2 On Greece’s main concerns in the Middle East and its relations with Egypt in the 1950s see Hatzivas-siliou, E., ‘Greece and the Arabs, 1956-1958’, BMGS 16 (1992)Google Scholar. Also Sakkas, Y., ‘ελληνική πολιτική στη Μέση Ανατολή επί κυβερνήσεων Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή’, in Svolopoulos, K., Botsiou, K. and Hatzivassiliou, E. (eds), О Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής στον εικοστό αιώνα, II (Athens 2008) 348-59Google Scholar.

3 On the details of this policy see Sakkas, ‘H ελληνική πολιτική στη Μέση Ανατολή’, 359-63. A more general account of Greek foreign policy in the Middle East from 1974 and up to new millennium is found in Roussos, S., ‘Ήελληνική πολιτική στη Μέση Ανατολή: Μεταξύ “επιχειρησιακής νοοτροπίας”, “εσωτερικής πολιτικής” και νέων προκλήσεων’, in Arvanitopoulos, K. and Koppa, M. (eds), 30χρόνια ελληνικής εζωτερικής πολιτικής, 1974-2004 (Athens 2005)Google Scholar.

4 Chila, I., ‘Ή αραβοϊσραηλινή διένεξη και η ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική’, in Konstas, D. and Tsardanidis, C. (eds), Σύγχρονη ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική, 1974–1987 (Athens 1988) 371 Google Scholar.

5 For instance, the status of the Athens PLO office was upgraded to the level of diplomatic representation, while Papandreou stated that Greece in no way accepted the Camp David accords: The New York Times, 24 Oct. 1981 and 17 Dec. 1981. Consequently, because of Greece’s position, it was not possible for the EEC to send a peacekeeping force to Sinai: Valinakis, Y., ‘H Ελλάδα στην ΕΠΣ: τα πρώτα δέκα χρόνια’, in Tsoukalis, L. (ed.), H Ελλάδα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα (Athens 1993) 255 Google Scholar. PASOK’s motto regarding Israel was that ‘To Ισραήλ είναι η αιχμή της αμερικάνικης παρουσίας στο μεσανατολικό χώρο, η υπο-ιμπεριαλιστική δύναμη ...’ [Israel is the spearhead of American presence in the Middle East, the sub-imperialist power]: Committee of International Relations of the [PASOK] Movement (ed.), To ΠΑΣΟΚ ото διεθνή χώρο (Athens 1977) 17.

6 The Cyprus issue entered a new phase following the unilateral proclamation of independence by the Turkish Cypriots in 1983. Hence, Greek diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing the recognition of Northern Cyprus by other states.

7 Third Worldism has been described as ‘the paradigm within which individual existences were made collective, a space in which the oppressed (colonized and poor) were able to reappropriate precious means of discourse and of action. Key here is dignity, the yearning of equal status and worth that both was impelled by and grew out of decolonialization’: Malley, R., The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley, CA 1996), 232-3Google Scholar.

8 It is difficult to find a commonly accepted definition of ‘national interest’. Here it is used in its broad traditional meaning, that is, the protection of the nation’s territory, wealth and access to necessary goods. For the debate on the concept of national interest see, among others, Morgenthau, H. J., In Defense of the National Interest (New York 1951)Google Scholar; Rosenau, J. N., The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York 1971), 239-49Google Scholar; Frankel, J., National Interest (Westport, CN 1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clinton, W. D., The Two Faces of National Interest (Baton Rouge, LA 1994)Google Scholar.

9 See Andreas Papandreou’s texts from an earlier period (1970-6), Από το ΠΑΚ στο ΠΑΣΟΚ (Athens 1976), passim, and Papandreou quoted in Angelos Elefantis, Στον αστερισμό του λαϊκισμού (Athens 1991) 169.

10 Within the ranks of PASOK the symbolism of the Palestinian movement was extremely strong ‘To Παλαι-στινιακό Κίνημα είναι η αιχμή του αντιιμπεριαλιστικού αγώνα στην περιοχή — και ίσως σε παγκόσμια κλίμακα’ [The Palestinian Movement is the spearhead of the anti-imperialist movement in the region, and perhaps on a global scale]: To ΠΑΣΟΚ ото διεθνή χώρο, 19.

11 Koliopoulos, J. S. and Veremis, T. M., Greece: The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present (London 2004) 270 Google Scholar. For an inspired analysis of Greek political culture and of the way it shaped the images of the Greek public concerning the international environment and Greece’s place in it in the 1980s see Diamandouros, N., ‘Politics and culture in Greece, 1974–91: an interpretation’, in Clogg, R. (ed.), Greece 1981-89: the Populist Decade (Basingstoke 1993)Google Scholar.

12 A relationship between the mass national public opinion and foreign policy decisions certainly exists, but it has proved difficult to analyse. For an interesting discussion of this relationship informed by identification theory see Bloom, W., Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 PASOK remained in power from 1981 to 1989 and returned to power again under Papandreou’s leadership in 1993.

14 It is important to note that the late 1970s and the 1980s were years of hostile propaganda and enmity between Damascus and Tripoli on the one hand and Riyadh and Cairo on the other.

15 ‘Papandreou faults U.S’, The New York Times, 29 May 1986; ‘US criticizes Papandreou for statement on terrorism’, The New York Times, 4 June 1986. Papandreou’s hard anti-American rhetoric softened in the mid-1980s. Ioannides, C., ‘Greece, Turkey, the United States and the politics of Middle Eastern terrorism’, in Vryonis, Speros Jr. (ed.), Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK 1974-1986 (New Rochelle and New York 1991)Google Scholar.

16 ‘Papandreou hopes for better ties with the U.S in his second term’, The New York Times, 6 June 1985. For an overview of the foreign policy of PASOK in the 1980s see T. A. Couloumbis, ‘PASOK’s foreign policies, 1981-89: continuity or change?’ in Clogg (ed.), The Populist Decade.

17 The New York Times, 13 March 1988. According to Konstantinos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece from 1990 to 1993, who was interviewed by the author in 1999, the escalation of the intifada had played into the hands of those within PASOK who strongly resisted ties with Israel and made it difficult for Papandreou to ignore their pressure. To what extent Papandreou himself agreed with them on principle rather than out of political expediency is an open question.

18 For a discussion of Greece’s policy towards Israel see Abadi, J., ‘Constraints and adjustments in Greece’s policy toward Israel’, Mediterranean Quarterly 11 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 On this period see Coufoudakis, V., ‘Greek foreign policy in the post-Cold War era: issues and challenges’, Mediterranean Quarterly 7 (1996)Google Scholar.

20 Interview with Konstantinos Mitsotakis.

21 Ibid.

22 Interviews by the author with Yannos Kranidiotis, Deputy Foreign Minister (1994-7) in 1997, and with Konstantinos Mitsotakis.

23 Athanassopoulou, E., ‘Turkey in the Balkans: the view from Athens’, International Spectator 29 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 This had been building up since the second half of the 1980s when the Arab economies entered a recession. Economic co-operation was essentially limited to trade relations. On Greece’s trade relations with the Arab countries between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s see Tsiovaridou, T., ‘El papel económico de Grecia en el área mediterránea’, in Girón, José and Pajović, Slobodan (eds), El Mediterráneo a finales del siglo XX (Oviedo 1998) 155-71Google Scholar.

25 For the contrast between Papandreou and Simitis in terms of Greece’s goals compare Papandreou’s speeches from the 1960s (their message still intact in the 1980s) collected by Kritikos, P., H ρήξη (Athens 1998 Google Scholar) with Ministry of Press and Mass Media, Greece: Your Strategic Partner in the New Millennium (Athens 1999).

26 Interview by the author with Yannos Kranidiotis.

27 For a detailed analysis of the thinking that led to the decision by the Simitis government to promote ties with Israel in the 1990s see, Athanassopoulou, E., ‘Responding to a challenge: Greece’s new policy towards Israel’, journal of Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies 2 (2002)Google Scholar.

28 Interview in 1997 with a senior official in the office of Theodoros Pangalos (Foreign Minister 1996-9), who spoke on condition of anonymity.

29 Republic of Cyprus, Press and Information Office, ‘Τι αλλάζει μετά την ένταξη της Κύπρου στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση για το Κυπριακό;’: http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/74889967AAC0D040C22573DE0034 EFB3?OpenDocument.

30 Nonetheless, more than a decade later, the Cyprus issue — still unresolved — made a come-back in Greece’s relations with the Arab states. At the foreign ministers’ meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Istanbul in June 2004 the observer status of Northern Cyprus was upgraded from Turkish Cypriot Community to Turkish Cypriot State, while at the same time the OIC urged its members to enter into bilateral relations with the Turkish Cypriots. Since then the OIC has continued to adopt similar resolutions, and gradually the Arab states began developing relations with North Cyprus: A. Dimou, Όργανισμός Ισλαμικής Διάσκεψης: ακόμη μία απόφαση-κόλαφος για το Κυπριακό με την Ελλάδα απούσα’, Στρατηγική, Sept. 2009. In a damage-limitation exercise the Greek government sought to influence the Arab governments not to establish relations with Northern Cyprus with mixed results. In any event, this time the preoccupation with Cyprus, though important to Athens, did not drive Greece’s policy towards the Middle East as it had done in the past.

31 The leader of the conservative New Democracy party, the nephew of the former Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis, succeeded Simitis to power in 2004.

32 On the subject of how interaction among EU member states and participation in EU practices may affect foreign policy behaviour and the beliefs that shape it see Ohrgaard, J. C., ‘International relations or European integration: Is the CFSP sui generis?’, in Tonra, B. and Christiansen, Thomas (eds), Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy (Manchester 2004)Google Scholar. For an insightful discussion of the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy in general see Ioakimidis, P. C., ‘The Europeanisation of Greece’s foreign policy: progress and problems’, in Mitsos, A. and Mossialos, E. (eds), Contemporary Greece and Europe (Aldershot 2000)Google Scholar; Ioakimidis, P. C., ‘The Europeanization of Greece: an overall assessment’, in Featherstone, K. and Kazamias, G. (eds), Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (London 2001)Google Scholar. According to Ioakimidis the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy has been mostly felt in the decision-making process and in the general approach to the big questions of national interest.

33 On this point see East, M. A., ‘Size and foreign policy behavior: a test of two models,’ World Politics 25 (1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in Kegley, C. W. Jr. et al. (eds), International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy (Columbia 1975)Google Scholar.

34 However, it should be noted here that small states often have the capacity to act in the international environment in ways that transcend the apparent limitations of their size. For a classic study on this issue see Vital, D., The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford 1967)Google Scholar.

35 According to Fox, A. Baker, ‘The small states in the international system, 1919-1969’, International Journal 24 (1969) 751-2Google Scholar: ‘...we can think of small states as those whose leaders recognize that their own state’s political weight is limited to a local arena rather than a global one, that they are dependent upon outside political forces for much of their security, and that their particular state’s interest may be dispensable in the eyes of one or more great powers’. See also Vital, Inequality of States, 33-6.

36 Until the mid-1970s there was no Middle East desk at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were only a couple of Greek embassies in the Arab world and they were undermanned, Bitsios, D., Πέρα από τα σύνορα (Athens 1983) 163 Google Scholar.

37 On the incomplete late modernization of the Greek state and its major characteristics during the period under examination see Sotiropoulos, D., Κράτος και μεταρρύθμιση στη σύγχρονη Noua Ευράχπη: Ελλάδα-Ισπανία-Ιταλία-Πορτογαλία (Athens 2007), passim Google Scholar. On the personalized foreign-policy decision making style see Ioakimidis, P. C. ‘The model of foreign policy-making in Greece: personalities versus institutions’, in Stavridis, S. et al. (eds), The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s (Basingstoke 1999)Google Scholar.

38 Realists have placed particular emphasis on this argument. See for instance the classic study by Waltz, K. N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA 1979)Google Scholar; also Kissinger, H. A., ‘System structures and American foreign policy’, in Kegley, C. W. Jr. and Wittkopf, Eugene (eds), Perspectives on American Foreign Policy (New York 1983)Google Scholar.

39 Vital, Inequality of States, passim.

40 Ioakimidis, ‘Europeanization of Greece’, 76.

41 For some interesting perspectives on the relationship between identity and international relations from the point of view of constructivism see Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York 1996)Google Scholar. For a contribution to this debate with specific reference to the Middle East see Telhami, S. and Barnett, M., ‘Introduction: identity and foreign policy in the Middle East’, in Telhami, S. and Barnett, M. (eds), Identity and foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca 2002), 6–8 Google Scholar.

42 On the impact of these two factors on Greek foreign policy see Ifantis, K., Άναζητώντας επιλογές: στρατηγικές εξισορρόπησης και συστημική πολικότητα’, in Arvanitopoulos, and Koppa, (eds), 30 χρόνια Google Scholar.

43 For an early classic study of the distinction between reality (operational environment) and image (psychological environment), see H., and Sprout, M., Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the context of International Politics (Princeton 1956)Google Scholar.

44 The prime example is the joint Greek-Turkish urban construction project in Oman, accounting for a 20 billion dollar budget. Turkey has for the past 30 years been building significant economic ties with most Muslim states in the Middle East. On the details of the expansion of these relations see for instance Robins, P., Turkey and the Middle East (London 1991) 100-11Google Scholar; Akder, H., ‘Turkey’s export expansion in the Middle East 1980-1985’, The Middle East Journal 41 (1987)Google Scholar.

45 For a discussion of some of these challenges and opportunities see Lesser, I. O. at al., Greece’s New Geopolitics (Santa Monica, CA 2001), chapter 2Google Scholar.

46 See for instance, the article by the PASOK MP and twice minister, Michalis Chrysochoidis, Έλλάδα και Μέση Ανατολή’, 15 Jan 2007, www.chrisochoidis.gr/2007/01/15/i-ellada-kai-i-mesi-anatoli, or the speech by the former minister of development, Christos Folias (New Democracy), during his visit to Lebanon, Έπενδύσεις στη Νοτιοανατολνκή Ευρώπη και τη Μέση Ανατολή: γέφυρα συνεργασίας Ελλάδας-Λιβάνου’, 29 Oct. 2008, www.folias.gr/images/activities/155.pdf.

47 Athanassopoulou, E., Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO (London 1999) 96-8Google Scholar.

48 See, for instance, the comments by the Greek Foreign Minister between 1974 and 1977, Bitsios, Πέρα από τα σύνορα, 159.

49 The New York Times, 15 Dec. 1981.

50 See for instance comments by the present PASOK Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dimitris Droutsas: [among our immediate priorities is] ‘Recovering the role that Greece can and ought to play in the Middle East. Strengthening again the traditional ties of friendship with the Arab world and relations with Israel’, Presentation to the press of the basic directions of Greek foreign policy by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. Droutsas, and by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, S. Kouvelis, 11 Jan. 2010, www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/el-GR/19012010_SB1421.htm.

51 It should be noted that Athens also favours a Euro-Atlantic co-ordination of policies in the Middle East.

52 This applies also to the Middle East peace efforts, despite the aspirations of the governments of both PASOK and New Democracy for Greece’s involvement in this big game, since the late 1990s. (For instance, between 1997 and 1999 Greece hosted a series of semi-official confidence-building meetings between Israelis and Palestinians). This is a very strange aspiration, however desirable the intended results may be. Not only does the EU itself play a lesser role than the US regarding this issue, but also within the EU or the EU troika discussions aiming to shape and structure a new order in the Middle East Greece has never featured as an actor, even a marginal one.