1 ‘Reform’, in Spanish; it denotes the regime’s self-transformation from dictatorial to democratic.

2 Huntington, S., ‘Will more countries become democratic?’, Political Science Quarterly 99 (1984) 193–218 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C., and Whitehead, L. (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore 1986) 17 Google Scholar.

4 Shain, Y. and Linz, J., Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions (Cambridge 1995) 57 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Ibid., 56.

6 Rustow, D., ‘Transitions to democracy: Towards a dynamic model’, Comparative Politics 2 (1970) 337-63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 On this see Eisenstadt, T., ‘Eddies in the Third Wave: Protracted transitions and theories of democratisation’, Democratisation 7 (2000) 3-24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Gill, G., The Dynamics of Democratisation (Basingstoke 2000) 48 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Gillespie, C., ‘Models of democratic transition in South America: Negotiated reform versus democratic rupture’, in Ethier, D. (ed.), Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia (Basingstoke 1990) 45–72 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Legg, K., Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford 1969) 241 Google Scholar.

11 Kakaounakis, N., 2650 μερόνυχτα συνωμοσίας (Athens 1976)Google Scholar.

12 Clapham, P. and Philip, G., ‘The political dilemmas of military regimes’, in Clapham, P. and Philip, G. (eds), The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (London 1985) 1-26Google Scholar, whence the term ‘veto regime’.

13 Woodhouse, C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels (New York 1985) 32 Google Scholar.

14 Grigoriadis, S. (Ιστορία τηςδικτατορίας, Athens 1975)Google Scholar enumerates one serious crisis per year from 1969 to 1973.

15 Veremis, T., О στρατός στην ελληνική πολιτική (Athens 1997) 268-9Google Scholar.

16 Murtagh, P., The Rape of Greece: The King, the Colonels and the Resistance (London 1994) 239 Google Scholar.

17 Manesis, A., ‘O εύκολος βιασμός της νομιμότητας και η δύσκολη νομιμοποίηση της βίας’, in Athanasatou, G., Rigos, A. and Seferiadis, S. (eds), HΑικτατορία 1967-1974 (Athens 1999) 37–52 Google Scholar.

18 The resistance groups were described as ‘fragmented, small in number, isolated, short-lived and aiming more at making their presence felt rather than seriously threatening the regime’; see G. Notaras, ‘Δικτατορία και οργανωμένη αντίσταση’, in Athanasatou et al. (eds), ΗΑικτατορία 1967-1974, 187-98.

19 D. Sotiropoulos, ‘H κοινωνική πολιτική της δικτατορίας’, in Athanasatou et al. (eds), H Δικτατορία 1967-1974, 115-31.

20 There was a ‘climate of economic euphoria’ (mainly from 1970 to 1973) in which ‘for the price of the loss of one’s individual and collective political autonomy, one could enjoy the privilege of ... the distributive function of the state’: D. Haralambis, ‘H δικτατορία ως αποτέλεσμα αντιφάσεων της μετεμφυλιακής δομής του πολιτικού συστήματος και οι αρνητικές της συνέπειες’, in Athanasatou et al. (eds), H Δικτατορία 1967-1974, 75-91. Makarezos, Minister of Economic Co-ordination from 1967 to 1973, claimed in his interview to have warned the other leaders that they should leave office by the end of 1971 at the latest (his emphasis).

21 Interview with Grigoris Farakos. For the schisms among the pre-1967 parties and elites see also Murtagh, The Rape of Greece.

22 Foreign Office Papers: FCO 9/1705, 4/4/1972.

23 Foreign Office Papers: FCO 9/1709, 2/1/1973.

24 For details about the suppression and aftermath of the attempted coup see Papadimitriou, N., Ηεξέγερση του Ναυτικού (Athens 1985)Google Scholar.

25 Verney, S. and Tsakaloyannis, P., ‘Linkage politics: The role of the European Community in Greek politics in 1973’, BMGS 10 (1986) 79-194Google Scholar.

26 For the condition of the Greek economy by late 1972-early 1973 see Mouzelis, N., Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment (London 1978)Google Scholar.

27 A detailed account of the ‘liberalization’ measures of 1973 is given in Grigoriadis, Ιστορία της δικτατορ-ίας. Significantly, the Spanish reforma started with the PCE (communist party) excluded from any negotiation with the regime elites until Prime Minister Suárez surprised the hard-liners by announcing the legalization of the party; also some political prisoners (accused of terrorist action) were still in prison. See Carr, R. and Fusi, P., Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London 1979)Google Scholar; and Graham, R., Spain: Change of a Nation (London 1984)Google Scholar.

28 Again from Spanish, this word denotes a problematic democracy, where the existence of institutions beyond government and parliamentary control (such as, most notably, the army and the Head of State) hinder the smooth functioning of the democratic constitution.

29 Veremis, О στρατός στην ελληνική πολιηκή, 267.

30 Meletopoulos, M., ΗΔικτατορία των Συνταγματαρχών (Athens 1996) 378 Google Scholar, 380.

31 Markezinis, S., Σύγχρονη πολιτική ιστορία της Ελλάδος (Athens 1994) 149 Google Scholar.

32 Markezinis, S., Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις (Athens 1979) 411 Google Scholar, where he gives a detailed account of the protracted negotiations between himself and Papadopoulos, their initial divergence and the concessions by the latter.

33 Makarezos was the third man in the dictatorial triumvirate (along with Papadopoulos and Pattakos); there were rumours he was preparing to run in the elections with his own party.

34 See Karamanlis, K., Αρχείο. Γεγονότα και κείμενα (Athens 1994)Google Scholar for this letter.

35 Leontaritis, G., Σάββας Κωνσταντόπουλος, τα άγνωστα ντοκουμέντα (Athens 2003) 166-7Google Scholar.

36 Grigoriadis, Ιστορία της δικτατορίας, 38. Nevertheless, Zournatzis recalls Mavros, in July 1973, prompting Markezinis to accept the offer from Papadopoulos to form a government immediately. Perhaps the cause of this change of heart within three months was the failure of Markezinis to meet Mavros’ expectations.

37 Interview with Kyrkos; Farakos partly explained the attitude of the above Left-wing leaders as an attempt to distance themselves from the official, ‘Orthodox’ KKE line.

38 KKE, Έκθεση και συμπεράσματα για τα γεγονότα του Νοέμβρη (Athens 1976) 18 Google Scholar.

39 Papandreou, A., Από то ПАК στο ΠΑΣΟΚ (Athens 1976) 58 Google Scholar.This position of Papandreou’s, consistent with his attitude during the dictatorship years, was considered by both Kyrkos and Farakos as an attempt to win over the more radical youth and opposition groups to his cause.

40 Rallis basically agreed with Varvitsiotis but said Karamanlis was sceptical about the possible success of his return to Greece, and that Karamanlis would by no means agree to become Prime Minister under Papadopoulos, an action which would legitimate the dictatorship a posteriori.

41 Barkman, C., Ambassador in Athens (London 1989) 121 Google Scholar. This is in sharp contrast to the Spanish anti-elites’ decision to support the reforma in their country. For more details see Share, D., The Making of Spanish Democracy (London 1986)Google Scholar.

42 See Markezinis, Σύγχρονη πολιτική ιστορία της Ελλάδος for details on the alarming information he received in the days before the coup.

43 Andrews, K., Greece in the Dark. 1967-1974 (Amsterdam 1980) 195 Google Scholar. Even the KKE report on the Polytechnic events partly considers this ‘an honouring of the liberalization plan’: KKE, Έκθεση και συμτιεράσματα, 55.

44 Foreign Office Papers: PREM 15/1611, 20/11/1973.

45 Quoted in Grigoriadis, Ιστορία της δικτατορίας, 111.

46 For instance, the KKE’s radio station accused both men of ‘Goebbels-like tactics’, aiming to distort the meaning of the uprising by presenting it as ‘a rampage of vandals’ (‘Voice of truth’ broadcast, 19/11/1973).

47 Again here, it is useful to bear in mind that the Spanish opposition followed exactly the opposite tactic, abstaining from any violent demonstrations that might have given the hard-liners an excuse for intervention. See Arango, J., The Spanish Political System: Franco’s Legacy (Boulder 1978)Google Scholar.

48 Foreign Office Papers: PREM 15/1611, 20/11/1973.

49 Cited in Andrews, Greece in the Dark, 306. This change of heart is also portrayed in Bonanos, G., H Αλήθεια (Athens 1986)Google Scholar. Also, Ioannidis told Pattakos in December ‘we are not joking: this is a dictatorship. We will send all our opponents into exile on the islands and stay in power for thirty years!’

50 Foreign Office Papers: FCO 9 1717-6/12/1973.

51 See also Haralambis, D., Στρατός και πολιτική εξουσία (Athens 1985)Google Scholar for the view that the self-transformation of the Greek dictatorship was a structural impossibility.

52 The Dutch ambassador noted, after a meeting with Markezinis in December (Barkman, Ambassador in Athens, 145): ‘I was indeed impressed by what he [Markezinis] had been able to get Papadopoulos’ agreement for - even after the disturbances’.

53 Huntington, S., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (London 1991) 190 Google Scholar.

54 Markezinis had alluded to this (Σύγχρονη πολιτική ιστορία της Ελλάδος, 183), interviewed in September 1973: ‘if I fail, power will pass into the hands of a Greek Gaddafi’.

55 Bonanos, ΗΑλήθεια, 135.

56 P. N. Diamantouros, ‘Regime change and the prospects for democracy in Greece: 1974-1983’, in O’Donnell et al. (eds), Transitions front Authoritarian Rule, 138-64.