This article engages with current debates in archaeology with respect to matters of ontological difference — particularly in terms of bodies, personhood and the much-contested category of the individual. Drawing on early Spanish historical accounts of the material and bodily practices through which the Inka sovereign was constituted, I argue that although he was certainly not a Cartesian individual, neither was he a kind of fractal or partible person. Contrary to the growing tendency to see non-Western modes of personhood as highly ‘relational’, the Inka emperor was in my view a bounded and tightly delineated entity, albeit one not contiguous with a biological body. In archaeological theory, a growing divide appears to be emerging between relational and individual species of personhood — with the former often ascribed to non-modern societies, and the latter frequently associated with the modern West. I present a critique of this trend and argue for the need to break beyond such binaries — interpreting the Inka emperor as a form of individual that stood outside a nature/society divide and thus still very much incommensurable with Western ontologies of the person.