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Making a Short Story Long: The Construction of the Suez–Mediterranean Oil Pipeline in Egypt, 1967–1977

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2011

Elie Podeh
Elie Podeh
Affiliation:
ELIE PODEH is senior lecturer in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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Abstract

The idea to construct a pipeline from Suez to the Mediterranean (SUMED) was initially raised before the 1967 War. With the closure of the Suez Canal following the war, the pipeline could offer a less expensive route for Gulf oil. However, the pipeline was inaugurated only in 1977, following three wars and debilitating negotiations between Egypt and foreign institutions. This article analyzes the motives for the project as well as the reasons for the long delay in its implementation. Anticipated financial profits were a major consideration for both the governments concerned and the oil companies. Yet the project was launched only after the parties involved realized that its construction also entailed significant political advantages and after the security risks were eliminated. In recent years, SUMED and the Suez Canal have become major transportation routes for crude oil, transforming Egypt into an actor in the oil market.

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Articles
Information
Business History Review , Volume 78 , Issue 1 , Spring 2004 , pp. 61 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2004

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References

1 Bowrin, Philip, “Now Egypt's Pipe Calls the Tune,” Guardian (London), 7 Oct. 1971.Google Scholar

2 There are various, contradictory estimates of the projected loss. This estimate is based on tolls collected in 1966, as well as on the data reported for the first quarter of 1967. See Kanovsky, Eliyahu, The Economic Impact of the Six-Day War (New York, 1970), 279.Google Scholar In his opinion, the estimated loss for 1967 was $330-$350 million.

3 The major exception is Shwadran, Benjamin, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers (New York, 1973).Google Scholar For two articles that deal with Tapline, see Little, Douglas, “Pipeline Politics: America, TAPLINE, and the Arabs,” Business History Review 64 (Summer 1990): 255–85;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMejcher, Helmut, “Saudi Arabia's ‘Vital Link to the West’: Some Political, Strategic and Tribal Aspects of the Transarabian Pipeline (TAP) in the Stage of Planning,” Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 4 (1982): 359–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a recent article that deals with the pipeline issue in a more general way, see Stevens, Paul, “Pipelines or Pipe Dreams? Lessons from the History of Arab Transit Pipelines,” Middle East Journal 54, no. 2 (2000): 224–41.Google Scholar For a recent study of the Israeli pipeline, see Bialer, Uri, Oil and the Arab—Israeli Conflict, 1948–63 (Oxford, 1999), 216–42.Google Scholar

4 A note on the use of archival sources is due here: As British firms and government were involved in the negotiations, it is clear that most of the archival material was to be found in the Public Record Office (PRO), mainly FCO 39. In contrast, the U.S. archives (USNA) yielded very limited information, most of it related to the parallel Israeli pipeline (PET 18–1 ISR). Some information on SUMED could be found in general economic reports sent by the U.S. embassy in Cairo to the Department of State (E 2 EGY).

5 In real terms, however, crude oil prices slightly declined from above $15 to below $12 per barrel in 1996 dollars. The low oil prices during the 1950s constituted a prime reason for the establishment of OPEC in 1960.

6 On developments in the oil market, see the following sources: Rustow, Dankwart A., “Middle East Oil in the International Economic Setting,” in Legum, Colin and Shaked, Haim, eds., Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS), vol. l, 1976–1977 (New York, 1978), 253–5;Google ScholarAkins, James E., “The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here,” Foreign Affairs 51 (April 1973): 462–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shwadran, Benjamin, Middle East Oil: Issues and Problems (Cambridge, Mass., 1977);Google ScholarShwadran, Benjamin, Middle East Oil Crises Since 1973 (Boulder, Colo., 1986);Google ScholarRivlin, Paul, “Oil,” in Sela, Avraham, ed., Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East (Jerusalem, 1999), 554–75;Google ScholarGilbar, Gad G., The Economic Development of the Middle East in Modern Times (Tel Aviv, 1990), 74–93Google Scholar [Hebrew]; Sayigh, Yusif A., Arab Oil Policies in the 1970s: Opportunity and Responsibility (Baltimore, 1983);Google ScholarPeterson, J. E., ed., The Politics of Middle Eastern Oil (Washington, D.C., 1983).Google Scholar

7 Waterbury, John, “The Suez Canal: The Opening, Part IV,” Northeast Africa Series 20, no. 5 (1975): 18.Google Scholar

8 The dichotomy between “good” and “bad” countries was suggested by Stevens. See “Pipelines or Pipe Dreams,” 235.

9 “Gulf States Turn to Pipelines for Oil Exports,” Khalij Times (Dubai), 20 Aug. 1982.Google Scholar

10 On the history of pipelines in the Middle East, see the sources in note 3.

11 Aulas, Marie-Christine, “Expansion of Petroleum Pipeline Continues,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), Aug. 1980, 14–15.Google Scholar

12 PRO, FCO 39/306, Weait (Oil Department) to Fremantle (Ministry of Power), 7 Feb.; Harding (Cairo) to Walker (North and East African Department), 17 Feb. 1968; Guardian (London), 7 Oct. 1971.Google Scholar For the plans to deepen the canal, see Petroleum Economist 41 (Dec. 1974), 461–2.Google Scholar

13 Kanovsky, The Economic Impact of the Six-Day War, 280.

14 For the importance of the Suez Canal and its dues for Egypt's economy, see Issawi, Charles, Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis (Oxford, 1963), 233;Google ScholarMabro, Robert, The Egyptian Economy, 1952–1972 (Oxford, 1974), 169–70.Google Scholar According to Kanovsky, in 1966 tankers carried 158 millions of crude oil through the canal, in addition to 74 million tons of dry cargo. See The Economic Impact of the Six-Day War, 282.

15 Waterbury, “The Suez Canal,” 18. According to Kanovsky, six months after the war it was estimated that 70 percent of all tankers under construction were very large crude carriers. See The Economic Impact of the Six-Day War, 280.

16 Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) 15 (12 Feb. 1971): 3–4.Google Scholar

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18 See, in this connection, U.S. National Archives, memorandum of conversation between Ernest Gross and R. D. Robinson, fellow directors of IMEG, with Lucius Battle, U.S. assistant secretary for Near East Affairs, PET 18–1 UAR, 26 June 1968. See also “Nasser Plans Suez Oil Link,” London Daily Mail, 1 Feb. 1971 (PRO, FCO 39/306); Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, 458–9, 487. Generally, there is little information on the Israeli pipeline because of government censorship. For some details, see USNA PET 18–1-ISR, Barbour (Tel Aviv) to Department of State, A-282,1 Nov.; A-370, 30 Nov. 1967; A-583,13 Feb. 1968; A-700, 22 March 1968; Rusk to Tehran, Tel. 90282, 28 Dec. 1967; Hughes to the Secretary, “The Proposed Israeli Oil Pipeline,” 27 March 1968; PET 2 ISR, Barbour to Department of State, A-777, “Petroleum Industrial Annual Report,” 17 Apr. 1968.

19 Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, 458, 487. The Arab League resolution was secret. See the correspondence in PRO, FCO 39/1378, Gore-Booth to Goulty, 29 July; Goulty to Young, 20 Aug.; Young to Goulty, 14 Sept. 1971.

20 PRO, FCO 39/306, Weait to Fremantle, 7 Feb. 1968; Robinson (IMEG director) to Mahmud Yunis, 15 Feb. 1968; Holding to Walker, 17 Feb. 1968.

21 The original plan, drawn before the war and the canal's closure, had envisaged the deepening of the canal from forty feet to forty-eight feet over the period 1966–72 to enable it to cope with 100,000-ton tankers. This was to be followed by another project for deepening the canal to sixty feet to enable it to accommodate 200,000-ton tankers. See Dr. Amin, Mahmud, al-Ahram (Cairo), 30–31 Mar. 1968Google Scholar (PRO, FCO 39/306).

22 Amin, , Al-Ahram (Cairo), 30–31 Mar. 1968Google Scholar (PRO, FCO 36/309).

23 Times (London), New York Times, 10 June 1968; PRO, FCO 39/306, Walker to Holding, 25 June 1968. USNA, memorandum of conversation between Ernest Gross and R. Robinson, fellow directors of IMEG, with Lucius Battle, U.S. assistant secretary for Near East affairs, PET 18–1 UAR, 26 June 1968.

24 New York Times, 6 Aug.; Times (London), 7 Aug. Guardian (London), 1 Oct. 1968.Google Scholar

25 PRO, FCO 39/306, Walker to Holding, 25 June 1968.

26 PRO, FCO 39/306, Mallet (North and East African Department) to Simmons (Cairo), 22 Aug. 1968.

27 PRO, FCO 39/306, notes/talking points for the UAR foreign minister (FM) visit/Brief 11, 24 Sept.; British archival material from office of the prime minister (hereafter PREM), 13/2073, record of meeting with the prime minister (PM), 24 Sept. 1968.

28 Fawzi also requested financing for the construction of an underground railway network in Cairo: PRO, FCO 39/559, record of conversation with PM, 10 Mar. 1969.

29 Bowrin, , Guardian (London), 7 Oct. 1971;Google Scholar PRO, FCO 39/753, ‘Aziz Sidky to Francois Puaux, ambassador of France, 9 June 1970; al-Nahar (Beirut), 13 Dec. 1970.Google Scholar

30 Financial Times (London), 18 Feb. 1970.Google Scholar For two contrasting Saudi views of the project, see interview with Sheikh Abdallah Tariki, former Saudi Minister of Oil, Financial Times (London), 26 Apr. 1968;Google Scholar and a meeting between IMEG director Sir Hutchinson and Yamani, the Saudi minister of oil, PRO, FCO 39/306, Fearnley's minute, 20 Feb. 1968.

31 Burrell, R. M., “Canal, Pipeline or Cape? Schemes for Oil Transportation,” New Middle East 41 (Feb. 1972)Google Scholar (PRO, FCO 39/1269).

32 According to al-Ahram (Cairo) (30 May 1970,Google Scholar PRO, FCO 39/753), the figures were as follows: Amoco ($7.5111.), Spain ($20m.), France ($40m.), Italy ($36m.), Kuwait ($7.5m.), Japan ($8m.), and Germany ($2m.). Different figures were given in the record of meeting between Sir Kenneth Hutchinson, director of IMEG and Mr. G. G. Arthur, 12 Feb. 1970. These figures were not necessarily definite. The Cairo embassy gave some other estimate. See Simmons to Miller, 23 June 1970; Financial Times (London), 18 Feb. 1970.Google Scholar On 7 Apr. 1970, SOCEA chairman reported that Kuwait confirmed that it had $30 million available, excluding the down payments.

33 Financial Times (London), 18 Feb. 1970;Google Scholar and PRO, PREM 15/536, al-Fiki to MP Edward Heath, 21 Nov. 1969.

34 PRO, FCO 39/753, Beaumont (Cairo) to FO, Tel. 164, 31 Jan.; record of meeting between Hutchinson and Mr. G. G. Arthur, 12 Feb. 1970. Still, in a reply to an inquiry by MP George Lawson and MP George Brown, who lobbied on behalf of the Motherwell Bridge Company, it was stated: “The financial and commercial considerations against our participation in the project … which were judged late last year to outweigh the political considerations in favour, are still valid.” Walker's minute, 20 Feb. 1970.

35 In May 1970, a Syrian bulldozer accidentally damaged the pipeline near the Jordanian frontier. The oil flow resumed only in January 1971, following a new transit agreement with the Syrian government. See Stevens, “Pipelines or Pipe Dreams?” 233.

36 In early 1970, the new Libyan regime under Colonel Qaddafi ordered cuts in oil production as part of his negotiations with oil companies to increase the profits of the government. This struggle, and eventual triumph, of the Libyan regime constituted a milestone in the struggle between the producing states and oil companies. See Shwadran, Middle East Oil Crises, 19–23.

37 PRO, FCO 39/754, “The SUMED Pipeline: The Oil Industry View,” 9 July 1970.

38 Ibid.

39 Amin, , al-Ahram (Cairo), 16 Nov. 1970Google Scholar (PRO, FCO 39/754).

40 PRO, FCO 39/754, Simmons's minute, 2 Dec. 1970; PREM 15/536, Beaumont to FO, Tel. 1380, 3 Dec. 1970.

41 PRO, FCO 39/754, Simmons's minute, 2 Dec. 1970.

42 PRO, FCO 39/754, Wilmshurst to Holding, 2 Dec. 1970.

43 PRO, PREM 15/536, record of meeting, 11 Dec. 1970. For the aide-memoire, see ibid. Heath responded that the SUMED issue “should be discussed in detail with the Ministers immediately involved.”

44 PRO, FCO 39/754, Adams's minute, 15 Dec. 1970.

45 Riad visited London on 3–6 Jan. 1971. See PRO, PREM 15/534, Adams's minute, 6 Jan. 1971.

46 PRO, PREM 15/536, Beaumont to FO, Tel. 1379, 3 Dec. 1970.

47 PREM 15/536, Beaumont to FO, Tel. 1381, 3 Dec. 1970.

48 PRO, FCO 39/1003, “SUMED Pipeline,” memorandum by Alec Douglas-Home, 31 Dec. 1970.

49 For details on the scope of these contracts, see PRO, FCO 39/754, “State of Negotiations with Users,” 31 Dec. 1970. See also Rendel, A.M., “A Stake in the Egyptian Pipeline,” Times (London), 2 Jan. 1971.Google Scholar

50 According to the chancellor, “the financial and commercial risks involved in the Sumed project are very great. In its present form, I could not agree to support it unless some acceptable further guarantee were offered to cover the whole of the UK participation.” See his minute, PRO, FCO 39/1003, 5 Jan. 1971. See also the minute by the secretary of state for trade and industry, ibid., 4 Jan. 1971. The idea to transfer the discussion to the committee was suggested by the foreign minister, and the prime minister concurred. See Alec Douglas-Home's minute to the PM, PREM 15/534, 11 Jan., and his reply, 25 Jan. 1971. See also FCO 39/1003, Roberts to Borrington, 6 Jan.; Holding to Simmons, 14 Jan. 1971. A headline in the Sunday Mirror (London) on 31 Jan. 1971Google Scholar read, “Ministers in Power Battle.”

51 PRO, FCO 39/1003, Beaumont to FO, Tel. 88, 21 Jan. 1971.

52 PRO, FCO 39/985, Beaumont to Douglas-Home, diplomatic report 423, 24 Aug. 1971.

53 PRO, FCO 39/1004, Cabinet: Defense and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee, “Brief for the Secretary of State on SUMED,” 2 Feb. 1971. For some other briefs prepared for the meeting, see PREM 15/534, DOP Committee (71) 4, 2 Feb. 1971.

54 PRO, FCO 39/1006, memo by the secretary of state for trade and industry, 2 Feb. 1971.

55 PRO, FCO 39/1004, Douglas-Home to Moon (10 Downing Street), 9 Feb. 1971.

56 PRO, PREM 15/534, Beaumont to FO, Tel. 234, 26 Feb. 1971.

57 An escrow account is one that the nominal holder of the assets can operate only subject to agreed procedures where another party has an effective voice. See PREM 15/534, OOP (71) 15, 16 March 1971.

58 PRO, PREM 15/534, DOP (71) 15, 16 March 1971; FCO 39/1008, Godber to Noble, 21 December 1971; MEED 15 (26 Mar. 1971).Google Scholar

59 MEED 15 (14 May, 18 June, 2 July 1971).Google Scholar

60 For these agreements, see Shwadran, Middle East Oil Crises, 22–27.

61 Al-Ahram (Cairo), 6 July 1971Google Scholar; MEED 9 July 1971 (FCO 39/1006). For a list of financial guarantees (amounting to $250-$280 million) and a list of consortium partners and suppliers, see MEED 15 (6 Aug. 1971).Google Scholar

62 PRO, FCO 39/1007, memorandum on SUMED, undated.

63 MEED 15 (6 Aug. 1971).Google Scholar

64 PRO, FCO 39/1006, Wilmshurst to Holding, 6 Aug. 1971; MEED 15 (13 Aug. 1971).Google Scholar

65 MEED 15 (27 Aug. 1971).Google Scholar

66 Bowrin, Philip, “Now Egypt's Pipe Calls the Tune,” Guardian (London), 7 Oct. 1971.Google Scholar

67 For a summary of the visit, see PRO, FCO 39/988, Beaumont to Douglas-Home, diplomatic report 450, 22 Sept. 1971.

68 For details on these meetings and the negotiations with Egypt, see PRO, FCO 39/1007, Douglas-Home to Cairo, Tel. 1891, 21 Oct.; Craig's minute, 28 Oct.; Douglas-Home to Waly, 3 Nov.; Godber to Cairo, Tel. 1233, 17 Nov. 1971; Beaumont to FO, Tel. 1398, 3 Nov.; FCO 39/1008, Craig's minute, 11 Nov.; Wali to Beaumont, 11 Nov. 1971. For details on the specific difficulties, see MEED 15 (5 Nov., 12 Nov., 26 Nov. 1971).Google Scholar

69 MEED 16 (21 Jan. 1973).Google Scholar

70 MEED 16 (21 Apr., 5 May 1972Google Scholar). The cost of the pipeline was to be covered by loans totaling $293 million. For the exact contribution of each loaner, see MEED 16 (5 May 1972), 498.Google Scholar

71 Following a visit by 'Ali Wali to Saudi Arabia in Nov. 1971, the latter signed an agreement to provide the credit of $20 million, in addition to reserving five million tons of SUMED throughput capacity a year for Saudi oil. See MEED 15 (12,19 Nov. 1971).Google Scholar

72 MEED 16:16, 21 Apr.; 16:18, 5 May 1972.

73 For a list of the companies and their share in the pipeline, see MEED 17:17, 22 Apr. 1973.Google Scholar

74 MEED 16 (20 Oct. 1972); 17Google Scholar (1 June 1973). The Middle East and North Africa, 1973–74 (London, 1974), 265Google Scholar; al-Usbu'al-'Arabi (Beirut), 24 Sept. 1973.Google Scholar

75 MEED 17 (8 June, 29 June 1973Google Scholar); al-Usbu'al-'Arabi (Beirut), 24 Sept. 1973.Google Scholar

76 Little, “Pipeline Politics,” 255.

77 The U.S. investment firm organized a $53 million loan for the state airline, Egyptair. Following this transaction, it inquired whether an American takeover of the SUMED operation could be organized if agreement with the consortium failed. See MEED 17 (29 June, 5 Oct., 30 Nov. 1973), 18Google Scholar (18 Jan. 1974); The Middle East and North Africa 1975–76 (London, 1976), 298.Google Scholar The figures are taken from MEED 18 (19 Apr. 1974).Google Scholar

78 The Egyptian People's Assembly approved the draft law on 27 Jan. 1974. In addition to Egypt, which owns half of the company, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates each own 15 percent, while Qatar owns the remaining 5 percent. For more details, see Arab Oil and Gas Directory (AOGD) (Beirut, 1974): 70–1Google Scholar; Al-Usbu'al-'Arabi, 24 Sept. 1973; Quarterly Economic Review (QER), Egypt, no.l (1974): 10Google Scholar; Wahish, Niveen, “A Twist of Fate,” al- Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 31 July-6 Aug. 2003.Google Scholar

79 MEED 17 (14 Dec. 1973)Google Scholar; The Middle East and North Africa 1975–76, 298.

80 Little, “Pipeline Politics,” 283.

81 In fact, a Republican Senator attacked the deal, claiming that it would give Arab oil producers “even more leverage than they now have.” See MEED 18 (18 Jan. 1974).Google Scholar

82 For the plans, see Arab Republic of Egypt, “Appraisal of the Rehabilitation of the Suez Canal,” 19 Nov. 1974, report no. 578-EGT.

83 Field, Peter, “Move to Reopen and Enlarge Suez Canal,” MEED 18 (8 Feb. 1974)Google Scholar; “Egyptian Economy Opening Up for Private Enterprise,” MEED 18 (22 Feb. 1974Google Scholar). On the various stages for the Canal's project, see AOGD (1974): 71–72.

84 QER, Egypt, 2 (1974): 14Google Scholar; AOGD (1974): 71.

85 “Over $7, 500 Million Pledged to Egypt since War,” MEED 18:34, 23 Aug. 1974, 961–4Google Scholar; “What Price the Sinai Accord?” MEED 19 (5 Sept. 1975): 3–5.Google Scholar

86 AOGD (1974): 71; MEED 18 (19 Apr. 1974Google Scholar). The contract was reportedly worth $348 million; see MEED 18 (26 Apr. 1974Google Scholar); QER, Egypt, 2 (1974): 14.Google Scholar

87 MEED 18 (28 June, 1 Nov. 1974).Google Scholar

88 Ibid. 18 (11 Oct. 1974).

89 Al-Ahram (Cairo), 30 Sept. 1975.Google Scholar Interestingly, there was little information in the Egyptian media or elsewhere on the actual construction of the project.

90 The widening and deepening of the canal enabled it to take fully laden very large crude carriers of about 150,000 deadweight tons, or very large crude carriers of up to 350,000 deadweight tons in ballast. See Petroleum Economist 53 (Aug. 1986): 306Google Scholar; Kanowski, Eliyahu, “Egypt's Troubled Economy,” MECS, vol. 6, 1981–1982 (New York, 1984), 408–9.Google Scholar

91 MEES 20 (13 Dec. 1976).Google Scholar

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93 Cairo Radio, 11 Dec. 1976 (BBC, ME/5389/A12,14 Dec. 1976).

94 The Middle East and North Africa, 1977–78 (London, 1978), 303Google Scholar; AOGD (1977–78): 84; QER, Egypt, 1st quarter 1977, 14; 1st quarter 1978, 12; MECS, vol. 2, 1977–1978 (New York, 1979).Google Scholar

95 See, e.g., Radio Ankara, 4 Jan. 1977 (BBC, ME/5406/A2, 7 Jan.); Iraqi News Agency, 3 Jan. (daily report, FBIS-MEA-77–2, 4 Jan. 1977, El). For some details on this pipeline, see Stanley Tucker, “Pipelines versus Tankers,” Petroleum Economist (Feb. 1978): 51–3; Stevens, “Pipelines or Pipe Dreams,” 229–31.

96 On the economic situation and the riots, see Waterbury, John, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, 1983), 406–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

97 AOGD (1983): 98; Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), Aug. 1980, 14–15.Google Scholar

98 Little, “Pipeline Politics,” 283–4.

99 On the Saudi project, see Safran, Nadav, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988), 432Google Scholar; Aulas, Marie-Christine, “Expansion of Petroleum Continues,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), Aug. 1980, 14–15.Google Scholar

100 See in this connection, Podeh, Elie and Winckler, Onn, “The Boycott that Never Was: Egypt and the Arab World, 1979–1989,” Durham Middle East Papers 72 (2002).Google Scholar

101 Mejcher, “Saudi Arabia's ‘Vital Link to the West’,” 375.

lO2 AOGD, 1983, 98; Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), Aug. 1980, 14–15Google Scholar; MEES 27 (28 May 1984).Google Scholar

103 MEES 27 (11 June 1984)Google Scholar; Petroleum Economist 51 (July 1984): 264.Google Scholar

104 An-Nahar Arab Report & Memo, 28 Jan. 1985, 9.

105 Petroleum Economist 53 (Aug. 1986): 306.Google Scholar

106 Petroleum Economist 57 (March 1990): 81Google Scholar; 58 (June 1991): 20.

107 MEED 38 (9 Dec. 23 Dec. 1994Google Scholar); Petroleum Economist, 60 (Mar. 1993) 49Google Scholar; 61 (12 Dec. 1994).

108 Wahish, Niveen, “A Twist of Fate,” al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 31 July-6 Aug. 2003.Google Scholar See also Amira Ibrahim, “From the Red to the Med,” ibid., 18–24 Nov. 1999; Sherine Abdel-Razek, “Rites of Passage,” ibid., 26 July-1 Aug. 2003.

109 Interview with Admiral Ahmed 'Ali Fadel, head of the SCA, al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 2–8 Aug. 2001Google Scholar; Wahish, , al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 31 July-6 Aug. 2003.Google Scholar

110 World Oil Transit Chokepoints, Nov. 2002, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.html.

111 After Saudi Arabia, Russia produced 4.31 million barrels per day (b/d), Norway 3.11 million b/d, Venezuela 2.66 million b/d and Iran 2.59 million b/d. For data for the year 2000, see http://www.eia.doe.gov.

112 See the source in note 110. This is in contrast to the thesis that Egypt is financially dependent on Saudi Arabia. See, e.g., Wien, Jake, “Saudi-Egyptian Relations: The Political and Military Dimensions of Saudi Financial Flows to Egypt,” Rand Paper Series (Washington, D.C., 1980Google Scholar); Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal, “The New Arab Political Order: Implications for the 1980s,” in Kerr, Malcolm H. and Yassin, El Sayed, eds., Rich and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order (Boulder, Colo., 1982), 319–47.Google Scholar

113 Stevens, “Pipelines or Pipe Dreams,” 235. On the advantages of SUMED in Egyptian eyes, see Al-Ahram (Cairo), 30 Sept. 1975.Google Scholar

114 Tucker, “Pipelines Versus Tankers,” 51.

115 Shwadran, Benjamin, “Middle East Oil Developments,” MECS, vol. 1, 1976–77 (New York, 1978), 273.Google Scholar

116 Waterbury, “The Suez Canal,” 18.

117 For this figure, see Middle East Finance and Economy, 28 Dec. 2003, http://www. ameinfo.com/news/Detailed/32817.html. Unfortunately, figures for SUMED are included generally in transportation and therefore cannot be exactly verified.

118 Each year the anniversaries of the nationalization of the Suez Canal (26 July 1956) and the opening of the Canal to navigation (17 Nov. 1869) are celebrated in Egypt. These celebrations are mentioned in Abdel-Razek, Sherine, “Rites of Passage,” al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 26 July-1 Aug. 2001.Google Scholar