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III. Napoleon and Sea Power
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 December 2011
Extract
The generally successful result of our naval wars may be ascribed largely to the advancement of experienced seamen to high office at the Admiralty. Since the period of the Dutch Wars this practice has prevailed more here than among our rivals, the outcome being the accumulation of a body of naval doctrine which has proved to be invaluable at crises such as arose in and after 1793. On the other hand the Revolution in France bore hard on her marine, leading to the emigration of most of the officers, and to the infiltration of doctrinaire views, derived from the land campaigns of 1793. Such, in brief, were the conditions amidst which the young Bonaparte came into contact with the Mediterranean campaign of that year.
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References
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page 138 note 2 F. Masson, Napoleon inconnu, II. 129; H. F. Hall, Napoleon's notes on English History, p. 9.
page 139 note 1 J. H. Rose, Lord Hood and the Defence of Toulon, p. 42.
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page 140 note 3 I dissent from the main thesis of Gen. Pierron's Comment s'est formé la Génie mil. de Napolén I.
page 141 note 1 Corresp. 1912–15, 1949, 2061, 2072, 2103, 2195.
page 141 note 2 De la Jonquère, L'Expédition d'Egypte, I. 154–68.
page 141 note 3 Corresp. 2419.
page 142 note 1 Desbrière, Projets…de Débarquement aux Îles britanniques, II. 50.
page 142 note 2 Corresp. 2502.
page 142 note 3 Spencer Papers, II. 322.
page 142 note 4 Chevalier, II. 358.
page 142 note 5 Colomb, Naval Warfare, p. 401.
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page 143 note 3 Corresp. 2878.
page 143 note 4 Jonquière, II. 320–2, 422–8.
page 143 note 5 Douin, op. cit., ad fin.
page 143 note 6 Corresp. 3045, 3056, 3063, 3901.
page 143 note 7 Berthier, Relation…de la Campagne d' Égypte, p. 38.
page 144 note 1 Corresp. 4091.
page 144 note 2 Bertrand, op. cit. II. 94. Jonquière (IV. 637) underrates the naval factor at Acre.
page 144 note 3 Bertrand, I. 123; Desvernois, Méms. 148; Gouvgaud, Journal inédit de Ste. Hélène, II. 74, 315.
page 145 note 1 Corresp. 4612, 4618, 4625, 4637, 4653, 4675; Chevalier, III. 47; Leyland, Blockade of Brest, I. p. xi.
page 145 note 2 Lettres inédites, II, 13, 21.
page 145 note 3 Corresp. 5327.
page 146 note 1 Desbrière, II. 296–8, 307, 309, 393.
page 146 note 2 Corresp. 5617.
page 146 note 3 Desbrière, II. pt. III. chs. 1–4; Corresp. 2419, 7309.
page 146 note 4 St Vincent and Nelson in July 1801 took the French preparations for invasion seriously; but the latter, after further experience, pronounced them impossible, from Boulogne. (Letters of Lord St Vincent, p. 125; Nicolas, IV. 425–7, 438, 443–7, 482.)
page 147 note 1 St Vincent pushed party discipline to an extreme in his assertion (Letters, I. 285) that the peace was the best ever made by England. She gave up her maritime gains except Trinidad and Ceylon, ceded by Spain and Holland. France, while retaining her military conquests, received back all her colonies.
page 147 note 2 Camb. Hist, of Brit. Foreign Policy, I. 310–27.
page 147 note 3 O. Browning, England and Napoleon, pp. 80, 100, 174.
page 147 note 4 Leyland, Blockade of Brest, II, Introduction and pp. 48–50; Corbett, Campaign of Trafalgar, ch. I.
page 147 note 5 Desbrière, III. 83, 84, 94, 106.
page 147 note 6 Ibid. III. 469.
page 148 note 1 O. Browning, England and Napoleon, p. 100.
page 149 note 1 Colomb (Naval Warfare, p. 185) says that not till May 8, 1805, did Napoleon aim at securing the naval command of the Channel; but it is clearly stipulated on Dec. 7, 1803.
page 149 note 2 Corresp. 7359, 7442; Desbrière, III. 636–9.
page 149 note 3 Corresp. 7842.
page 149 note 4 Corresp. 7832.
page 149 note 5 Corresp. 8998, 9209.
page 150 note 1 Corresp. 7832.
page 150 note 2 Nicolay, Napoléon au Camp de Boulogne, ch. IX.
page 151 note 1 Chevalier, III. 152.
page 151 note 2 Corresp. 8379–8383.
page 151 note 3 Corresp. 8060, 8206, 8231, 8292, 8309, 8575, 8582, 8618, 8730.
page 151 note 4 Corresp. 8480. This order explains Ganteaume's avoidance of battle on July 21, 1805, for which he has been unjustly blamed. (Clowes, Royal Navy, V. p. vii.)
page 152 note 1 Corresp. 8577, 8618, 8582–3; Desbrière, IV. 503–28.
page 152 note 2 Corresp. 8809.
page 152 note 3 Corresp. 8713, 8938.
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page 153 note 1 Troude, Batailles navales, III. 359.
page 153 note 2 Corresp. 8998.
page 153 note 3 Leyland, II. 330, 337. Mahan, writing before the publication of these volumes, did not know of the risk to Cornwallis on August 4–13, 1805.
page 154 note 1 Desbrière, La Campagne maritime de 1805, pp. 74–9.
page 155 note 1 For Decres' doubts and hesitations see Desbrière, op. cit. p. 113.
page 155 note 2 Desbrière, Projets, etc. III. 372; IV. 830; V. 398, 465; James, Naval History, III. 328.
page 155 note 3 Corresp. 9132. See, too, 9122.
page 155 note 4 Méneval Méms.I. 407.
page 155 note 5 Corresp. 9133.
page 156 note 1 Corresp. 9135.
page 156 note 2 Corresp. 9160.
page 156 note 3 Neil Campbell, Napoleon…at Elba, pp. 229, 339.
page 156 note 4 Journals of Admiral T. Byam Martin, II. 409.
page 157 note 1 1 Journals of Admiral T. Byam Martin, II. 240, 278, 290–2; Ross, Life of Admiral Saumarez II. ch. 13.
page 157 note 2 Corresp. 20150, 20205, 20243.