Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 April 2011
The intricate interplay among environmental pressure groups, oil companies, and governments is revealed from the perspective of the Anglo-Dutch company Royal Dutch Shell. An examination of three environmental issues demonstrates the company's awareness of such problems and describes its efforts to contain potential damage to the degree permitted by existing technological and economic constraints. The industry view is that government measures should create a level playing field and should be effective and economically feasible. While pressure groups are skilled at calling attention to environmental problems, industry highlights the tradeoffs between different societal aims that are entailed in tackling these problems. Governments are left to fi nd the best ways to weigh conflicting interests.
1 Doyle, Jack, Riding the Dragon: Royal Dutch Shell and the Fossil Fire (Boston, 2002).Google Scholar
2 Quoted in Lerner, Steve, Diamond: A Struggle for Environmental Justice in Louisiana's Chemical Corridor (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 278.Google Scholar
3 Lindmark and Bergquist offered this suggestion: Lindmark, Magnus and Bergquist, Ann Kristin, “Expansion for Pollution Reduction? Environmental Adaptation of a Swedish and a Canadian Metal Smelter, 1960–2005”, Business History 50 (2008): 530–46Google Scholar.
4 Rosen, Christine Meisner and Sellers, Christopher C., “The Nature of the Firm: Towards an Ecocultural History of Business”, Business History Review 73 (1999): 577–600.Google Scholar
5 Jones, Geoffrey and Zeitlin, Jonathan, Oxford Handbook for Business History (New York, 2008), 5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6 Gorman, Hugh S., Redefining Effi ciency: Pollution Concerns, Regulatory Mechanisms, and Technological Change in the U.S. Petroleum Industry (Akron, Oh., 2001), 109.Google Scholar
7 Fischer, Kurt and Schot, Johan, “Introduction: The Greening of the Industrial Firm”, in Environmental Strategies for Industry: International Perspectives on Research Needs and Policy Implications, ed. Fischer, Kurt and Schot, Johan (Washington, D.C., 1993), 3–33.Google Scholar
8 Howarth, Stephen and Jonker, Joost, A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 2: Powering the Hydrocarbon Revolution (Oxford, 2007), 401–39.Google Scholar9DePuis, E. Melanie, “Introduction”, in Smoke and Mirrors: The Politics and Culture of Air Pollution, ed. DePuis, E. Melanie (New York, 2004), 1–11Google Scholar.
10 Higher compression caused gasoline to “pre-ignite” before the piston completed its downstroke.
11 Jonker, Joost and Zanden, Jan Luiten van, A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1: From Challenger to Joint Industry Leader (Oxford, 2007), 340–43Google Scholar ; Beaton, Kendall, Enterprise in Oil: A History of Shell in the United States (New York, 1957), 412–14Google Scholar.
12 McCarthy, Tom, Auto Mania: Cars, Consumers, and the Environment (New Haven, Conn., 2007), 48.Google Scholar
13 Ibid., 49.
14 Markowitz, Gerald and Rosner, David, Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution (Berkeley, Calif., 2003), 12–35.Google Scholar
15 , McCarthy, Auto Mania, 49.Google Scholar
16 , Jonker and Zanden, van, History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 1, 343, 525n32Google Scholar ; , Beaton, Enterprise in Oil, 412–14Google Scholar.
17 Forbes, R. J., “Technische ontwikkeling van de Koninklijke, 1914–1940” (Dec. 1944): 70–81,Google Scholar internal report, Shell The Hague Archives, Netherlands (SHA); Forbes, R. J. and O'Beirne, D. R., The Technical Development of the Royal Dutch/Shell, 1890–1940 (Leiden, 1957), 397–401Google Scholar ; for more about the Asian market agreement, See , Jonker and Zanden, van, From Challenger to Joint Industry Leader, 443Google Scholar.
18 Uekoetter, Frank, “The Merits of the Precautionary Principle: Controlling Automobile Exhaust in Germany and the United States before 1945”, in Smoke and Mirrors: The Politics and Culture of Air Pollution, ed. DePuis, E. Melanie (New York, 2004), 119–53.Google Scholar
19 Rove, D. J., Lead Manufacturing in Britain, a History (London, 1983), 233–35, 360–62.Google Scholar
20 Carson, Rachel, “A Fable for Tomorrow”, in Silent Spring (Boston, 1962), ch. 1.Google Scholar
21 Nriagu, Jerome O., “The Rise and Fall of Leaded Gasoline”, The Science of the Total Environment 92 (1990): 13–28, 20–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; , McCarthy, Auto Mania, 180–81Google Scholar.
22 Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, Annual Report, 1963.
23 Report by Lord Rothschild on Pollution, 5 July 1967, “Environmental Conservation, 1967–1968”, Committee of Managing Directors (CMD) fi les, S28, Shell London Archives (hereafter SLA); see also , Howarth and , Jonker, Powering the Hydrocarbon Revolution, 423–25Google Scholar.
24 , Markowitz and , Rosner, Deceit and Denial, 117.Google Scholar
25 , McCarthy, Auto Mania, 178–80.Google Scholar
26 Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, Annual Report, 1970.
27 Pratt, Joseph A., Prelude to Merger: A History of Amoco Corporation, 1973–1998 (Houston, 2002), 74–79.Google Scholar
28 Report by Lord Rothschild on Pollution, 5 July 1967.
29 Shell News 4 (1979): 12–16.Google Scholar
30 Product Safety and Environmental Conservation Report for 1975, CMD fi les, S74; and Product Safety and Environmental Conservation Report for 1978, CMD fi les S83, both SLA.
31 Product safety, Occupational Health and Environmental Conservation Report for 1983, CMD fi les, S108, SLA.
32 Chandler, Geoffrey, “Shell's Reputation”, Interchange 62 (Jan./Feb. 1972).Google Scholar
33 Minutes CMD, 10 June 1969, Environment and Public Health/Safety, 1969–75, CMD fi les, S63, SLA. In this role CMD nominated E. J. G. Toxopeüs, who in 1969 became chairman of the Interfunctional Contact Committee, which was renamed Environmental Conservation Committee.
34 Minutes CMD, 13 Oct. 1970, Public Affairs, 1969–1975, CMD fi les, S67, SLA.
35 Tookey, Richard, “PA is Good Business”, Interchange 19 (1988).Google Scholar
36 Tookey, Richard, “Public Opinion in the 90s: Threat or Opportunity?” Interchange (1991).Google Scholar
37 Interview with Braks, Tony, Shell World, Oct. 1994Google Scholar.
38 Sluyterman, Keetie, A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol. 3: Keeping Competitive in Turbulent Markets, 1973—2007 (Oxford, 2007), 335–41.Google Scholar
39 “Brent Field: A Comparison of Two Field Offtake Systems”, MR 81, SLA.
40 Conference minutes, 12 July 1995, including attachments, “Shell U.K. Issues Brief: North Sea abandonment–Brent Spar disposal”, Feb. 1995 and update on 1 May 1995, SLA.
41 Zyglidopoulos, Stelios C., “The Social and Environmental Responsibilities of Multinationals: Evidence from the Brent Spar Case”, Journal of Business Ethics 36 (2002): 141–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
42 Conference minutes, 12 July 1995, including attachments, SHA.
43 Conference minutes, 14 June 1995, SHA.
44 , Zyglidopoulos, “Social and Environmental Responsibilities”, 144.Google Scholar
45 Conference minutes, 12 July 1995, including attachments; interview by author with C. A. J. Herkströter, 14 Dec. 2004.
46 Conference minutes, 13 Sept. 1995; C. A. J. Herkströter letter, 31 July 1995, both SLA.
47 Ibid.
48 Conference minutes, 15 July 1995, SHA.
49 Financial Times, 6 Sept. 1995; Peter Melchett to Shell U.K., 4 Sept. 1995, www.archive.greenpeace.org (accessed 6 Jan. 2005).
50 “Greenpeace under Fire on Brent Spar Coverage”, Nature 377 (1995): 6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
51 “Brent Spar—The Wider Perspective”, Shell Management Brief (Aug. 1995).Google Scholar
52 “Brent Spar: See and Hear the Solution”, Interchange (1998): 17.Google Scholar
53 OSPAR Decision 98/3 on the Disposal of Disused Offshore Installations, 1998, www.ospar.org.
54 Report by Lord Rothschild on Pollution, 5 July 1967.
55 Minutes CMD, 22 Aug. 1979, Environment, public health, safety, 1976–1978, CMD fi les, DCS, S74, SLA.
56 HSE review 1985, discussed 12 Aug. 1986, Environment, public health, and safety, 1986, CMD fi les, DCS, S116, SLA.
57 World Commission of Environment and Development World Commission, Our Common Future (Oxford, 1987), 43.Google Scholar
58 Ibid., 308–43.
59 Conference minutes, 12 Feb. 1992; PA review, “Profi t with Responsibility”, both SHA.
60 Visser, Koos, “The Test of Tomorrow”, Shell Selected Papers (Sept. 1993).Google Scholar
61 Product Safety, Occupational Health and Environmental Conservation report for 1988, HS/1990, CMD fi les, DCS, S130, SLA.
62 Davies, Ged, “Global Warming: The Role of Energy Effi cient Technologies”, Shell Selected Papers (1989).Google Scholar
63 “Global Climate Change”, Shell Briefi ng Service (SBS) (1990).
64 Shell World, Feb. 1995.
65 Statement of the Global Climate Coalition before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Hearing on S5565, the Clean Power Act, Nov. 1, 2001: http://epw.senate.gov/107th/Global_Climate_Coalition.htm.
66 Moody-Stuart, Mark, “Winners and Losers—Meeting the Upstream Challenges of the 21st Century”, speech given at the AAPG/SVG Congress, 9 Sept. 1996, Caracas, Venezuela.Google Scholar
67 Herströter, Cor, “Refl ections on Kyoto”, 2 Feb. 1998.Google Scholar
68 Speech by Browne, John, Royal Institute of International Affairs conference, Chatham House, London, 6 Feb. 1998Google Scholar.
69 Kolk, Ans and Levy, David, “Winds of Change: Corporate Strategy, Climate Change and Oil Multinationals”, European Management Journal 19 (2001): 501–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
70 Watts, Philip, “Energy and Climate—The Role of Industry”, paper presented at the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and Eidanren seminar, Tokyo, 5 June 2003.Google Scholar
71 “People, Planet ”, Shell Report, 1999.
72 “Meeting the Energy Challenge”, Shell Report, 2002.
73 , Sluyterman, Keeping Competitive, 426–30.Google Scholar
74 Gore, Al, An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It (New York, 2006).Google Scholar
75 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva, 2007).Google Scholar
76 Veer, Jeroen van der, “Our Approach to Climate Change”, introduction to Shell Sustainability Report, 2006 (2006).Google Scholar