1. The United States officially sought information on what a mandatory role would entail. Major General Jaces Harbord, G., Chief of the President’s Mission to the Near East, was assigned the responsibility ‘to investigate and report on political, military, geographical, administrative, economic, and other considerations involved in possible American interests and responsibilities in that region’. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), pp. 826–8 Google Scholar. (Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations.) See New York Times (22 February 1920), IV, p. 1.

2. Foreign Relations, 1919, Paris Peace Conference, III, p. 788. A similar refusal to commit American forces was expressed by President Harding before the Lausanne conference opened in 1922. The administration was strictly committed to ‘protection of legitimate American rights and interests, without participation in political or territorial settlements, and of using the influence and good offices of the United States wherever possible toward a beneficent and last peace in the Near East’. New York Times (18 November 1922), p. 2.

3. Anderson, M. S., The Eastern Question 1774–1923 (New York, 1966), p. 362.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Italy and Greece also clashed. In a letter to the New York Times a Greek spokesman, Cleanthis Zonaras, the former Civil Governor of Myriophyto, Thrace, lamented that without historic rights in Asia Minor Italian rule ‘in occupied Greek territories is as tyrannical as was the Turkish despotism’. (1 June 1919), III, p. 2.

5. ‘Of all the powers, Greece was the only one who could advance the additional claim that in the regions she coveted there was a large population which was Greek Orthodox and within that population a large proportion which spoke the Greek language, living in communities that had their own schools and a Greek way of life. Moreover, Greece was contiguous to the regions in which she hoped to expand’. See Dakin, D., The Unification of Greece 1770–1923 (New York, 1972), p. 222.Google Scholar

6. Anderson, M. S., Ibid., pp. 362–3.Google Scholar

7. Ibid., p. 363.

8. The Greek claims for the landing were almost entirely false. See Thompson, Charles T., The Peace Conference Day by Day (New York, 1920), pp. 373–4.Google Scholar

9. The American naval force included the battleship U.S.S. Arizona and five destroyers.

10. According to Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, when Italian troops seized the port of Adalia, ‘President Wilson attacked the move so vigorously that Premier Orlando for a time withdrew from the conference. President Wilson now announced his support of the long-debated claim of Greece to the possession of Smyrna, Aidin and the coast. Apparently, President Wilson’s theory in proposing this move was that the nearest friendly troops were the Greek divisions in Macedonia, and that prompt action was necessary to protect the Christians of the Smyrna district… Lloyd George cordially approved President Wilson’s proposal, Clemenceau offered no objections, and the occupation was ordered and quickly accomplished’. [My underline.] See I Was Sent To Athens (New York, 1929), pp. 23–4. On the other hand, Joseph C. Grew, an American delegate to the Lausanne Conference (1922–3), writes that ‘in May 1919, Great Britain and France, in order to forestall Italian imperialistic enterprises in Anatolia, encouraged Greece to land troops at Smyrna’. See Era, Turbulent, A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, I (Boston, 1952), p. 477 Google Scholar. John A. DeNovo writes: ‘Wilson was drawn into another intra-Allied controversy when Italian ambitions in Anatolia frightened Lloyd George and Clemenceau… Lloyd George did not intend to stand idly by while the Italians ousted Britain’s Greek ally from Smyrna. He proposed on 6 May that the Greeks be permitted to land two or three divisions at Symrna and won the approval of Wilson and Clemenceau for this fateful operation to be designated an Allied force under Greek command’. [My underline.] See American Interests and Politics in the Middle East 1900–1939 (Minneapolis, 1963), p. 117.

11. Anderson, M. S. writes: ‘Occupation by the deposed Greeks, by the rayah whom they have so often defeated in the past, was an unbearable insult: anger mixed with fear began to unite the population of Anatolia against these new invaders and their backers in western Europe’. Anderson also cites a British representative in Constantinople who described the hostility between Greeks and Turks on 17 August 1919 as ‘animosity which has to be seen to be believed, which is as unreasoning as it is rabid, and which is gradually becoming pretty nearly unquenchable’. The Eastern Question 1717–1923 (New York, 1966), pp. 364ff. British Department Foreign Policy. 1st Series, IV, p. 880 Google Scholar. See also the account by former Consul-General of the United States in the Near East, George Horton. He testified that ‘to the Turk, the Hellene is not only a “dog of an unbeliever”, but he is a former slave’. The Blight of Asia (New York, 1926), p. 74. Riza Bur Bey, the second ranking Turkish delegate to the Lausanne Conference (November 1922-July 1923), claimed that the United States and the allies did not understand the gravity of the situation in Asia Minor. He states: ‘It has been shown that Greeks and Turks cannot live side by side, and the only solution is for the Greeks to go’. New York Times (18 December 1922), p. 1.

12. The terms of the treaty were worked on in a London conference in February and March of 1920, and finalized at San Remo in April. On 10 October 1921, Admiral Mark L. Bristol, high commissioner of the United States in Constantinople between 1919 and 1927, informed Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes that ‘It is now quite clear that the Treaty of Sèvres, if it is retained at all by the Allies, will be modified in important particulars. Presumably, there will be further negotiations among the allies to accomplish this… we cannot rely upon the Allies to protect our interests in the Near East’. Bristol to Hughes, 10 October 1921, Department of State 711.67/21. Cited in J. A. DeNovo, Ibid., p. 131.

13. According to Howard, H. N., ‘the Greek aggression at Smyrna did more than any other factor to precipitate the nationalist movement in Turkey, but the British action at Constantinople [16 March 1920, which preserved the sultan on his throne] added the finishing touches’. See The Partition of Turkey, Howard Fertig edition (New York, 1966), p. 257.Google Scholar

14. Ibid., p. 264.

15. Israel, F. L., ed., The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents 1790–1966, III (New York, 1967), p. 2616.Google Scholar

16. There is substantial and continued controversy over the term ‘isolationism’ as a description of American policy of the period. For example, among many others, Williams, W. A. discredits the notion of isolationism in ‘The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920’s, Science and Society (1954), pp. 1–20 Google Scholar; and Hoff Wilson, Joan asserts that the term ‘independent internationalism’ is more descriptive of the character of American policy for the period. See American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920–1933 (Boston, 1973), p. x.Google Scholar

17. It is interesting to note that when the United States tilted toward one state, strain developed in the bilateral relation with the other. For example, two such instances occurred over the Cyprus problem which seriously affected the trilateral relation. In 1964 the Johnson Administration tilted in favor of Greece, provoking an immediate coolness in Turco-American relations. In 1974, the Nixon Administration tilted in favor of Turkey, provoking a similar response in Greco-American relations.

18. Quoted in Vinson, J., ‘Charles Evans Hughes’, in Graebner, N. A., ed., An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1961), p. 132.Google Scholar

19. Cited in Morgenthau, H., Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (New York, 1919), pp. 117–120.Google Scholar

20. The American infatuation with Greece and ‘Creek civilization’ is as old as the republic and can be attributed to several factors: historically the intellectual link which educated Americans shared with classical Greece; the element of Greek Christianity which conspicuously defined all Greek conflict with the Turk on religious grounds; and American Philhellenism. See Raphalides, S. J., United States Policy Toward the Greek War of Independence, Ph.D. dissertation (Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, 1974).Google Scholar

21. New York Times (26 April 1920), p. 12. See also Senate Resolution 364 congratulating the peoples of Greece upon the reintegration of their ancient territories. Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd session, SR 364, 59, pt. 9., p. 7713.

22. Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd session, SR 333, 59, pt. 5, p. 4210. New York Times (7 March 1920), p. 2. (17 May 1920), p. 1.

23. New York Times (7 June 1919), p. 6.

24. There exists a plethora of eyewitness accounts (as well as hearsay) about the burning of Smyrna, the looting and atrocities committed against the Greek and Christian population, and the ‘violation’ of American property and institutions. See George Horton, op. cit., pp. 126–54 and pp. 275–92. One interesting interchange on the subject reportedly took place between James Cannon, Jr., a southern Methodist Episcopal bishop and Secretary of State Hughes: ‘I endeavored to impress Secretary Hughes with the urgency of the need for prompt, definite, and effective action owing to the critical conditions existing, especially in Asiatic Turkey, where the Turks were ruthlessly slaughtering Greeks and Armenians, combatants and noncombatants, children and old people. Secretary Hughes read the resolution [of a memorial of his church] and called my attention to what he considered to be the extreme language used, asking what was meant by the words “whatever steps may be necessary”. I replied that it meant exactly what it said. “But”, said Secretary Hughes, “that could mean war”. I replied, “Certainly it could, if the Turks thought the United States government was not in earnest in commanding that they cease committing atrocities; but if war is necessary, the resolutions clearly contemplate war”.’ J. Cannon, Jr., Bishop Cannon’s Own Story: Life As I Have Seen It, edited by Watson, R. L., (Durham, Duke University Press, 1955), p. 226.Google Scholar

25. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, pp. 947–8.

26. New York Times (1 October 1922), p. 1. Bishop James Cannon, Jr., a representative of American church and relief organizations, made no secret of his Turcophobic views. He sent the following cable to Secretary of State Hughes: ‘You will recall that the American church bodies urged the State Department in July [1922] to take whatever steps were necessary to protect the Eastern Christians. A prompt, definite American demand, supported if necessary by the American naval units present, would probably have prevented, certainly greatly minimized the Smyrna fires and massacres’. For an account of Cannon’s efforts behind the cause of American intervention in Turkey see Dabney, V., Dry Messiah: The Life of Bishop Cannon (New York, 1949)Google Scholar. A similar problem confronted the administration over United States participation in a proposed inquiry into the atrocities committed against Armenians. Harding notified Hughes: ‘Frankly, I very much hesitate to hold aloof from a participation which makes such a strong appeal to a very large portion of our American citizenship’. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, p. 922.

27. New York Times (4 October 1922), p. 1.

28. New York Times (11 October 1922), p.3.

29. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, p. 922.

30. New York Times (12 October 1922), p. 3.

31. The delegation was headed by Richard Washburn Child, Ambassador to Italy, Admiral Mark L. Bristol, American High Commissioner to Turkey, Grew, Joseph C., Amory, Copley, Berlin, F. Lammot, Dwight, Harry G., Heck, Lewis G., and Gillespie, Julian. Foreign Relations, II, p. 899 Google Scholar. See also Grew, J. C., Turbulent Era, I (Boston, 1952), p. 484.Google Scholar

32. New York Times (12 November 1922), IX, p. 6.

33. The trustees of the New York based Church Peace Union petitioned Secretary of State Hughes to send authorized representatives to the Lausanne Conference with power to assume for the United States its full share of responsibility in cooperation with other nations ‘for the just solution of the Near East problems’. New York Times (16 December 1922), p. 2. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Rev. Malcolm McLeod of the Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas in New York, and Bishop William Manning of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. New York Times (13 November 1922), p. 2.

34. ‘If the [Harding] Administration were to do what I am urging, I am convinced that the whole country would arise to support it and the Turks would yield to our superior force. It would prevent war, as Mr. Morgenthau showed….’. New York Times (16 November 1922), p. 18.

35. See DeNovo, J. A., op. cit., pp. 167–209.Google Scholar

36. (20 November 1922), p. 16. As the deliberations proceeded at Lausanne, the editorial policy was modified and called for a stronger voice on the part of the United States.

37. New York Times (31 October 1922), p. 1.

38. New York Times (1 October 1922), p. 2.

39. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, pp. 887–8.

40. Ibid.

41. DeNovo, J. A., op. cit., p. 140.Google Scholar

42. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, p. 888.

43. Gelb, L. H., ‘Muskie and Brzezinski: The Struggle Over Foreign Policy’, in New York Times Magazine, 6 (20 July 1980), p. 35.Google Scholar