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² Graebner, Norman A., “The State of Diplomatic History,” Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter, 4 (March 1973), 3–7.Google ScholarUnger, Irwin, “The ‘New Left’ and American History: Some Recent Trends in American Historiography,” American Historical Review, 72 (July 1967), 1237–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Siracusa, Joseph M., New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians (Port Washington, N. Y., 1973)Google Scholar, are balanced surveys. A sympathetic appraisal is Theoharis, Athan G., “Revisionism,” in DeConde, Alexander, ed., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas, 3 vols. (New York, 1978), 3:900–13.Google ScholarRe the linkage between the New Left's views on the Cold War and its approach generally to American foreign policy, see: Holsti, Ole R., “The Study of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Theories of the Radical Right and Radical Left,” American Political Science Review, 68 (March 1974), 217–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Siracusa, , “The New Left, The Cold War, and American Diplomacy: The Case for Historiography as Intellectual History,” World Review, (March 1975), 37–52.Google Scholar

³ Thomson, Sandra C. and Coppin, Clayton A. Jr, “Texts and Teaching: A Profile of Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1972,” West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences, 13 (June 1974), 71–72Google Scholar; Perkins, Bradford, “Rating DeConde's Stable of Diplomatic Historians,” Diplomatic History, 3 (Fall 1979), 442.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ This critical attitude is perhaps most marked in works dealing with U.S.-Latin American relations, where condemnation of the United States for its hegemonial ambitions, its excessive sensitivity to American business interests, and its support of local dictators has become almost a staple of the field. See, for examples, of U.S. policies generally: Weischadle, David E., “Paternalism: A View of the Latin American Foreign Policy of the Untied States, 1823–1934,” Social Studies, 61 (November 1970), 263–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Connell-Smith, Gordon, The United States and Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American Relations (London, 1974)Google Scholar; re Cuba in the 1920s: Langley, Lester D., The Cuban Policy of the United States: A Brief History (New York, 1968), 137–52Google Scholar; re Nicaragua: Macaulay, Neill, The Sandino Affair (Chicago, 1967)Google Scholar, Millet, Richard, Guardians of the Dynasty (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1977)Google Scholar, and Bacevich, Andrew J. Jr, “The American Electoral Mission in Nicaragua, 1927–28,” Diplomatic History, 4 (Summer 1980), 241–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Nearing, Scott and Freeman, Joseph, Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism (New York, 1925)Google Scholar, was an influential contemporary polemic. More scholarly respectable were the volumes in the series Studies in American Imperialism, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes: Knight, Meivin M., The Americans in Santo Domingo (New York, 1928)Google Scholar; Marsh, Margaret A., The Bankers in Bolivia: A Study in American Foreign Investment (New York, 1928)Google Scholar; Jenks, Leland H., Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar (New York, 1928)Google Scholar; Bailey, W. and Diffie, Justine W., Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New York, 1931)Google Scholar; Rippy, J. Fred, The Capitalists and Colombia (New York, 1931)Google Scholar; and Kepner, Charles D. Jr and Soothill, Jay H., The Banana Empire: A Case Study of Economic Imperialism (New York, 1935).Google Scholar For accounts re two of the more prominent early academic critics of U.S. Latin American policies: Karnes, Thomas L., “Hiram Bingham and His Obsolete Shibboleth,” Diplomatic History, 3 (Winter 1979), 39–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and re Inman, Samuel Guy, Woods, Kenneth E., “‘Imperialistic America’: A Landmark in the Development of U.S. Policy toward Latin America,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 21 (Winter 1967), 55–72.Google Scholar

⁶ Charles A. Beard, with the collaboration of Smith, G.H.E., The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1934), 549–52.Google Scholar

⁷ Beard, , “War with Japan: What Shall We Get Out of It?” Nation, March 25, 1925, 311–13Google Scholar, Beard, with the collaboration of Smith, G.H.E., The Open Door at Home: A Trial Philosophy of National Interest (New York, 1934), 223–24.Google Scholar For his fuller elaboration of the “continental” conception, see Beard and Beard, Mary R., America in Midpassage, 2 vols. (New York, 1939), 1: 452–57.Google Scholar

⁸ LaFeber, Walter, “‘Ah, If We Had Studied It More Carefully’: The Fortunes of American Diplomatic History,” Prologue, 11 (Summer 1979), 124–25, 129.Google Scholar For Harrington's own debt to Beard, “Beard's Idea of National Interest and New Interpretations,” American Perspective, 4 (Fall 1950), 335–45.Google Scholar

⁹ Williams, , The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York, 1959), xxiiiGoogle Scholar; The Contours of American History (Cleveland, 1961), 375, 449; and The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, 1959), 34, 80. Williams traces the influences upon and evolution of his views in “Open Door Interpretation,” in DeConde, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2; 703–10. For his homage to Marx: The Great Evasion: An Essay on the Contemporary Relevance of Karl Marl and on the Wisdom of Admitting the Heretic into the Dialogue about America's Future (Chicago, 1964); but see the criticism by a more orthodox Marxist: Genovese, Eugene D., “William Appleman Williams on Marx and America,” Studies on the Left, 6 (January-February 1966), 70–86.Google ScholarRe his debt to Beard; “A Note on Charles Austin Beard's Search for a General Theory of Causation,” American Historical Review, 62 (October 1956): 59–80, and “Charles Austin Beard: The Intellectual as Tory-Radical,” in Goldberg, Harvey, ed., American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities (New York, 1957), 295–308.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Williams, Tragedy, 118. Williams most fully developed this thesis in “The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920's,” Science & Society, 18 (Winter 1954), 1–20.

¹¹ Kolko, Gabriel, Main Currents in Modern American History (New York, 1976), 196.Google Scholar

¹² Parrini, Carl P., Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923 (Pittsburgh, 1969), esp. 248–76.Google Scholar For this argument by a German scholar strongly influenced by American New Left works: Schröder, Hans-Jürgen, “Ökonomische Aspekte der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik 1900–1923,” Neue Politische Literatur, 17 (July-September 1972), 298–321Google Scholar; further variations on the theme: Van Meter, Robert H. Jr, “Herbert Hoover and the Economic Reconstruction of Europe, 1918–1921,” and Parrini, “Hoover and International Economics,” in Gelfand, Lawrence E., ed., Herbert Hoover: The Great War and Its Aftermath 1914–23 (Iowa City, 1979), 143–206.Google Scholar The New Left thesis re Wilson's goals owes much to: Sklar, Martin J., “Woodrow Wilson and the Political Economy of Modern United States Liberalism,” Studies on the Left, 1, no. 3 (1960), 17–47Google Scholar; Mayer, Arno J., Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918 (New Haven, 1959)Google Scholar, and Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919 (New York, 1967); and Levin, N. Gordon Jr, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968).Google Scholar

¹³ Smith, Robert F., “American Foreign Relations, 1920–1942,” in Bernstein, Barton J., ed., Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York, 1968), 237–45.Google Scholar See also: Smith, , “Export Trade Ideology of American Business and Its Relationship to Foreign Policy: 1919–1933,” Discourse, 3 (July 1960), 189–200Google Scholar, and “Republican Policy and the Pax Americana 1921–1932,” in Williams, , From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations (New York, 1972), 253–92.Google Scholar Re the U.S. as a counterrevolutionary force: Williams, , America Confronts a Revolutionary World: 1776–1976 (New York, 1976).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Williams, , “A Note on American Foreign Policy in Europe in the Nineteen Twenties,” Science & Society, 22 (Winter 1958), 1–20.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Costigliola, Frank, “Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s,” Journal of Economic History, 37 (December 1977), 911–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dayer, Roberta A., “The British War Debts to the United States and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1920–1923,” Pacific Historical Review, 45 (November 1976), 569–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ Artaud, Denise, “Retour à la normale ou naissance d'une communauté atlantique?” in Artaud, , La reconstruction d l'Europe (1919–1929) (Paris, 1973), 33–34.Google Scholar For the fuller development of her argument, see “Le gouvernement américain et la question des dettes de guerre au lendemain de l'armistice de Rethondes (1919–1920),” Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, 20 (April-June 1973), 201–09; “Le gouvernement des États-Unis et le contrôle des emprunts européens, 1921–1929,” Bulletin de la Sociéte d'Histoire Moderne, 5th ser., 71, no. 3 (1972), 17–26; “L'impérialisme américain en Europe, au lendemain de la première guerre mondiale,” Relations internationales, no. 8 (1976), 323–41; “Aux origines de l'atlantisme: la recherche d'unéquilibre européen au lendemain de première guerre mondiale,” ibid., no. 10 (1977): 115–26; “Die Hintergründe der Ruhrbesetzung 1923: Das Problem der interalliierten Schulden,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zietgeschichte, 27 (April 1979), 241–59; “La question des dettes interalliées et la reconstruction de l'Europe,” Revue historique, 261 (April-June 1979), 363–82; and La question des dettes interalliées et la reconstruction de l'Europe (1917–1929), 2 vols. (Lille, 1978).

¹⁷ Re the ties between American business and German cartels from the 1920s in pursuit of profits and stability through “international business solidarity” (p. 728: Kolko, Gabriel, “American Business and Germany, 1930–1941,” Western Political Quarterly, 15 (December 1962). 713–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar; American efforts for German economicrehabilitation: Costigliola, Frank, “The United States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s,” Business History Review, 50 (Winter 1976), 477–502.CrossRefGoogle ScholarDie amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921–32 (Düsseldorf, 1970), by the New Left-influenced German historian Werner Link, is the fullest and most sophisticated exposition of what is pictured as American efforts to incorporate Germany as a junior partner “in die bürgerlich-demokratische, kapitalistische Staatenwelt” (p. 545). See also: Link, “Die Ruhrbesetzung und die Wirtschaftspolitischen Interessen der USA,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 17 (October 1969), 372–82; “Der amerikanische Einfluss auf die Weimarer Republik in der Dawesplanphase: Elemente eines ‘penetrierten Systems,’” Aus Politik and Zeit Geschichte: Beilage zur Wochen Zeitung das Parlament, November 10 1973, 3–12; “Zum Problem der Kontinuität der amerikanischen Deutschlandpolitik in zwanzigsten Jahrhundert,” Amerikastudien/American Studies, 20 (1975) 122–54; and “Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA,” in Knapp, Manfred, et al., Die USA und Deutschland 1918–1975: Deutschamerikanische Beziehungen zwischen Rivilität und Partnerschaft (Munich, 1978), 62–106.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Williams, , American-Russian Relations 1781–1947 (New York, 1952), 177–229.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Williams, , “China and Japan: A Challenge and a Choice of the Nineteen Twenties,” Pacific Historical Review, 26 (August 1957), 259–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar, See also, re American support for disarmament to reduce the burden upon productive enterprise from heavy military expenditures: Richard H. Van Meter, Jr., “The Washington Conference of 1921–1922: A New Look,” ibid., 46 (November 1977), 603–24. U.S. hostility to Chinese nationalism: Brian T. George, “The State Department and Sun Yat-sen: American Policy and the Revolutionary Disintegration of China, 1920–1924,” ibid., 46 (August 1977): 387–408. Washington as defender of “American corporate interests in China” (p. 627): David A. Wilson, “Principles and Profits: Standard Oil Responds to Chinese Nationalism, 1925–1927,” ibid., 46 (May 1977), 625–47. The “decisive” (p. xiv) role of the bankers is shaping policies aimed at keeping China in its semi-colonial status: Dayer, Roberta A., Bankers and Diplomats in China 1917–1925: The Anglo-American Relationship (London, 1981).Google Scholar The “Washington system” as a mechanism for controlling Chinese nationalism: Bix, Herbert P., “Imagistic Historiography and the Reinterpretation of Japanese Imperialism,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 7 (July-September 1975), 53–55.Google Scholar

²⁰ Gardner, Lloyd C., Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964), 64–84, 131–51.Google Scholar A more extreme, post-Vietnam restatement of this line argues that U.S. hostility to Japan from 1931 on reflected not simply the desire to preserve the Open Door in China but the determination to “maintain American hegemony” in the Far East; Breslin, Thomas A., “Mystifying the Past; Establishment Historians and the Origins of the Pacific War,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 8 (October-December 1976), 32.Google Scholar

²¹ Williams, Tragedy, 114. Re the Middle East: Williams, , America and the Middle East: Open Door Imperialism or Enlightened Leadership? (New York, 1958)Google Scholar, and Smith, Douglas L., “The Millspaugh Mission and American Corporate Diplomacy in Persia, 1922–1927,” Southern Quarterly, 14 (January 1976), 141–72.Google Scholar Eastern Europe: Costigliola, Frank, “American Foreign Policy in the ‘Nutcracker’: The United States and Poland in the 1920s,” Pacific Historical Review, 48 (February 1979), 85–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Aim of American policy toward Liberia “to promote the dominance of its capital behind the facade of an independent state managed by the national elite” (p. 37): Sundiata, I. K., Black Scandal: America and the Liberian Labor Crisis, 1929–1936 (Philadelphia, 1980).Google Scholar

²² Smith, “American Foreign Relations, 1920–1942,” 244.

²³ See, for examples, Lewis, Gordon K., “The Rise of the American Mediterannean,” Studies on the Left 2, no. 2 (1961), 42–58Google Scholar, and Smith, Robert F., “The United States and Latin-American Revolutions,” Journal of Inter-American Studies, 4 (January 1962), 89–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ Seidel, Robert H., “American Reformers Abroad: The Kemmerer Missions in South America, 1921–1931,” Journal of Economic History, 32 (June 1972), 520–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Progressive Pan Americanism: Development and United States Policy toward South America, 1906–1931 [Cornell University Latin American Program, Dissertation Series, no. 45] (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973).

²⁵ Wilfiams, , “Latin America: Laboratory of American Foreign Policy in the Nineteen-twenties,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 11 (Autumn 1957), 3–30.Google Scholar Case studies of U.S. relations with individual Latin American countries reflecting a New Left perspective that deal — at least in part — with the 1920s include: Smith, Robert F., The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917–1960 (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; Benjamin, Jules R., The United States & Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880–1934 (Pittsburgh, 1977)Google Scholar; Schmidt, Hans, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1914–1934 (New Brunswick, 1971)Google Scholar; Castor, Suzy, “The American Occupation of Haiti (1915–34) and the Dominican Republic (1916–24),” Massachusetts Review, 15 (Winter-Spring 1974), 253–75Google Scholar; Rabe, Stephen G., “Anglo-American Rivalry for Venezuelan Oil 1919–1929,” Mid-America, 58 (April-July 1976), 97–109Google Scholar; Randall, Stephen J., The Diplomacy of Modernization: Colombian-American Relations, 1920–1940 (Toronto, 1977)Google Scholar, and LaFeber, Walter, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New York, 1978).Google Scholar

²⁶ Smith, Robert F., The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916–1932 (Chicago, 1972), 190–265.Google Scholar A more strident account by a Mexican scholar, Meyer, Lorenzo, Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy, 1917–1942 (Austin, 1977), 75–148, 229–34Google Scholar, sharply indicts the “tremendous and unrelenting pressure” (p. 131) exerted by Washington in behalf of the oil companies.

²⁷ Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, 47–63, 109–32, 194–216; Green, David, The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago, 1971)Google Scholar, Smith, Robert F., “The Good Neighbor Policy: The Liberal Paradox in United States Relations with Latin America,” in Liggio, Leonard P. and Martin, James J., eds., Watershed of Empire: Essays on New Deal Foreign Policy (Colorado Springs, 1976), 65–94.Google Scholar

²⁸ Radosh, Ronald, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York, 1969)Google Scholar; Berger, Henry W., “Unions and Empire: Organized Labor and American Corporations Abroad,” Peace and Change, 3 (Spring 1976), 34–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Walker, J. Samuel, “Henry A. Wallace as Agrarian Isolationist, 1921–1930,” Agricultural History, 49 (July 1975), 532–48.Google Scholar

²⁹ Williams, , “A Note on the Isolationism of Senator William E. Borah,” Pacific Historical Review, 22 (November 1953), 391–92Google Scholar; Pinckney, Orde S., “William E. Borah: Critic of American Foreign Policy,” Studies on the Left, 1 no. 3 (1960), 48–61Google Scholar; Berger, Henry W., “Laissez Faire for Latin America: Borah Defines the Monroe Doctrine,” Idaho Yester days, 9 (Summer 1965), 10–17.Google Scholar

³⁰ Williams, Contours, 426–30, 485; Williams, , Some Presidents: Wilson to Nixon (New York, 1972), 33–49.Google Scholar For an examination of the New Left view of Hoover, see Adler, Selig, “Hoover's Foreign Policy and the New Left,” in Fausold, Martin L. and Mazuzan, George T., eds., The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal (Albany, 1975), 153–63.Google Scholar

³¹ For critical appraisals of New Left premises and assumptions, see Tucker, Robert W., The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, 1971)Google Scholar, and Zevin, Robert, “An Interpretation of American Imperialism,” Journal of Economic History, 32 (March 1972), 316–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Focusing upon Williams: Thompson, J. A., “William Appleman Williams and the ‘American Empire,’” Journal of American Studies, 7 (April 1973), 91–104CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Melanson, Richard A., “The Social and Political Thought of William Appleman Williams,” Western Political Quarterly, 31 (September 1978), 392–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The New Left interpretation applied to the 1890s is challenged by Holbo, Paul, “Economics, Emotion, and Expansion: An Emerging Foreign Policy” in Morgan, H. Wayne, ed., The Gilded Age, rev. ed. (Syracuse, 1970), 199–221Google Scholar; to the Cold War by; Maddox, Robert J., The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (Princeton, 1973)Google Scholar, and Levine, Alan J., “Some Revisionist Theses on the Cold War, 1943–1946: A Study of a Modern Mythology,” Continuity, No. 1 (Fall 1980), 75–97.Google Scholar

³² Maddox, Robert J., “Another Look at the Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s,” Mid-America, 50 (January 1971), 35–43Google Scholar, is a brief, but trenchant, analysis of Williams on the 1920s. A more ambitious re-examination of American policies during the period, Wilson, Joan H., American Busienss & Foreign Policy 1920–1933 (Lexington, KY., 1971)Google Scholar, does an excellent job of showing the factors that prevented in practice development of a coherent program for promoting “America's economic empire” (p. 112), but accepts the New Left basic premise of a broad consensus — however imperfectly executed — among American business and government leaders about the importance of “economic expansion” (p. 8).

³³ U.S. Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, 1960), 139, 537.Google Scholar

³⁴ Lipsey, Robert E., Price and Quantity Trends in the Foreign Trade of the United States (Princeton, 1963), 41, 44.Google Scholar

³⁵ Deutsch, Karl W. and Eckstein, Alexander, “National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890–1959,” World Politics, 13 (January 1961), 274, 281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁶ Kuznets, Simon, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and Financing (Princeton, 1961), 128–29.Google Scholar

³⁷ Svennilson, Ingvar, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy (Geneva, 1954), 138, 149, 152, 293Google Scholar; Maizels, Alfred, Industrial Growth and World Trade: An Empirical Study of Trends in Production, Consumption and Trade in Manufactures from 1899–1959 with a Discussion of Probable Future Trends (Cambridge, Eng., 1965), 223–24, 352.Google Scholar

³⁸ Lipsey, Price and Quantity Trends, 41, 44.

³⁹ Deutsch and Eckstein, “National industrialization,” 274.

⁴⁰ Lewis, Cleona, America's Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), pp. 246, 253–55, 281–88Google Scholar; Eckes, Alfred E. Jr, The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Austin, 1979), pp. 27–55.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Historical Statistics, p. 541.

⁴² DeNovo, John, “The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918–1920,” American Historical Review, 61 (July 1956), 854–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nash, Gerald D., United States Oil Policy, 1890–1964: Business and Government in Twentieth Century America (Pittsburgh, 1968), 49–71Google Scholar, In 1929, the United States imported $145 million worth of petroleum and petroleum products, exported $962 million worth: Historical Statistics, 546, 548.

⁴³ Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Problem of International Investment (London, 1937), 65–66, 174–76.Google Scholar

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⁴⁵ Lewis, America's Stake, 173–397, 450, 605, 645–46.

⁴⁶ Historical Statistics, 151, 564; Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy, 64–65, 128–29, 132, 137, 524.

⁴⁷ Fleisig, Heywood, “The United States and the Non-European Periphery during the Early Years of the Great Depression,” in van Der Wee, Herman, ed., The Great Depression Revisited: Essays on the Economics of the Thirties (The Hague, 1972), 145–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Glynn, Sean and Lougheed, Alan L., “A Comment on United States Economic Policy and the ‘Dollar Gap’ of the 1920's,” Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 26 (November 1973), 692–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁸ Royal Institute, Problem of International Investment, 174.

⁴⁹ Moran, Even Theodore H., “Foreign Expansion as an ‘Institutional Necessity’ for U.S. Corporate Capitalism: The Search for a Radical Model,” World Politics 25 (April 1973): 369–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar, acknowledges that United States direct investment in manufacturing outside Canada, Europe, and the United Kingdom “did not begin to grow with any dynamism” until the Great Depression with its accompanying restrictions upon trade (p. 378).

⁵⁰ Lebergott, Stanley, “The Returns to U.S. Imperialism, 1890–1929,” Journal of Economic History, 40 (June 1980), 230–33, 250–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁵⁵ All data, except for China, are from Royal Institute, Problem of International Investment, 17, 142, 186–87, 278–79. Pound values have been converted into dollars at the official exchange rate of $4.86. Re China: Remer, C. F., Foreign Investments in China (New York, 1933), 308, 405.Google Scholar The 1929 estimates in Lewis, America's Stake, 606, differ somewhat in dollar amounts, but there is no significant difference in the pattern of distribution.

⁵⁶ Zs. L. Nagy, The United States and the Danubian Basin 1919–1939 [Academiae Scientarium Hungaricae, Studia Historica, No. 121] (Budapest, 1975), 5–17; Berend, Iván T. and Ránki, György, Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York, 1974), 201–41.Google Scholar

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⁵⁸ In Morocco, for example, the United States vigorously protested attempted French and Spanish encroachments on the most-favored nation status, equality of commercial opportunity, and capitulatory privileges guaranteed this country by along series of international treaties: Hall, Luella J., The United States and Morocco 1776–1956 (Metuchen, N.J., 1971) 661–887.Google Scholar But such actions were taken more as a matter of principle than because of any substantive American interests that were at stake. See, for Arabic northern third of Africa: Gallagher, Charles F., The United States and North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (Cambridge, 1963), 232–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stookey, Robert W., America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter (New York, 1975), 535–54Google Scholar; and Brown, L. Carl, “The United States and The Maghrib,” Middle East Journal, 30 (Summer 1976), 273–90.Google Scholar Sub-Saharan Africa: McKinley, Edward H., The Lure of Africa: American Interests in Tropical Africa, 1919–1939 (Indianapolis, 1974), 90–102.Google Scholar South Africa: Noer, Thomas J., Britain, Boer, and Yankee: The United States and South Africa 1870–1914 (Kent, Ohio, 1978), ix–xiii, 91–140.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Lewis, America's Stake, 186.

⁶⁰ Kaufman, Burton I., Efficiency and Expansion: Foreign Trade Organization in the Wilson Administration, 1913–1921 (Westport, Conn., 1974), 74–76, 117–24, 228–57Google Scholar; Baker, James C. and Bradford, M. Gerald, American Banks Abroad: Edge Act Companies and Multinational Banking (New York, 1974), 19–31, 49–64Google Scholar; Kennedy, David M., Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York, 1980), 338–41Google Scholar; Lewis, America's Stake, 191–98. Re the post-1920 retrenchment by even the leader in foreign branch banking: Mayer, Robert, “The Origins of the American Banking Empire in Latin America: Frank A. Vanderlip and the National City Bank,” Journal of Interamericon Studies and World Affairs, 15 (February 1973), 60–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁶³ See, for example, how France's financial crisis forced the French government to appeal to J.P. Morgan & Company for assistance to save the franc: Schuker, Stephen A., The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill, 1976), 108–68.Google ScholarRe the role of American capital exports in German reconstruction: Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig, “Amerikanischer Kapitalexport und Wiederaufbau der deutschen Wirtschaft 1919–23 im Vergleich zu 1924–29,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 64 (1977), 497–529Google Scholar; German reliance upon American capital and technological and managerial know-how for its industrial modernization: Hardach, Karl, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century (Berkeley, 1980), 32, 36–37.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Royal Institute, Problem of International Investment, 133–38, 164–65.

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⁶⁶ Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation, 45–49, 148–52, 180–96; Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade, 191–98.

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⁷¹ Clarke, Stephen V.O., Central Bank Cooperation. 1924–31 (New York, [1967]), 71–143Google Scholar, Chandler, Lester V., Benjamin Strong, Central Banker (Washington, 1958), 277–422Google Scholar; Meyer, Richard H., Bankers' Diplomacy: Monetary Stabilization in the Twenties (New York, 1970)Google Scholar; Costigliola, Frank, “The Other Side of Isolationism: The Establishment of the First World Bank, 1929–1930,” Journal of American History, 59 (December 1972), 602–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷² As Chandler, Benjamin Strong, points out, even Strong, who was more committed than any other Federal Reserve official to maintaining international monetary stability, was willing to cooperate toward achieving that goal “only to the extent” that the policies required “were not seriously incompatible with domestic objectives” (p. 423). On the role of the Fed's contraction of domestic credit in 1928–1929 in bringing on the Great Depression: Pedersen, Jørgen, “Some Notes on the Economic Policy of the United States during the Period 1919–1932.” in Hegeland, Hugo, ed., Money, Growth, and Methodology and Other Essays in Economics in Honor of Johan Åkerman [Lund Social Science Studies, No. 20] (Lund, 1961), 480–89Google Scholar, and Cleveland, “International Monetary System, 44–49.

⁷³ Myers, William S., ed., The State Papers and Other Public Writings of Herbert Hoover, 2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y., 1934), 1:592Google Scholar, Re the “Lack of United States Leadership” to meet the international economic crisis, see Kindleberger, Charles P., The World in Depression 1929–1939 (Berkeley, 1973), esp. 297–300.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Alhjerg, Victor L., “High Tariff and World Trade: 1920–1932,” Current History, 42 (June 1962), 344–49, 364Google Scholar; Kelly, William B. Jr, “Antecedents of Present Commercial Policy, 1922–1934,” in Kelly, , Studies in United States Commercial Policy (Chapel Hill, 1963), 3–63Google Scholar; Synder, J. Richard, “William S. Culbertson and the Formation of Modern American Commercial Policy, 1917–1925,” Kansas Historical Quarterly, 35 (Winter 1969), 396–410.Google Scholar and “Hoover and the Hawley-Smoot Tariff: A View of Executive Leadership,” Annals of Iowa, 41 (Winter 1972). 1173–89. Re the Southern shift to support for protectionism: Dollar, Charles M., “The South and the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922: A Study in Regional Politics,” Journal of Southern History 39 (February 1973), 45–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; farmer support, Connor, James R., “National Farm Organizations and United States Tariff Policy in the 1920's,” Agricultural History 32 (January 1958), 32–43Google Scholar; the role of special interest groups in shaping the Smoot-Hawley Act, Schattschneider, E.E., Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics, as Shown in the 1929–1930 Revision of the Tariff (1935; repring ed., Hamden, Conn., 1963).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Warren, Harris G., Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression (New York, 1959), 87–94Google Scholar; Kasurak, Peter, “American foreign policy officials and Canada, 1927–1941: a look through bureaucratic glasses,” International Journal, 32 (Summer 1977), 551–52Google Scholar; Kottman, Richard, “Herbert Hoover and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff: Canada, A Case Study,” Journal of American History, 62 (December 1975), 609–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The effect of U.S. tariff policies in stimulating protectionism in Australia: Esthus, Raymond A., From Enmity to Alliance: U.S.-Australian Relations, 1931–1941 (Seattle, 1964), 6–8, 16–23Google Scholar; in Britain, Boyce, R.W.D., “America, Europe, and the Triumph of Imperial Protectionism in Britain, 1929–30,” Millennium, 3 (Spring 1974), 53–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and generally throughout the world: Jones, Joseph M., Tariff Retaliation: Repercussions of the Hawley-Smoot Bill (Philadelphia, 1934).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁶ Daniel, Robert L., “The Armenian Question in American-Turkish Relations, 1914–1927,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 46 (September 1949), 266–72.Google Scholar

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⁷⁸ Pritchard, Earl H., “The Japanese Exclusion Bill of 1924 (An Historical Sketch),” Research Studies of the State College of Washington, 2 (1930), 65–77Google Scholar, and Paul, Rodman W., The Abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement (Cambridge, 1936).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Kennedy, Padraic C., “La Follette and the Russians,” Mid-America, 53 (July 1971), 190–208Google Scholar; Briley, Ronald F., “Smith W. Brookhart and Russia,” Annals of Iowa, 42 (Winter 1975), 541–55Google Scholar; Meiburger, Sister Anne Vincent, Efforts of Raymond Robins toward the Recognition of Soviet Russia and the Outlawry of War, 1917–1933 (Washington, 1958), 1–101, 143–89Google Scholar; and Libbey, James K., Alexander Gumberg & Soviet-American Relations 1917–1933 (Lexington, Ky., 1977).Google Scholar On the other hand, many businessmen attracted by and favoring trade with Russia continued to oppose Soviet recognition because of ideological hostility. And the way in which official policy makers subordinated economics to ideology in dealing with the Soviet Union hardly comports with the view that trade expansion was their first priority. On these points, see Wilson, Joan H., Ideology and Economics: U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918–1933 (Columbia, Mo., 1974).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See, for examples, Kennedy, Padraic C., “La Follette's Foreign Policy: From Imperialism to Anti-Imperialism,” Wisconsin Magazine of History, 46 (Summer 1963), 287–93Google Scholar, and Hauptman, Laurence M., “Utah Anti-imperialist: Senator William H. King and Haiti, 1921–34,” Utah Historical Quarterly, 41 (Spring 1973), 116–27.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Kirk, Grayson L., Phillippine Independence: Motives, Problems, and Prospects (New York, 1936)Google Scholar; Lawrence, John R., “The American Federation of Labor and the Philippine Independence Question, 1920–1935,” Labor History, 7 (Winter 1966), 62–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Friend, Theodore, Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929–1946 (New Haven, 1965), 81–108.Google Scholar

⁸² Murray, Robert K., The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis, 1969), 280–93, 321–26, 395–97.Google Scholar

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⁸⁴ Wilkins, Mira, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, 1974), 49–163CrossRefGoogle Scholar, is a judicious and balanced survey.

⁸⁵ Karnes, Thomas L., Tropical Enterprise: The Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in Latin America (Baton Rouge, 1978).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ For examples, see Yeselson, Abraham, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations 1883–1921 (New Brunswick, 1956), 220Google Scholar; Trask, Roger R., “The United States and Turkish Nationalism: Investments and Technical Aid during the Atatiirk Era,” Business History Review 38 (Spring 1974), 63–64Google Scholar; Pike, Frederick B., “Corporatism and Latin American-United States Relations,” Review of Politics, 36 (January 1974), 137–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Chile and the United States, 1880–1962: The Emergence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy (Notre Dame, 1963), pp. 233–35; Reynolds, Clark W., “Development Problems of an Export Economy: The Case of Chile and Copper,” in Mamalakis, Markos and Reynolds, , eds., Essays on the Chilean Economy (Homewood, Ill., 1965), 214–32Google Scholar; Carey, James C., Peru and the United States, 1900–1962 (Nore Dame, 1964), 51–65Google Scholar, and Landau, Zbigniew, “Poland and America: The Economic Connection 1918–1939,” Polish American Studies, 32 (Autumn 1975), 44, 48–19.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Naleszkiewicz, Wladimir, “Technical Assistance of the American Enterprises to the Growth of the Soviet Union, 1929–1933,” Russian Review, 25 (January 1966), 54–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Sutton, Antony C., Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1917 to 1930 (Stanford, 1968)Google Scholar, emphasize the importance of the American role; McKay, John P., “Foreign Enterprise in Russian and Soviet Industry: A Long Term Perspective,” Rusiness History Review, 48 (Autumn 1974), 350–54Google Scholar, is more deflationary about the American contribution.

⁸⁸ Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1978), 93–133.Google ScholarRe the minor role played by the U.S. government in support of American oil companies in Latin America: Lieuwen, Edwin, Petroleum in Venezuela: A History (Berkeley, 1954), 18–71Google Scholar; Klein, Herbert S., “American Oil Companies in Latin America: The Bolivian Experience,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 18 (Autumn 1964), 47–56Google Scholar; and most importantly, Wilkins, Mira, “The Multinational Oil Companies in South America in the 1920s: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru,” Business History Review, 48 (Autumn 1974), 414–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar New Left-influenced writers, such as Randall, Stephen J., “The International Corporation and American Foreign Policy: The United States and Colombian Petroleum, 1920–1940,” Canadian Journal of History, 9 (August 1974), 179–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “The Barco Concession in Colombian-American Relations, 1926–1932,” Americas, 33 (July 1976), 96–108, emphasize what they picture as U.S. diplomatic pressure to push American oil firms into Latin America; but Randalls own evidence (“International Corporation,” p. 180; “Barco Concession,” p. 107) shows Colombian eagerness for American investment given the lack of local capital and know-how.

⁸⁹ Tulchin, Joseph S., The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy toward Latin America (New York, 1971).Google Scholar

⁹⁰ DeNovo, John, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900–1939 (Minneapolis, 1963), 167–209Google Scholar; Reed, Peter M., “Standard Oil in Indonesia, 1898–1928,” Business History Review, 32 (Autumn 1958), 311–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹¹ For examples, re sanctity of contracts and no expropriation without fair compensation: Little, Douglas J., “Twenty Years of Turmoil: ITT, The State Department, and Spain, 1924–1944,” Business History Review, 53 (Winter 1979), 449–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Shubert, Adrian, “Oil Companies and Governments: International Reaction to the Nationalization of the Petroleum Industry in Spain: 1927–1930”, Journal of Contemporary History, 15 (October 1980), 712–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar; re equality of opportunity: Stivers, William, “International Politics and Iraqi Oil, 1918–1928: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy,” Business History Review, 55 (Winter 1981), 532–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar: re the Open Door Policy in China: Kirwan, Harry W., “The Federal Telegraph Company: A Testing of the Open Door,” Pacific Historical Review, 22 (August 1953), 271–86.Google Scholar While Wilson, “Principles and Profits,” argues that U.S. policy was motivated by a desire to protect American corporate interests in China, his own evidence (pp. 640–41. 646) shows that the State Department was less concerned with the immediate interests of the Standard Oil Company than with its political goal of preserving the existing treaty system and the traditional policy of free and unrestricted trade. Similary), Washington actively intervened in the 1930s in behalf of American firms only when such action coincided with its larger policy objective of upholding the Open Door: Anderson, Irvine H. Jr, The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933–1941 (Princeton, 1975), 39–70.Google Scholar

⁹² Newton, Wesley P., “International Aviation Rivalry in Latin America, 1919–1927,” Journal of Inter-American Studies, 7 (July 1965), 345–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and The Perilous Sky: U.S. Aviation Diplomacy and Latin America 1919–1931 (Coral Gables, Fla., 1978). Although critical of American officials' “narrow, sphere-of-interest orientation” (p. 321), Randall, Stephen J., “Colombia, the U.S. and Interamerican Aviation Rivalry, 1927–1940,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 14 (August 1972), 297–324CrossRefGoogle Scholar, acknowledges reasonable grounds for Washington's security concerns.

⁹³ Brandes, Joseph, Herbert Hooter and Economic Diplomacy: Department of Commerce Policy 1921–1928 (Pittsburgh, 1962)Google Scholar, and “Product Diplomacy: Herbert Hoover's Anti-Monopoly Campaign at Home and Abroad,” in Hawley, Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce, 186–214.

⁹⁴ Braisted, William R., “China, the United States Navy, and the Bethlehem Steel Company, 1909–1929,” Business History Review, 42 (Spring 1968), 50–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fithian, Floyd J., “Dollars Without the Flag: The Case of Sinclair and Sakhalin Oil,” Pacific Historical Review, 39 (May 1970), 205–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁹⁷ The fullest rebuttal of the New Left view of the role of the United States is provided by the following articles by Kane, N. Stephen: “Bankers and Diplomats: The Diplomacy of the Dollar in Mexico, 1921–1924,” Business History Review, 47 (Autumn 1973), 335–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “American Businessmen and Foreign Policy: The Recognition of Mexico, 1920–1923,” Political Science Quarterly, 90 (Summer 1975), 293–313; and “Corporate Power and Foreign Policy: Efforts of American Oil Companies to Influence United States Relations with Mexico, 1921–1928,” Diplomatic History, 1 (Spring 1977), 170–98. See also, re the Bucareli agreements and the recognition of the Obregón regime: Trani, Eugene P., “Harding Administration and Recognition of Mexico,” Ohio History, 75 (Spring and Summer 1966), 137–48, 190–92.Google Scholar The pragmatic and conciliatory approach taken by Morgan partner Thomas W. Lamont, the moving spirit in the International Bankers Committee on Mexico: Smith, Robert F., “The Formation and Development of the International Bankers Committee on Mexico,” Journal of Economic History, 23 (Winter 1963), 574–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Thomas W. Lamont and United States-Mexican Relations: Some Aspects of the Usefulness of a Private Manuscript Collection,” Harvard Library Bulletin, 15 (January 1967), 49–58; and “The Morrow Mission and The International Committee of Bankers on Mexico: The Interaction of Finance Diplomacy and The New Mexican Elite,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 1 (November 1969): 149–66. Pro-Mexican sympathies in this country: Ignacias, C. Dennis, “Propaganda and Public Opinion in Harding's Foreign Affairs: the Case for Mexican Recognition,” Journalism Quarterly, 48 (Spring 1971), 41–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Schmidt, Henry C., “The American Intellectual Discovery of Mexico in the 1920's,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 77 (Summer 1978), 335–51.Google Scholar The role of the Mexican government's anti-clerical campaign: SisterRice, M. Elizabeth Ann, The Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico, as Affected by the Struggle for Religious Liberty in Mexico, 1925–1929 (Washington, 1959)Google Scholar; Berbusse, Edward J., , S.J., “The Unofficial Intervention of the United States in Mexico's Religious Crisis, 1926–1930,” Americas, 23 (July 1966), 28–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vinca, Robert, “The American Catholic Reaction to the Persecution of the Church in Mexico, From 1926 to 1936,” Records of the American Catholic Society of Philadelphia, 79 (March 1968), 3–38Google Scholar; and Davis, Mollie C., “American Religious and Religiose Reaction to Mexico's Church-State Conflict, 1926–1927: Background to the Morrow Mission,” Journal of Church and State, 13 (Winter 1971), 78–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Countervailing forces against strong U.S. action: Snow, Sinclair, “Protestant versus Catholic: U.S. Reaction to the Mexican Church-State Conflict of 1926–29,” North Dakota Quarterly, 39 (Summer 1977), 68–80Google Scholar; Horn, James J., “Did the United States Plan an Invasion of Mexico in 1927?” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 15 (November 1973), 454–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Mexican Oil Diplomacy and the Legacy of Teapot Dome,” West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences, 17 (June 1978), 99–112. Mexican leaders' desire to avoid frightening away American capital: Hall, Linda B., “Alvaro Obregón and the Politics of Mexican Land Reform, 1920–1924,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 60 (May 1980), 217–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Morrow's role: Ross, Stanley R., “Dwight W. Morrow, Ambassador to Mexico,” Americas, 14 (January 1958), 273–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Dwight Morrow and the Mexican Revolution,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 38 (November 1958), 506–28.

⁹⁸ Details can be found in Hogan, Michael J., “Informal Entente: Public Policy and Private Management in Anglo-American Petroleum Affairs, 1918–1924,” Business History Review, 48 (Summer 1974), 187–205CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918–1928 (Columbia, 1977), 105–85; and Shwadran, Benjamin, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, 3rd ed. (New York, 1973), 20–24, 71–78, 82–83, 195–238.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Feis, Herbert, The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Phase 1919–1932 (Baltimore, 1950.Google Scholar Quote p. 9.

¹⁰⁰ Cohen, Warren I., The Chinese Connection: Roger S. Greene, Thomas W. Lamont, George E. Sokolsky and American-East Asian Relations (New York, 1978), 41–70, 97–119, 148–60.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Historical Statistics, 550, 552; Dietrich, Ethel B., Far Eastern Trade of the United States (New York, 1940), 10–11Google Scholar; Remer, Foreign Investments in China, 81–148, 239–338; Royal Institute, Problem of International Investment, 186–87; Mira Wilkins, “The Role of U.S. Business,” and Yukio, Cho, “An Inquiry into the Problem of Importing American Capital into Manchuria: A Note on Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941,” in Borg, Dorothy and Okamoto, Shumpei, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931–1941 (New York, 1973), 353, 359, 374, 379–83, 393.Google Scholar The dollar amounts in different estimates vary slightly, but not substantively.

¹⁰² Masland, John W., “Missionary Influence upon American Far Eastern Policy,” Pacific Historical Review, 10 (September 1941), 279–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Varg, Paul A., Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890–1952 (Princeton, 1958), esp. 180–211Google Scholar; Trani, Eugene P., “Woodrow Wilson, China, and the Missionaries, 1913–1921,” Journal of Presbyterian History, 49 (Winter 1971), 328–51Google Scholar; Metallo, Michael V., “American Missionaries, Sun Yat-sen, and the Chinese Revolution,” Pacific Historical Review, 47 (May 1978), 261–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shirley S. Garrett, “Why They Stayed: American Church Politics and Chinese Nationalism in the Twenties,” and Varg, , “The Misisonary Response to the Nationalist Revolution,” in Fairbank, John K., ed., The Missionary Enterprise in China and America (Cambridge, 1974), 283–335.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Isaacs, Harold R., Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India (New York, 1958), 63–71, 140–66, 195–209Google Scholar; Iriye, Akira, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York, 1967), 117–29.Google Scholar Even a sophisticated New Left-oriented scholar, Israel, Jerry, Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1905–1921 (Pittsburgh, 1971)Google Scholar, acknowledges that a reformist urge to remake China along the lines of the American model was as important a determinant of the Open Door Policy as the quest for markets and investment opportunities.

¹⁰⁴ Buckley, Thomas H., The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922 (Knoxville, 1970), esp. 145–71, 185–90Google Scholar; Trani, Eugene P., “Four American Fiddlers and Their Far Eastern Tunes: A Survey of Japanese-American Relations, 1898–1941,” in Gordon, Bernard K. and Rothwell, Kenneth J., eds., The New Political Economy of the Pacific (Cambridge, 1975), 56–59Google Scholar; Fifield, Russell H., “Secretary Hughes and the Shantung Question,” Pacific Historical Review 23 (November 1954), 373–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Pugach, Noel H., “American Friendship for China and the Shantung Question at the Washington Conference,” Journal of American History, 64 (June 1977), 67–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Though more critical of the shortcmings of the Conference from the Chinese standpoint, even a Koumintang writer acknowledges that China did gain “two major successes” (p. 53): Japan's withdrawal from Shantung and the laying of the basis for tariff autonomy: King, Wunsz, China at the Washington Conference 1921–1922 (New York, 1963).Google ScholarCohen, Warren I., “From Contempt to Containment: Cycles in American Attitudes toward China,” in Braeman, John, et al., Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy (Columbus, 1971), 529–44Google Scholar, and America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New York, 1971), 100–35, are perceptive surveys of U.S.-Chinese relations during the Republican era.

¹⁰⁵ For examples, see the articles by Hoyt, Frederick B.; “Protection Implies Intervention: The U.S. Catholic Mission at Kanchow,” Historian, 38 (August 1976), 709–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “The Lesson of Confrontation: Two Christian Colleges Face the Chinese Revolution, 1925–1927,” Asian Forum, 8 (Summer 1976), 45–57, and “The Open Door Leads to Reluctant Intervention: The Case of the Yangtze Rapid Steamship Company,” Diplomatic History, 1 (Spring 1977), 155–69.

¹⁰⁶ Borg, Dorothy, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution 1925–1928 (1947; reprint ed., New York, 1968)Google Scholar, is the basic work. But see also: Buhite, Russell D., “Nelson Johnson and American Policy Toward China, 1925–1928,” Pacific Historical Review, 35 (November 1966), 451–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy Toward China 1925–1941 (East Lansing, 1968), 19–54; Fishel, Wesley R., The End of Extraterritoriality in China (Berkeley, 1952), 126–87Google Scholar; Liu, Daniel T.J., “A Historical Study of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations: The National Government Formative Period, 1925–1930,” Chinese Culture, 15 (June 1974), 54–88Google Scholar; and Etzold, Thomas H., “In Search of Sovereignty: The Unequal Treaties in Sino-American Relations, 1925–1930,” in Chan, F. Gilbert and Etzold, , China in the 1920s: Nationalism and Revolution (New York, 1976), 176–96, 226–31.Google Scholar The quote is from Hoyt, Frederick B., “The Open Door Empire Viewed as a Chinese Dynasty,” Australian Journal of Politics and History, 20 (April 1976), 31.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Doenecke, Justus D., “American Public Opinion and the Manchurian Crisis, 1931–33,” Ph.D. diss., Princeton University (1966), 8Google Scholar, 62–63, 77, 81, 117–18, 133, 137–39, 184–86, 200, 212–13, 229, 253, 261–62; Lorence, James J., Organized Business and the Myth of the China Market: The American Asiatic Association, 1898–1937 (Philadelphia, 1981), 92.Google Scholar Until roughly 1940 a majority of businessmen – including those involved in the Far East — appear to have been agains the U.S. taking a hard line toward Japan. See: Stromberg, Roland N., “American Business and the Approach of War, 1935–1941,” Journal of Economic History, 13 (Winter 1953), 67CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hoffer, Peter C., “American Businessmen and the Japan Trade, 1931–1941: A Case of Attitude Formation,” Pacific Historical Review, 41 (May 1972), 189–205CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wilkins, “Role of U.S. Business,” 341–70.

¹⁰⁸ Cohen, Warren I., “The Role of Private Groups in the United States,” in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History, 421–28Google Scholar; Doenecke, Justus, “The Debate over Coercion: The Dilemma of America's Pacifists and the Manchurian Crisis,” Peace and Change, 2 (Spring 1974), 47–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Pearson, Alden B., “A Christian Moralist Responds to War: Charles C. Morrison, The Christian Century, and the Manchurian Crisis, 1931–33,” World Affairs, 139 (Spring 1977), 296–307.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ This point is most fully developed in the following articles by Norman A. Graebner: “Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese,” in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History, 25–32; “Japan: Unanswered Challenge, 1931–1941,” in Morris, Margaret F. and Myres, Sandra L., eds., Essays on American Foreign Policy [Walter Prescott Webb Memorial Lectures, vol. 8] (Austin, 1974), 117–28Google Scholar; and “The Manchurian Crisis, 1931–1932,” in Higham, Robin, ed., Intervention or Abstention: The Dilemma of American Foreign Policy (Lexington, Ky., 1975), 60–78.Google ScholarRe Hoover's view that the United States “can and will make a large measure of [economic] recovery irrespective of the rest of the world”: Myers, State Papers, 1: 574–75; his definition of the limits of America's vital interest: Reagan, Michael D., “The Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1932: Stimson, Hoover and the Armed Services,” in Stein, Harold, ed., American Civilian-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (University, Ala., 1963), 30–31, 33–34Google Scholar, and Burner, David, Herbert Hoover: A Public Life (New York, 1978), 293–97.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ The limits of how far Stimson was willing to go – as shown in the pioneering analyses of Clyde, Paul H., “The Diplomacy of ‘Playing fo Favorites’: Secretary Stimson and Manchuria, 1931,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 35 (September 1948), 187–202CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Perkins, Ernest R., “The Nonapplication of Sanctions against Japan, 1931–1932,” in Lee, Dwight E. and McReynolds, George E., eds., Essays in History and International Relations in Honor of George Hubbard Blakeslee (Worcester, 1949), 215–32Google Scholar — have been more fully documented by the most recent study of his role: Ostrower, Gary B., Collective Insecurity: The United States and the League of Sations during the Early Thirties (Lewisburg, Pa., 1979), 56–166, 199–206.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Thomson, James C. Jr, “The Role of the Department of State,” in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History, 88–97Google Scholar; McCarty, Kenneth J. Jr, “Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Manchurian Crisis,” Southern Quarterly, 10 (July 1972), 305–24Google Scholar; Doenecke, Justus D., ed., The Diplomacy of Frustration: The Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933 as revealed in the Papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck (Stanford, 1981), esp. 10–40Google Scholar; and Borg, Dorothy, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938: From the Manchurian Incident through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War (Cambridge, 1964), 34–35, 569 (n101).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹² May, Ernest R., “Emergence to World Power,” in Higham, John, ed., The Reconstruction of American History (London, 1962), 180–81.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Braeman, John, “American Foreign Policy in the Age of Normalcy: Three Historiographical Traditions,” Amerikastudien/American Studies 26 (1981), 125–58.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Holbo, Paul S., “Isolationist Critics of American Foreign Policy: A Historical Perspective,” Air University Review, 19 (March-April 1968), 48–57Google Scholar; Johnson, James A., “The New Generation of Isolationists” Foreign Affairs, 49 (October 1970), 136–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹⁵ Typical is the plea in Williams's latest work, Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament Along With a Few Thoughts About an Alternative (New York, 1980), that “we must now ‘order’ ourselves rather than policing and saving the world…. Our future is here and now, a community to be created among ourselves….” (pp. xi-xii).

¹¹⁶ Re “new class” attitudes on foreign policy, see: Kristol, Irving, “American Intellectuals and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 45 (July 1967), 594–609CrossRefGoogle Scholar; the strength of “socially critical orientations” (p. 75) among the social science faculties of the country's leading universities: Lipset, Seymour M., “The New Class and the Professoriate,” in Bruce-Briggs, B., ed., The New Class? (New Brunswick, 1979), 67–87.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Lipsey, Price and Quantity Trends, 8–23.

¹¹⁸ A recent, and influential example, is the so-called Brandt Report. See the critical analyses by Henderson, P.D., Minogue, Kenenth, Letwin, William and Kedourie, Elie under the overall title “What's Wrong with the Brandt Report?” Encounter, December 1980, 12–30.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Abrams, Richard M., “United States Intervention Abroad: The First Quarter Century,” American Historical Review, 79 (February 1974), 73–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar