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Oil and the Marshall Plan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2012

David S. Painter
David S. Painter
Affiliation:
David S. Painter is an historian at the State Department.
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Abstract

One of the most difficult problems United States policymakers faced during the Marshall Plan years was balancing the national interest in European recovery with the private interests of U.S. companies with European markets. In this article, Dr. Painter describes how policymakers grappled with the often conflicting interests of the U.S. oil industry and war-ravaged Western Europe. In so doing, he provides a case study of the complex relationship of public policy and private power.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business History Review , Volume 58 , Issue 3 , Autumn 1984 , pp. 359 - 383
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1984

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References

1 See the discussion of the sterling area in Larson, Henrietta M., Knowlton, Evelyn H., and Popple, Charles S., New Horizon. 1927–1950, vol. 3 of History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) (New York, 1971), 695–97, 703, 708.Google Scholar See also Economic Cooperation Administration, The Sterling Area: An American Analysis (London, 1951), 1–147Google Scholar, and Gardner's, Richard N.classic Sterling Dollar Diplomacy (London, 1956).Google Scholar

2 Block, Fred L., The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present (Berkeley, 1977), 76–83Google Scholar; Yergin, Daniel, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, 1977), 303–9Google Scholar; Alpert, Paul, Twentieth Century Economic History of Europe (New York, 1951), 288–310Google Scholar; Zupnick, Elliot, Britain's Postwar Dollar Problem (New York, 1957), 39, 64, 85–86, 118–20.Google Scholar On Europe's economic situation in general, see Sanford, William F. Jr., “The American Business Community and the European Recovery Program, 1947–1952” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1980), 1–8Google Scholar; see also Sanford, William F. Jr., “The Marshall Plan: Origins and Implementation,” Department of State Bulletin 82 (June 1982): 17–20.Google Scholar

3 Block. Origins of International Economic Disorder, 82–83; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 3 (1947);204–19 (hereafter FRUS). See also Jackson, Scott, “Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitment for a European Recovery Program,” Journal of American History 65 (March 1979): 1043–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Paterson, Thomas G., “The Quest for Peace and Prosperity: International Trade. Communism, and the Marshall Plan,” Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, ed. Bernstein, Barton J., (Chicago, 1970), 78–96Google Scholar; Sanford, “Marshall Plan,” 20–26. Block points out that the “genius” of the Marshall Plan was that “it simultaneously attacked all of the forces that were moving Western Europe away from multilateralism”; by strengthening the European economy, it aimed at undercutting the appeal of the left and the pull from the Soviet Union as well as the trend toward state capitalism in foreign trade.

4 See the oil industry study, “Report of the Group on ‘American Petroleum Interests in Foreign Countries,’” in Senate Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources. American Petroleum Interests in Foreign Countries, 79th Cong., lst sess., 1945, 153–438, esp. 423–24; Wilkins, Mira, The Maturing, of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad 1914–1970 (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 303, 314–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also the astute analysis “Oil Supply—and Demand,” Economist 157, 8 Oct. 1949, 797–800, and Arthur Krock in the New York Times, 10 March 1950.

5 Odell, Peter R., Oil and World Power, 5th ed. (Harmondsworth, 1970), 108–9Google Scholar; Alpert, Economic History of Europe, 296–308, 387; Jensen, Walter C., Energy in Europe 1945–1980 (London, 1967), 1–20.Google Scholar On Eastern Europe, see Chester, Edward W., United States Oil Policy and Diplomacy: A Twentieth Century Overview (Westport, Conn., 1983), 91–94Google Scholar; for the view of leading oil experts Wallace Pratt and Joseph Pogue, see Pogue to Robert McConnell, 14 Jan. 1948, RG 304, Office File of the Chairman, General Correspondence, “Fuel and Fuel Oil,” Records of the National Security Resources Board; Pratt to McConnell, 23 Jan. 1948. ibid.; Report of the United States Committee on Petroleum, 5 Nov. 1947, RG 59, box 22, “CEEC Reports,” Records of the Petroleum Division (hereafter PED Records); Collisson to Cooper, 7 Jan. 1948, RG 48, Cooper Papers, box 15, “ERP 1948,” Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior (hereafter Interior Records); “Chapter G—Petroleum.” 2 Jan. 1948, Collisson Papers, box 14, “Office File,” Interior Records; Millis, Walter, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), 356–57Google Scholar; House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Petroleum Study, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 400 (hereafter Petroleum Study).

6 Mendershausen, Horst, “Dollar Shortage and Oil Surplus in 1949–1950,” Essays in International Finance 11 (Nov. 1950): 8–11Google Scholar; Zupniek, Britain's Dollar Problem, 119.

7 See the comments by Emilio Collado of Jersey in Record of Action. Investment Panel, Advisory Committee on Overseas Territories, 25 Oct. 1949, William L. Clayton Papers, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL). (I wish to thank William Burr for drawing my attention to this document.) See also Larson et al., New Horizons, 697, 703; Mendershausen, “Dollar Shortage and Oil Surplus,” 7–9; “British and U.S. Battle for Oil Markets,” Business Week, 19 Nov. 1949, 125.

8 Mutual Security Agency, “ECA and MSA Relations with International Oil Companies Concerning Petroleum Prices,” 15 Aug. 1952, in Senate Select Committee on Small Business, The Impact of Monopoly and Cartel Practices on Small Business, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952, 140 (hereafter cited as “ECA Price History”); Petroleum Study, 148, 409–11; see also Walter Levy, “Petroleum Under the ECA Program,” RG 286, 53 A 441, Mutual Security Agency. Office of Administration, box 265, “Petroleum, Procurement Outside the United States,” Records of the Agency for International Development (hereafter ECA Records); and Oil Forum 2 (Oct. 1948): 397–98.

9 “EGA Price History,” 140. The oil shortage quickly turned into a surplus in 1949; see the discussion below.

10 Ibid., 141, 150; George W. Stocking, ‘Pricing Middle East Crude Oil,” 10 Sept. 1949, 53 A 405, box 1, “Oil, Petroleum, etc.,” ECA Records.

11 Zupnick, Britain's Dollar Problem, 120; Frank, Helmut J., Crude Oil Prices in the Middle East: A Study in Oligopolistic Price Behavior (New York, 1966), 29–36Google Scholar; Senate Select Committee on Small Business, The International Petroleum Cartel (Washington, D.C., 1952), 360–63, 370–72Google Scholar; “ECA Price History,” 141–42, 147; Dechert Memo of Discussion, 2 Aug. 1948, and Harden to Dechert, 14 Oct. 1948, both in .53 A 405, box 1, “Oil. Petroleum, etc.,” ECA Records. “36 API” refers to the specific gravity of oil as established by the American Petroleum Institute. “Specific gravity is relative density, acomparison of the density of a volume of oil to the density of the same volume of water. The gravity of water on the API scale is 10°. Very heavy crude oil is 11° or 12°, very light crude is 40° gasoline is about 60°.” Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy. 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, part 4: 1881.

12 Hoffman to the heads of Jersey, Socony, Gulf, SOCAL, and the Texas Company, 16 July 1948, 53 A 441, Hoffman Correspondence, folder no. 2, ECA Records; Dechert Memo of Discussion, 2 Aug. 1948, Dechert to Henderson, 10 Aug. 1948. and Levy to Hoffman, 14 Sept. 1948, all in 53 A 405, box 1, “Oil, Petroleum, etc.,” ECA Records; Levy to Bissell. 19 May 1948, RG 353, box 34, Records of the Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees of the Department of State, European Recovery Program Committee. Levy was supported by ECA's Petroleum Branch, which was staffed largely by former oil company officials. The Controller's Office wanted the oil companies to furnish data on volumes and prices so that ECA could be sure that the prices it financed could be defended before Congress and the public; see Anderson to Hoffman, 29 Sept. 1948, Nakasian to Hoffman. 16 Sept. 1948, Levy to Hoffman, 14 Sept. 1948, and Harden to Dechert, 4 Oct. 1948, all in 53 A 405, box 1, “Oil, Petroleum, etc.,” ECA Records; Hoffman to the heads of Jersey, Socony. Gulf, SOCAL, and the Texas Company, 3 Dec. 1948, 53 A 441, Hoffman Correspondence, box 269, folder no. 4, ECA Records; Anderson to levy, 27 Dec. 1948, 53 A 441, Office of the Controller, box 7, “Petroleum.” ECA Records; “ECA Price History,” 147; on Hoffman, see Sanford, “American Business and the European Recovery Program,” 131–33, 231–33. Levy was in the early stages of what was to be a long and successful career as an oil consultant; see his Oil Strategy and Politics, 1941–1981 (Boulder, Colo., 1982). According to Sanford, Hoffman's attitude towards the oil companies was consistent with his position on all industries supplying goods to Europe under the ERP.

13 “ECA Price History,” 142; Johnson to Steelman, 14 Feb. 1949, OF 56, HSTL; Stocking to Levy, 11 Jan. 1949. RG 59. decimal file. 811.6363/1–949, Records of the Department of State (hereafter cited by decimal number only).

14 “ECA Price History,” 142; Hoffman to the heads of Jersey, Socony, Gulf, and Caltex, 14 Feb. 1949, printed in Petroleum Study, 414; see the company replies, ibid., 414–20. U.S. independent oil companies charged that by paying the majors high prices, ECA subsidized the dumping of low-cost Middle East oil in the United States; see the testimony of independent oilman L. Dan Jones in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Extension of the European Recovery Program, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, 503–18. For ECA's defense of its pricing policies, see Hoffman to Bloom, 1 March 1949, in Petroleum Study, 409–11.

15 The consultants were Max Ball, former head of the Oil and Gas Division of the Department of the Interior; Edward S. Mason, Harvard University; Sumner Pike, commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission; George W. Stocking, Vanderbilt University; and L. S. Wescoat, Pure Oil Corporation; “ECA Price History,” 142–43; “Recommendation of ECA Consultants,” 23 March 1949, and Stocking to Levy, 15 April 1949, both in 53 A 441, Office of the Controller, box 7, “Petroleum,” ECA Records; Stocking, “Pricing Middle East Crude Oil,” 10 Sept. 1949, 53 A 405, box 1, “Oil, Petroleum, etc.,” ECA Records.

16 Bruce to the heads of Jersey, Socony, Gulf, and Caltex, 25 March 1949, Petroleum Study, 412–22; Frank, Crude Oil Prices, 44–53; “ECA Price History,” 143–44.

17 Stocking, “Pricing Middle East Crude Oil,” 10 Sept. 1949, Kohler to assistant administrator, 20 Sept. 1949, and Price Branch, Office of the Controller, “Preliminary Report on Prices Paid in ECA-Financed Petroleum Transactions,” 24 Oct. 1949, all in 53 A 405, box 1, “Oil, Petroleum, etc.,” ECA Records; Nakasian to Stocking, 1 Oct. 1949, and Nakasian to Kohler, 8 Nov. 1949; both in 53 A 441, Office of the Controller, box 7, “Petroleum,” ECA Records; “ECA Price History,” 144–45. For statistics on imports, see Oil and Gas Division Department of the Interior, “Paper Dealing with Petroleum Imports and Exports,” 19 July 1950, Minerals and Fuels Division, “Oil and Cas Division,” Interior Records (hereafter cited as OGD Oil Imports Paper).

18 “ECA Price History.’ 141, 147–48; Nakasian to Kohler, 19 May 1949; and Kohler to the assistant administrator, 15 Aug. 1949; both in 53 A 441, Office of the Controller, box 7, “Petroleum,’ ECA Records; Penrose, Edith T., The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry (London, 1968), 185–88.Google Scholar

19 “ECA Price History,” 148–49; Nakasian to Kohler, 8 Nov. 1949, 53 A 441, Office of the Controller, box 7, “Petroleum,” ECA Records; Lisle, T. Orchard, “E.C.A. Ruling Hurts International Oil Trade,” Oil Forum 4 (Oct. 1950); 377–78Google Scholar; Lisle, “Price Cuts Imposition by E.C.A. Unwise and Unfair,” ibid. (Dec. 1950); 489, 491.

20 “ECA Price History,” 145.

21 “ECA Price History,” 145–46; Oil Forum 5 (Jan. 1951): 19–20, 28; for background on TAPLINE, see Miller, Aaron David, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1949 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980), 154–57Google Scholar, 179–84, 195–98.

22 “ECA Price History,” 147; United States v. Standard Oil Company of California, the Texas Company, Bahrein Petroleum Company, Ltd, California-Texas Oil Company, Ltd., Caltex Oceanic, Ltd., and Mideast Crude Sales Company, 155 F. Supp. 121. In July 1957 a federal district court dismissed the government's complaint, and this ruling was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1959; see Engler, Robert, The Politics of Oil. Private Power and Democratic Directions (Chicago, 1961), 523.Google Scholar In June, President Truman had authorized the Justice Department to initiate an antitrust investigation of the oil companies; see Kaufman, Burton I., The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Policy in the Cold War Era (Westport, Conn., 1978).Google Scholar ECA's problems with the oil companies undoubtedly influenced his decision.

23 House Select Committee on Small Business, Effects of Foreign Oil Imports on Independent Domestic Producers, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1950, pt. 2, 523, 529; Minutes, Petroleum Policy Committee, 9 Feb. 1949, RG 353, box 70, “PPC M-15,” Records of the Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees of the Department of State, Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy (hereafter ECEFP Records); E. Groen, “The Significance of the Marshall Plan for the Petroleum Industry in Europe—Historical Review of the Period 1947–1950,” in U.S. Senate and House Select Committees on Small Business, Report on the Third World Petroleum Congress (Washington, D.C., 1952), 50–55Google Scholar; “Up From the Ashes,” Lamp 33 (Sept 1951): 2–5, discusses the rehabilitation of European refineries.

24 Working Group on Britain (WGB), “United States Petroleum Policy and the United Kingdom,” 23 Aug. 1949, box 2, “Near East Oil,”PED Records; “The Sterling Dollar Oil Problem,” 27 April 1949, 800.6363/4–2749; Nitze to secretary of state, 12 May 1949, 841.6363/5–1249; see also “British and U.S. Battle for Oil Markets,” Business Week, 19 Nov. 1949, 125; and “Oil Supply—and Demand,” Economist 157 (8 Oct. 1949); 797–98.

25 Levy, “Statement of Issues Relating to Dollar and Sterling Oil as They May Be Raised by American Oil Companies,” 14 March 1949, 53 A 405, box 1, “Oil, Petroleum, etc.,” ECA Records; Effects of Oil Imports, 529–31; Groen, “Significance of the Marshall Plan,” 40–46, 56; “Chapter G-Petroleum,” 2 Jan. 1948, box 14, “Office File” Collisson Papers, Interior Records.

26 On the divisions within ECA, see Henderson to Levy, 17 March 1949; ECA Industry Division, “Potential Impact of the Petroleum Expansion Plans of Participating Countries on United States Security Interests and United States Foreign Commercial Policy,” 6 May 1949; and M. E. Locker, “The Application of ECA Policy to the Petroleum Program.” 11 May 1949; all in 53 A 441, Office of the Controller, box 7, “Petroleum,” ECA Records; Ad Hoc Committee on the Problem of Dollar-Sterling Oil, 3 March 1949, 53 A 405, box 1, “Oil, Petroleum, etc.,” ECA Records; B. B. Biggs (Executive Office ANPB), “Meeting at ECA,” 3 March 1949; and “Implications of ECA Equipment Policy on Future Position of Dollar versus Sterling Oil,” 14 March 1949; both in RG 334, box 8, F. 4, Records of Interservice Agencies, Army Navy Petroleum Board #38 (hereafter ANPB Records).

27 Funkhouser to secretary of state, 5 April 1949, 890.6363/4–549; Nitze to secretary of state, 12 May 1949, 841.6363/5–1249; WGB, “U.S. Petroleum Policy and the UK,” 23 Aug. 1949, cited in note 24.

28 WGB, “US Petroleum Policy and the UK,” 23 August 1949, cited in note 24, Biggs to Levy, 14 March 1949, ANPB #38, box 8, F. 4, ANPB Records; Biggs to secretary of defense, 2 May 1949, RG 330, CD-7–1–9, Secretary of Defense Office Files; Biggs statement, 12 Sept. 1949, “PPC Documents 11–19/4c,” ECEFP Records.

29 Petroleum Study, 108–9; Effects of Oil Imports, 531–32; Mendershausen, “Dollar Shortage and Oil Surplus,” 13; Anderson to Hoffman et al. (with attached “Statement on Estimated European Consumption in Fiscal 1953 and on Refining Capacity as Planned by the European Countries”), 23 May 1949, 53 A 441, box 87, ECA Records; Anderson to Hoffman et al., 13 June 1949, 53 A 405, box 1, ECA Records. (I wish to thank Ethan Kapstein for drawing my attention to this document.)

30 Ad Hoc Committee on the Problem of Dollar-Sterling Oil, 3 March 1949, 53 A 405, box 1, “Oil, Petroleum, etc.,” ECA Records; Effects of Oil Imports, 532; Levy testimony, Petroleum Study, 394–441; Hoffman testimony, ibid., 150–51; “World Oil in Turmoil,” Fortune, Feb. 1950, III; New York Times, 21 Oct. 1949.

31 “The Sterling Oil Problem,” 27 April 1949, 800.6363/4-2749; “Discrimination by the United Kingdom Against Oil Operations of United States Companies,” 26 Sept. 1949, RG 353, box 83, “JPD Documents 7–12” Records of the Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees of the Department of State, Joint Petroleum Discussion (hereafter JPD Records); Larson, New Horizons, 705–6; Neal, Charles Allen, “Cause and Effect of Argentine Oil Deal as Seen through British Eyes,” Oil Forum 3 (Aug., Sept. 1949); 335–36Google Scholar, 347, 386–87.

32 Johnson to Steelman, 14 Feb. 1949, OF 56, HSTL; Nitze to secretary of state, 27 April 1949; and “The Sterling Oil Problem,” 27 April 1949; both in 800.6363/4–2749; “United States Trade in Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,” 12 Aug. 1949, 811.6363/8–1249; Thompson, Ernest O. (head of the Texas Railroad Commission), “Middle East Oil Presents Problems for U.S. Producers,” Oil Forum 3 (March 1949): 123–26Google Scholar; and Thompson, “Oil Conservation Progress in Texas During 1949,” ibid. (Nov. 1949): 487–88.

33 “Sterling Dollar Oil Problem,” 27 April 1949, 800.6363/4–2749; Minutes, Petroleum Policy Committee, 13 April 1949, “PPC Minutes, 1948–19,” ECEFP Records.

34 “U.S. Trade in Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,”12 Aug. 1949, 811.6363/8–1249; Johnson to Steelman, 14 Feb. 1949; and staff memo for the president, n.d.; both in OF 56, HSTL; Adelman, M. A., The World Petroleum Market (Baltimore, 1972), 144–50.Google Scholar See also the numerous exchanges between the State Department and congressmen from oil states in the 811.6363 file for 1949; Lisle, T. Orchard. “Import-Export Oil Divides American Oil Industry,” Oil Forum 3 (March, Oct. 1949): 115–18Google Scholar, 412–14, 431.

35 Holman to Hoffman, 9 March 1949; Holman to Hoffman, 9 Sept. 1949; and Socony-Vacuum, “United States Oil Company Operations Abroad as Affected by the Sterling Dollar Position and the OEEC Program,” 13 May 1949; all in 53 A 405, box 1, ECA Records; Holman, Eugene (president of Jersey), “Imported Oil Flood Unsound and Foolhardy,” Oil Forum 3 (July 1949); 289–92Google Scholar; Oil Forum 4 (Sept. 1950); 337–38, Adelman, World Petroleum Market, 144–50.

36 WGB, “US Petroleum Policy and the UK,” 23 Aug. 1949; and Funkhouser to Childs. 23 Sept. 1949; both in box 2, “Near East Oil,” PED Records; Eakens to Beale, 2 Sept. 1949, 841.6363/5–1849.

37 “The Dollar Crisis,” Round Table 39 (Sept. 1949): 303–8; “United Kingdom: The Economic Crisis,” ibid., 344–46; Block. Origins of Economic Disorder, 94–95; “Devaluation of Sterling: The Decision and Its Consequences,” Round Table 40 (Dec. 1949): 8–14; “Report on Sterling: Before and After Devaluation,” ibid. (Sept. 1950): 308–19.

38 Block, Origins of Economic Disorder, 94–95; Under Secretary's Meeting, “The United Kingdom Economic Crisis—Factual Background and Possible Remedies,’ 17 Aug. 1949, RG 59, box 9, minutes, memos 2/3/49–12/30/49, Office of the Executive Secretariat; Mendershausen, “Dollar Shortage,” 20; Funkhouser to Childs, 23 Sept. 1949, box 2, “Near East Oil,” PED Records; “The Significance of Petroleum in the British Balance of Payments,” 13 Sept. 1949, box 69, “PPC Documents,” ECEFP Records.

39 Eakens to Labouisse, 20 Oct. 1949, 800.6363/10–2049; Acheson to U.S. Embassy, London, 2 Nov. 1949, 841.6363/9–2849; U.S. Working Group, U.S.-U.K.-Canada Petroleum Discussions, “ECA Proposal for a US Position on Petroleum,” 26 Sept. 1949, box 2, “Near East Oil,” PED Records; “Position Paper Setting Forth Policy for Talks on Petroleum Matters,” 18 Nov. 1949, “JPD Documents 1–6,” JPD Records; Acheson to U.S. Embassy, London, 21 Nov. 1949, 841.6363/11–1649.

40 George A. Eddy, “Personal Comments on Sterling Oil Competition,” 25 Oct. 1949, and Eddy to Labouisse, 16 Dec. 1949, both in 800.6363/12–1649; Eakens memorandum of conversation, 13 May 1949, 811.6363/5–1349.

41 “The Caltex Plan,” 9 Sept. 1949, 841.6363/9–1449; Jersey's plan, dated 12 August 1949, is in “JPD Documents 1–6,” JPD Records; the Socony plan was sent to the State Department on 19 September 1949, 811.6363/9–1949.

42 Webb to U.S. Embassy, London, 25 Nov. 1949, 841.6363/11–2549; Moline, “Meeting on Displacement of Dollar Oil in Sterling Area by Surplus British Production,” 28 Nov. 1949, and U.S. Embassy, London, to secretary of state, 29 Nov. 1949, both in 841.6363/11–2849; Moline memorandum of conversation, 2 Dec. 1949, 841.6363/12–249: Holmes to secretary of state, 16 Dec. 1949, 840–50 Recovery/12–1649: FRUS 5 (1950): 9–10; “Saving on Dollar Oil,” Economist 157, 24 Dec. 1949, 1424–25; New York Times, 25 Dec. 1949 and 4 Jan. 1950. According to Jersey, its foreign producing affiliates lost outlets for sixteen million barrels of crude oil and products during 1949 because of the dollar shortage and sterling restrictions. This represented 6 percent of Jersey sales outside the United States; “Dollars, Sterling and Oil,” Lamp 32 (March 1950): 2. By April 1950, the State Department was estimating that sterling oil was displacing dollar oil at a rate of 135,000 barrels per day, which was equivalent to about 9 percent of the total overseas production of U.S. companies: Petroleum Study, 222.

43 Mendershausen, “Dollar Shortage,” 3; FRUS 5 (1950): 9–10; Chester, U.S. Oil Diplomacy 97; New York Times. 31 Jan., 1 and 2 Feb., and 7 March 1950.

44 Mendershausen, “Dollar Shortage,” 17–18.

45 Ibid.: New York Times. 9 Feb. 19.50.

46 Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), “Dollar-Sterling Oil Problem,” 26 Jan. 1950, PSF, box 132, “Oil,” HSTL: FRUS 1950 5:34–35; Oil forum 4 (Jan. 1950): 12–14, 40; Mendershausen, “Dollar Shortage,” 18–19; Larson, New Horizons. 708; New York Times, 30 and 31 March, and 5 April 1950; Petroleum Study, 222–24.

47 Mendershausen, “Dollar Shortage,” 26–32; Larson, New Horizons, 710–13; OGD Oil Imports Paper, 19 July 1950, cited in note 17; New York Times, 28 April 1950.