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An Organizational Perspective on the Military-Industrial Complex
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 June 2012
Abstract
Is there a “military-industrial complex” in the United States? What is the relationship between business, government, and the military with its needs for vast quantities of goods and services? How has organization for war and defense changed since the demands of World War I first made such questions important? How much do we know about what actually happened between World War I and Vietnam to change the relationship between private and public organizations? Professor Cuff discusses the complexities involved in trying to answer such historical questions, and prescribes a professional historian's regimen for future work on this subject.
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- Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1978
References
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