) 31 Australian Law Journal 240Google Scholar, reprinted in Jesting Pilate, 2nd ed. (New York 1997), 203 and Lord Cooke in Brader v Ministry of Transport [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 73, 78 (CA).

51 Wade, W., “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty” [1955] Cambridge Law Journal 172, 189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52 As to which, see J.W.F. Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and European Effects (Cambridge 2007), 114. W.S. Holdsworth, above n 46, refers at pp. 39–40 to the co-operation between the judges and Parliament, which he contrasts with the “jealousy between the lawyers and the Legislature” which marked jurisdictions where fundamental laws governed the State.

53 A view I have taken in “Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-go-round” (2003) 14 Public Law Review 148 and do not revisit here.

54 347 US 483 (1954).

55 Dred Scott v. Stanford (1856) 60 US 39; R. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (United States 1990), 307.

56 See discussion in P. Cane, “Public and Private Law: a Study of the Analysis and Use of a Legal Concept”, in J. Eekelaar and J. Bell (eds.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 3rd series (Oxford 1987), 57, 59–60.

57 See Allan, T.R.S., “Doctrine and Theory in Administrative Law: An Elusive Quest for the Limits of Jurisdiction” [2003] Public Law 429.Google Scholar

58 See, for instance, D. Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Cambridge 2004).

59 The line drawn in R v. Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club ex p. Aga Khan [1993] 1 W.L.R. 909 (CA) strikes me as unsustainable. Certainly, it does not seem to fit the right to justice contained in our Bill of Rights Act, which requires observance of human rights by anyone who exercises functions that affect the rights and interests of others.

60 See, for example, Finn, J., “Controlling the Exercise of Power” (1996) 7 Public Law Review 86Google Scholar.

61 M. Taggart, “The Province of Administrative Law Determined?”, in M. Taggart (ed.), The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford 1997), 1, 3.

62 Ibid., p. 5.

63 [1995] 1 All E.R. 513.

64 As D. M0ullan suggests in “Administrative Law at the Margins” in M. Taggart (ed.), above note 61, 134, p. 142. See also J. McLean, “Intermediate Associations and the State”, in M. Taggart (ed.), above note 61, 160, p. 160.

65 Hinds v. The Queen [1977] A.C. 195 (PC), 212–213: “What, however, is implicit in the very structure of a Constitution on the Westminster model is that judicial power, however it be distributed from time to time between various courts, is to continue to be vested in persons appointed to hold judicial office in the manner and on the terms laid down in the Chapter dealing with the judicature, even though this is not expressly stated in the Constitution: Liyanage v. The Queen [1967] 1 A.C. 259, 287–288.”

66 See discussion in Chapter 17 “Statutory Restriction of Review”, of M. Aronson, B.D. Dyer and M. Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 3rd ed. (Sydney 2004), 830–868.

67 R v. Secretary of State ex p. Venables [1998] A.C. 407; R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 A.C. 513; R (Pro-Life Alliance) v. BBC [2004] 1 A.C. 185.

68 D.G.T. Williams, above note 4, p. 47.

69 T.R.S. Allan, above note 57, p. 433.

70 As Lord Diplock recognised in R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] A.C. 617.

71 Sedley, S., “Human Rights: A Twenty-first Century Agenda” [1995] Public Law 386, 388–389.Google Scholar

72 To use Ronald Dworkin's metaphor: Taking Rights Seriously (London 1977), 31.

73 R v. Inland Revenue of Commissioners, ex p. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] A.C. 617, 644.

74 C. Harlow blames Dicey for leaving a “disabling legacy for English constitutional law” by obscuring the close relationship between law and politics even though it was a relationship which he recognised. “Disposing of Dicey: From Legal Autonomy to Constitutional Discourse?” (2000) 48 Political Studies 356, 357.

75 Dicey, in contrast, D. Dyzenhaus says, had a very rigid view of the distinction, and deliberately constructed the rule of law as an “ideological obstacle” in the way of the growth of administrative agencies. “Judicial Review and Democracy” in M. Taggart (ed.), above note 61, 279, p. 281.

76 As T.R.S. Allan has been at the forefront in pointing out. See, for instance, Law, Liberty and Justice: the Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford 1993).

77 Taggart, M., “‘Australian Exceptionalism’ in Judicial Review” (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 1, 13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

78 T.R.S. Allan suggests that the rule of law “entails and requires a judicial commitment to consistency and rationality”: “Fairness, Equality, Rationality: Constitutional Theory and Judicial Review”, in C. Forsyth and I. Hare (eds.), above note 24, 15, p. 17.

79 Lord Bingham, “The Rule of Law” [2007] C.L.J. 67, 76.

80 Ibid., p. 76.

81 Lord Radcliffe, “Law and the Democratic State”, in Not in Feather Beds (London 1968), 45, 47.

82 Ibid., p. 50.

83 Ibid., p. 51.

84 T.R.S. Allan, “Fairness, Equality, Rationality: Constitutional Theory and Judicial Review” in C. Forsyth and I. Hare (eds.), above note 24, 15, p. 29.

85 Ibid., p. 29.

86 S. Sedley, Freedom, Law and Justice (London 1999), 21.

87 See, for example: R v. Hansen [2007] 3 N.Z.L.R. 1 (SC); Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 A.C. 557; Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256.

88 M. Loughlin, above note 47, p. 114.

89 Cf. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15.

90 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (1985), at para. [10.81].

91 Ibid., at para. [10.81].

92 Ibid., at para. [10.81].

93 See Quilter v. Attorney-General [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 73. See also Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 A.C. 557 at para. [134] per Baroness Hale.

94 336 US 106, 113 (1949).

95 [2005] 2 A.C. 68.

96 S. Sedley, above note 86, p. 41.

97 Gleeson, M., “Outcome, Process and the Rule of Law” (2006) 65 Australian Journal of Public Administration 5, 12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

98 P. Cane, “Mapping the Frontiers” in P. Birks (ed.), Frontiers of Liability (Oxford 1994), 137, 153.

99 A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government (New York 1976), 115–118.

100 See, for example, Harksen v. Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC).

101 See Eskridge, W. in “Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics” (2000) 114 Yale Law Journal 1279, 1298.Google Scholar

102 See Fredman, S., “From Deference to Democracy: the Role of Equality under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 53.Google Scholar

103 See MacCormick, N., “Argumentation and Interpretation in Law” (1993) 6 Ratio Juris 16–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

104 Such theories are described by P. Craig as “deeply problematical” in Administrative Law, 5th ed. (London 2003), 27–28.

105 Harkson v. Lane [1998] 1 SA 300.

106 M. Aronson, B.D. Dyer and M. Groves, above note 66, p. 104 citing W. Wade and C. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 7th ed. (Oxford 1994), 306. This passage has been dropped from the current edition of Wade.

107 As Cooke P. saw in Daganayasi v. Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 N.Z.L.R. 130 (CA).

108 L. Weinrib, “The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism” in S. Choudhry (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge 2006), 84, 96.

109 Lord Cooke, “The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law” in M. Taggart (ed.), above note 1, p. 5.

110 See his comments in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Daly [2001] 2 A.C. 532, 549.

111 As Craig suggests, above n 104, p. 630.

112 Lord Denning, Freedom under the Law (London 1949), 96.

113 D.G.T. Williams, “Criminal Law and Administrative Law: Problems of Procedure and Reasonableness”, in P. Smith (ed.), above note 38, p. 170.

114 D.G.T. Williams, above note 33, p. 168.