¹ For overviews of the Indian and Latin American business history literature, see Tumbe, Chinmay, “Recent Trends in the Business History of India,” Business History Review 93, no. 1 (2019): 153–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Dávila, Carlos, “The Current State of Business History in Latin America,” Australian Economic History Review 53, no. 2 (2013): 109–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Austin, Gareth, Dávila, Carlos, & Jones, Geoffrey, “The Alternative Business History: Business in Emerging Markets,” Business History Review 91, no. 3 (2017): 537–569CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ For a reflection on the multinodal origins of business history and its implications for the development of the field see Kipping, Matthias, Takafumi, Kurosawa and Wadhwani, R. Daniel, “A Revisionist Historiography of Business History: A Richer Past for a Richer Future,” in The Routledge Companion to Business History, ed. Wilson, John F., Toms, Steven, de Jong, Abe, and Buchnea, Emily (Abingdon, 2017), 19–35Google Scholar.

⁴ Quote from speech delivered at the workshop on Chinese business held at the University of Akron, 27–29 Oct. 1995. Cited in McElderry, Andrea, “Time and Space: Periodizing Chinese Business,” Chinese Business History Newsletter 6, no. 1 (1996): 5–6Google Scholar. This article uses East Asian language naming conventions. For authors with phoneticized Korean, Japanese, and Chinese names, the family name is listed first, and the given name follows (e.g. Xi Jinping, Kim Jung-un, Abe Shinzo). For authors who have adopted Indo-European given names, the Western convention is used (e.g. Amy Tan, Sandra Oh, Marie Kondo).

⁵ The dataset was manually constructed using information collected from online journal databases. Specifically, for each online database, I conducted full-text and article-title searches of the terms “China,” “Chinese,” “Sino,” “Hong Kong,” “Canton,” Cantonese,” “Taiwan,” and “Taiwanese.” I then read the abstracts of each article to confirm whether or not Chinese business was included in the core subject matter or if one of the aforementioned terms was simply used in passing. In the cases where this was unclear from the abstract, I browsed the articles in full.

⁶ The list is as follows: Yen-p'ing, Hao, “Entrepreneurship and the West in East Asian Economic and Business History,” Business History Review 56, no. 2 (1982): 149–54Google Scholar; Brown, Rajeswary Ampalavanar, ed., Chinese Business Enterprise in Asia (London, 1995)Google Scholar; Coble, Parks M., “Comments and Reflections on Chinese Business History,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3–4 (1998): 145–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Feuerwerker, Albert, “Doing Business in China over Three Centuries,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3–4 (1998): 16–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yen-p'ing, Hao, “Themes and Issues in Chinese Business History,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3–4 (1998): 106–26Google Scholar; Bun, Kwan Man, “Chinese Business History in the People's Republic of China,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3–4 (1998): 35–64Google Scholar; Chi-Kong, Lai, “Enterprise History Studies and Archives,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3 (1998): 169Google Scholar; Man-houng, Lin, “Interpretative Trends in Taiwan's Scholarship on Chinese Business History: 1600 to the Present,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3–4 (1998): 65–94Google Scholar; Zelin, Madeleine, “Critique of Scholarship on Chinese Business History in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3–4 (1998): 95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chan, Wellington K. K., “Tradition and Change in the Chinese Business Enterprise,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3–4 (1998): 127–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chi-Kong, Lai, “Chinese Business History: Its Development, Present Situation, and Future Direction,” in Business History around the World, ed. Amatori, Franco and Jones, Geoffrey (Cambridge, U.K., 2003), 298–316Google Scholar; Zelin, Madeleine, “Guest Editor's Introduction,” Enterprise & Society 6, no. 3 (2005): 357–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chan, Wellington K. K., “Chinese Entrepreneurship since Its Late Imperial Period,” in The Invention of Enterprise: Entrepreneurship from Ancient Mesopotamia to Modern Times, ed. Landes, David S., Mokyr, Joel, and Baumol, William J. (Princeton, 2010), 469–500CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cochran, Sherman, “Chinese And Overseas Chinese Business History: Three Challenges To The State Of The Field,” in Kudaisya, Medha Malik and Chin-keong, Ng, eds., Chinese and Indian Business (Leiden, 2009): 11–29Google Scholar; Bian, Morris L., “Interpreting Enterprise, State, and Society: A Critical Review of the Literature in Modern Chinese Business History, 1978–2008,” Frontiers of History in China 6, no. 3 (2011): 423–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zelin, Madeleine, “Chinese Business Practice in the Late Imperial Period,” Enterprise & Society 14, no. 4 (2013): 769–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yeh Wen-hsin, Klaus Mühlhahn, and Hajo Frölich, “Introduction to “Rethinking Business History in Modern China”,” Cross-currents no. 16 (2015): 1–12.

⁷ Fairbank, John K., Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir (New York, 1982), 355Google Scholar. The United States Congress's National Defense Education Act of 1957 (later renamed the Higher Education Act) and the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 (officially titled the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act) provided federal funding for the multidisciplinary study of societies, like China, that were considered to be of strategic importance to the United States. Congress also provided funds to the Ford Foundation, which began awarding individual grants for the study of Chinese language and culture, as well as institutional grants to the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies for area-studies conferences and workshops.

⁸ A debate between China studies scholars, including William Skinner, Joseph Levenson, and Benjamin Schwartz, and classically trained Sinologists, such as William Mote, played out in the pages of the 1964 issue of the Journal of Asian Studies. The debate centered on the continued relevance of philological approaches to understanding China. The debate continues to this day, with renowned Sinologists such as Geremie Barmé advocating for a “New Sinology.” See Skinner, G. William, “What the Study of China Can Do for Social Science,” Journal of Asian Studies 23, no. 4 (1964): 517–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Barmé, Geremie R., “Towards a New Sinology,” Chinese Studies Association of Australia Newsletter, no. 31 (2005): 4–9Google Scholar.

⁹ Weber viewed the emergence of capitalism in Europe as the product of a unique configuration of institutional and cultural factors. In the case of China, Weber argued, it was the societal adherence of Confucian ethics— such as filial piety, social harmony, patrimonial bureaucracy— that precluded the development of rational law, rational accounting, rational enterprise, and the rational functioning of the apparatus of the state and caused the development of industrial capitalism having “gone backward in China, not forward.” See Max Weber, General Economic History, trans. Frank H. Knight (Glencoe, IL, 1950): 352.

¹⁰ In their later studies of guandu shangban enterprises, Wellington K. K. Chan and Lai Chi-Kong challenged Albert Feurwerker's characterization of traditional Confucian culture and state domination as the sole factors behind the “failure to establish modern enterprise in China.” Both Chan and Lai instead lay the blame at the feet of government officials who refused to relinquish control over enterprises to private actors and instituted systems of bureaucratic management that ultimately inhibited the growth of industry. See Chan, “Government, Merchants, and Industry to 1911,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 11, Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, ed. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (Cambridge, U.K., 1980), 460; Lai, “The Qing State and Merchant Enterprise: The China Merchants’ Company, 1872–1902,” in To Achieve Security and Wealth: The Qing Imperial State and the Economy, 1644–1911, ed. Jane Kate Leonard and John R. Watt (Ithaca, 1992), 139–55; and Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844–1916) and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, MA, 1958).

¹¹ Levy, Marion J., The Rise of the Modern Chinese Business Class (New York, 1949)Google Scholar.

¹² Building upon the theory of the “Asiatic mode of production,” Karl Wittfogel argued that China's development was held in thrall by despotic states that over-expropriated surplus from an economy of undifferentiated village communities. See Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven, 1957); Levenson, Joseph R., Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley, 1968)Google Scholar; and Wright, Mary, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874 (Stanford, 1957)Google Scholar.

¹³ Huang, Ray and Needham, Joseph, “The Nature of Chinese Society,” East and West 24, no. 3 (1974): 381Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Albert Feuerwerker, remarks at the 1991 AAS roundtable, quoted in Gardella, Robert, “Prospects for Research in Chinese Business History,” Chinese Business History Newsletter 2, no. 1 (1991), 3Google Scholar. Indeed, well into the 1980s scholars continued seeking to explain “why there were no revolutionary breakthroughs in the commercial and industrial history of China.” See Chan, Wellington K. K., “The Organizational Structure of the Traditional Chinese Firm and Its Modern Reform,” Business History Review 56, no. 2 (1982): 218–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Tawney, R. H., Land and Labour in China (New York, N.Y., 1932), 110Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Kahn, Harold and Feuerwerker, Albert, “The Ideology of Scholarship: China's New Historiography,” in History in Communist China, ed. Feuerwerker, Albert (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 13Google Scholar.

¹⁷ The theoretical basis of the “sprouts of capitalism” literature can be traced back to Mao Zedong's claim that “as China's feudal society developed its commodity economy and so carried within itself the embryo of capitalism, China would of herself have developed slowly into a capitalist society even if there had been no influence of foreign imperialism.” Cited in Feuerwerker, Albert, “China's History in Marxian Dress,” American Historical Review 66, no. 2 (1961): 327CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ This type of ideology-centered scholarship is now being reborn under the banner of the “New Left.” For example, in his three-volume series The Political and Economic History of China, Hu Angang, an influential professor of economics at Tsinghua University, argues that the relative decline of late imperial China was attributable to “the absence of strong, modern-minded leadership” and the failure of traditional institutions to cope with a rapidly changing world. The inability of the Qing dynasty and the Nationalist state to meet the challenges posed by a rapidly industrializing West, Hu contends, necessitated the Chinese Communist Party's rise and provided legitimacy for a “government-enforced, fast, and dramatic socioeconomic transition.” Hu Angang, The Political and Economic History of China, 1949–1976, vol. 3, trans. Hu Guangyu, Glenn Griffith, and Vivian Hui (Hong Kong, 2013), 48–49.

¹⁹ For an excellent review and analysis of this Mainland Chinese literature, see Zelin, Madeleine, “Critique of Scholarship on Chinese Business in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan,” Chinese Studies in History 31, no. 3–4 (1998): 95–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ See Bozhong, Li, Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 1620–1850 (London, 1998)Google Scholar; for English translations of Xu and Wu, see Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, eds., Chinese Capitalism, 1522–1840 (Basingstoke, 2000). See also Allen, Robert, “Agricultural Productivity and Rural Incomes in England and the Yangtze Delta, c.1620–c.1820,” Economic History Review 62, no. 3 (2009): 525CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Myers, Ramon, The Chinese Economy, Past and Present (Belmont, CA, 1980)Google Scholar; and Bin, Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca, 1997)Google Scholar.

²¹ See Shiyue, Li and Bin, Hu, “Yangwupai yu Jindai Gongye” [The self-strengtheners and modem industries], Bulletin of Shandong Normal University 3 (1979): 33–41Google Scholar.; Li Shiyue and Hu Bin, “Li Hongzhang yu Lunchuan Zhaoshangju” [Li Hongzhang and the China Merchants’ Steamship Navigation Company], LS 2 (1982): 44–60.

²² As Kwan has argued, in the titles of Chinese-language articles one can see how the phrase “sprouts of capitalism” was simply replaced with parallel concepts such as the “sprouts of modernization” and “sprouts of market economy.” Kwan, “Chinese Business History.”

²³ As Li Huaiyin has argued, there was a paradigmatic shift with the “revolutionary historiography that bases its analyses on Marxist methodologies and highlights rebellions and revolutions as the overarching themes” being gradually displaced by a new generation of scholarship that applied modernization theory in a quest to identify those “‘modern’ elements in the Chinese economy, society, government, and culture that arguably contributed to China's modern progress and heralded capitalist developments in the post-Mao era.” See Li, “From Revolution to Modernization: The Paradigmatic Transition in Chinese Historiography in the Reform Era,” History and Theory 49, no. 3 (2010): 336, 359.

²⁴ Wadhwani, R. Daniel and Lubinski, Christina, “Reinventing Entrepreneurial History,” Business History Review 91, no. 4 (2017): 767–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Hao, “Entrepreneurship.”

²⁶ Cohen, Paul, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York, NY, 1984)Google Scholar.

²⁷ Cohen, Paul, China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past (London, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ Myers, Chinese Economy; Wong, China Transformed; Li, Agricultural Development.

²⁹ See Junjian, Jing, “Legislation Related to the Civil Economy in the Qing Dynasty,” in Civil Law in Qing and Republican China, ed. Bernhardt, Katherine and Huang, Philip (Stanford, 1994), 42–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zhiping, Liang, Qingdai Xiguanfa: Shehui yu Guojia [Qing customary law: Society and the state] (Beijing, 1996)Google Scholar; and Zelin, “Chinese Business Practice,” 772. Moreover, as Helen Dunstan argues, even in cases where the officials did intervene, they generally did so not on the basis of Confucian principles but from a sophisticated understanding of political economy. Dunstan, State or Merchant? Political Economy and Political Process in 1740s China (Cambridge, MA, 2006).

³⁰ Rowe, William, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796–1889 (Stanford, 1984), 341Google Scholar.

³¹ Xuncheng, Du, Zhongguo Chuantong Lunli yu Jindai Zibenzhuyi [Traditional Chinese ethics and modern capitalism] (Shanghai, 1993)Google Scholar; Lixing, Tang, “Mingqing Huishang Xinli Yanjiu” [Research on the psychology of Huizhou merchants in the Ming and Qing], in Jinnian Liung Fangzhong jiaoshou xueshu tuolunhui wenji [Commemorative essays in honor of Liang Fangzhong], ed. Mingsui, Tang and Qichen, Wang (Guangzhou, 1990), 268–91Google Scholar; Lufrano, Richard John, Honorable Merchants: Commerce and Self-Cultivation in Late Imperial China (Honolulu, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² Duara, Prasenjit, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942 (Stanford, 1988)Google Scholar.

³³ Shaolun, Huang, ed., Zhongguo Zongjiao Lunli yu Xiandaihua [Chinese religious ethics and modernization] (Hong Kong, 1991)Google Scholar; Redding, Gordon, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁴ Paul Cohen, China Unbound, 2; Robert Gardella, “Prospects for Research in Chinese Business History.”

³⁵ A full run of the Chinese Business History (中国商业历史) newsletter has been digitized and made available online by scholars at the University of Hong Kong: https://www.hkihss.hku.hk/en/researchs/chinese-business-history-resources/.

³⁶ These essays were compiled as an edited volume and later published as a stand-alone book. See Gardella, Robert, Leonard, Jane, and McElderry, Andrea, eds., Chinese Business History: Interpretive Trends and Priorities for the Future (Armonk, NY, 1998)Google Scholar.

³⁷ In The Visible Hand, Alfred Chandler argued that the story of American capitalism is one of corporate managerial hierarchies gradually outcompeting personal business networks. According to Chandler, in cases where administrative coordination was more efficient than market coordination, modern enterprises internalized these functions through the creation of rationalized and impersonal “management hierarchies.” These managerial hierarchies enabled the firms to achieve new economies of scale and displace owner-operated enterprises. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA, 1977). See Chan, “Organizational Structure”; Mira Wilkins, “The Impacts of American Multinational Enterprise,” in America's China Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance, ed. John King Fairbank and Ernest R. May (Cambridge, MA, 1986), 259–294; Amsden, Alice H., The Rise of “the Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies (Oxford, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Cochran, Sherman, Encountering Chinese Networks: Western, Japanese and Chinese Corporations in China, 1880–1937 (Berkeley, 2000), 182Google Scholar.

³⁹ Köll, Elisabeth, From Cotton Mill to Business Empire: The Emergence of Regional Enterprises in Modern China (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 282Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Bun, Kwan Man, “Managing Market, Hierarchy, and Network: The Jiuda Salt Industries, Ltd., 1917–1937,” Enterprise & Society 6, no. 3 (2005): 395–418CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Juanjuan, Peng, The Yudahua Business Group in China's Early Industrialization (Lanham, MD, 2020)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ For example, historian Bryna Goodman showed that networks based on native place association were modern, adaptive institutions that coordinated capital and labor, facilitated the resolution of disputes, and advanced the interests of their communities. The sociologist Gary Hamilton argued, in opposition to Alice Amsden, that Asian business networks operated at levels of efficiency that rivaled those of their hierarchical counterparts, and that the hierarchies-over-networks framework failed to explain the evolution of economic structures in Taiwan and South Korea. See Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853–1937 (Berkeley, 1995); Hamilton, ed., Asian Business Networks (Berlin, 1996); Feenstra, Robert C. and Hamilton, Gary G., Emergent Economies, Divergent Paths: Economic Organization and International Trade in South Korea and Taiwan (Cambridge, U.K., 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Amsden, Alice H. and Chu, Wan-wen, Beyond Late Development: Taiwan's Upgrading Policies (Cambridge, MA, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Kwok-bun, Chan, Chinese Business Networks: State, Economy and Culture (Singapore, 2000)Google Scholar; and Menkhoff, Thomas and Solvay, Gerke, Chinese Entrepreneurship and Asian Business Networks (London, 2002)Google Scholar.

⁴² A more thorough discussion of this “networks versus hierarchies” debate is presented in Morris Bian's article, “Interpreting Enterprise, State, and Society.”

⁴³ Participants in the 2021 Chinese Business History Workshop held in Inner Mongolia were invited to present their work at a special panel of the 2^nd World Congress of Business History, a joint initiative between the European Business History Association and the Business History Society of Japan. See http://bhs.ssoj.info/WCBH2020/index.html.

⁴⁴ As Andre Gunder Frank has argued, the first global economy was very much Sinocentric. It was only through the exploitation of silver from the Americas that Europeans were able to buy into the prosperous Asian trade and thus realize their own subsequent age of prosperity. See Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley, 1998).

⁴⁵ On the influence of the global silver trade on Chinese economic development, see Von Glahn, Richard, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000–1700 (Berkeley, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Man-houng, Lin, China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808–1856 (Leiden, 2006)Google Scholar; and So, Billy K. L., ed., The Economy of the Lower Yangzi Delta in Late Imperial China (London, 2013)Google Scholar. For a general introduction to the economic history of late imperial China, see Von Glahn, Richard, The Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, U.K., 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁶ Zelin, “Chinese Business Practice,” 772.

⁴⁷ Maddison, Angus, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run (Paris, 2007), 44Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Kenneth Pomeranz argues that China experienced its own “industrious revolution” but that revolution did not follow the path that was forged in England because of differences in the distribution of energy resources, availability of land, and the extent of overseas trade. For Pomeranz the “discovery” and exploitation of the New World was a key factor in developmental divergence. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, 2000).

⁴⁹ See Zelin, Madeleine, Ocko, Jonathan K., and Gardella, Robert, eds., Contract and Property in Early Modern China (Stanford, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yigong, Su, “Discovering the Chinese Common Law: The Formation of the Loan Contract in Qing China,” Frontiers of Law in China 10, no. 2 (2015): 365–98Google Scholar; Dykstra, Maura, “Cross-Jurisdictional Trade and Contract Enforcement in Qing China,” International Journal of Asian Studies 16, no. 2 (2019): 99–115CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jian, Qu, Social Order through Contracts (Singapore, 2021)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ David Faure, “The Lineage as Business Company: Patronage versus Law in the Development of Chinese Business,” in Brown, Chinese Business Enterprise, 82–106.

⁵¹ Zelin, Madeleine, “The Rise and Fall of the Fu-Rong Salt-Yard Elite: Merchant Dominance in Late Qing China,” in Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance, ed. Esherick, Joseph W. and Rankin, Mary B. (Berkeley, 1990), 91Google Scholar. See also Wakefield, David, Fenjia: Household Division and Inheritance in Qing and Republican China (Honolulu, 1998)Google Scholar; Ruskola, Teemu, “Corporation Law in Late Imperial China,” in Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company Law, ed. Wells, Harwell (Cheltenham, 2018), 355–80Google Scholar.

⁵² As Zelin argued, the lineage trust “has often been pushed aside as Chinese familialism, when, in fact, within the context of a legal system in which the state did not promulgate regulations for the incorporation of business, this was an ingenious technique for protecting assets.” Quote from speech delivered at the 1995 workshop on Chinese business history at the University of Akron. Cited in McElderry, “Time and Space,” 5.

⁵³ There did not, however, exist a free market for the exchange of these shares, and in many cases there were additional restrictions that limited their liquidity. For example, as Sherman Cochran notes in the case of the Shenxin cotton mill, the sale of company stock required the unanimous consent of the shareholders. See Zelin, Madeleine, “A Deep History of Chinese Shareholding,” Law and History Review 37, no. 2 (2019): 325–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks, 120–22.

⁵⁴ Zelin, “Deep History,” 327.

⁵⁵ Faure, David, China and Capitalism: A History of Business Enterprise in Modern China (Hong Kong, 2006), 43Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Specifically, Faure argues that the lack of “a well-defined commercial law, or even a customary law in which the concerns of business were very clearly spelt out except in moralistic terms” meant that business people could not seek recourse through legal institutions. Here, Faure echoes the much older work of Morris and Bodde which held that the “overwhelmingly penal emphasis” of Chinese law, and its lack of concern with economic rights, meant that civil disputes were “either ignored entirely. . . or were given limited treatment within its penal format.” See Bodde, Derk and Morris, Clarence, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty Cases (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 4Google Scholar; Faure, China and Capitalism, 3–4, 35; “Lineage as Business Company.”

⁵⁷ Following Weber, Faure argues that while in Europe individualist ideology enabled business institutions to distance themselves from their ritual origins, in China adherence to a collective ideology meant that business continued to be structured by ritual institutions. Faure, China and Capitalism, 37.

⁵⁸ More specifically, Faure argues that investment strategies and the division of profits were dictated by rule-of-thumb accounting practices that failed to account for capital, rather than by double-entry bookkeeping, which would have allowed for “the thought experiment that compares likely capital gains from different strategies of investment, making maximization not only an aspiration, but a reality.” Here Faure follows the heavily contested theories of Max Weber and Werner Sombart, who both credited the Venetian invention of double-entry bookkeeping with playing a pivotal role in laying the foundations for the Industrial Revolution. Faure, “Commercial Institutions and Practices in Imperial China as Seen by Weber and in Terms of More Recent Research,” Taiwan Dongya Wenming Yanjiu Xuekan 10, no. 2 (2013): 88; Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. Henderson, A. M. and Parsons, Talcott (1947; New York, 1964), 264Google Scholar; Weber, General Economic History, 275; Yamey, Basil S., “Accounting and the Rise of Capitalism: Further Notes on a Theme by Sombart,” Journal of Accounting Research 2, no. 2 (1964): 117–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Elsewhere, Faure contends that “no system of accounting was merged into production practices (Chinese accounts being used in household expenditures and in commerce) to permit the employment of managers beyond the immediate, watchful eyes of the owners of the businesses.” Faure, Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China (Stanford, 2007), 6.

⁵⁹ Faure, China and Capitalism, 42.

⁶⁰ Madeleine Zelin, “A Critique of Property Rights in Prewar China,” in Zelin, Gardella, and Ocko, Contract and Property, 18–19. See also Chen Li and Madeleine Zelin, Chinese Law, vol. 3 (Leiden, 2015).

⁶¹ Huang, Philip C. C., Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing (Stanford, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thomas Buoye, “Litigation, Legitimacy, and Lethal Violence,” in Zelin, Gardella, and Ocko, Contract and Property, 94–119.

⁶² Qiu Pengsheng, “Mingqing Zhongguo yu Quanqiushi de Lianjie” [introduction to the special issue, “Patterns of historical change in Late Imperial China: A global and comparative perspective”], Wenhua Yanjiu (2014), 9–17; Dykstra, “Cross-Jurisdictional Trade.”

⁶³ Gardella, Robert, “Commercial Bookkeeping in Ch'ing China and the West: A Preliminary Assessment,” Late Imperial China 4, no. 7 (1982): 56–72Google Scholar; Gardella, “Squaring Accounts: Commercial Bookkeeping Methods and Capitalist Rationalism in Late Qing and Republican China,” Journal of Asian Studies, 51, no. 2 (1992): 317–39; Auyeung, Pak, Fu, Lei, and Zhixiang, Liu, “Double-Entry Bookkeeping in Early-Twentieth-Century China,” Business History Review 79, no. 1 (2005): 73–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁴ Scholars such as Cao Shuji, Jiang Qin, and Li Jingzhang have woven together fragmentary sources to reconstruct the daily financial records of indigenous businesses; however, the incomplete nature of their archives made it difficult to build generalizable claims. See Cao and Jiang, “Southern Zhejiang Rural Industry and Markets during the Qing Dynasty: Evidence Derived from the Iron Smelting Industry in Shicang Village,” Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiusuo Jikan 81 (2010): 833–88; and Li, Jinshang Laozhang [Old account books of Shanxi merchants] (Beijing, 2012).

⁶⁵ Weipeng, Yuan, Macve, Richard, and Debin, Ma, “The Development of Chinese Accounting and Bookkeeping before 1850: Insights from the Tŏng Tài Shēng Business Account Books (1798–1850),” Accounting and Business Research 47, no. 4 (2017): 401–30Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Cao Shuji and Matthew Lowenstein, “Double, Double, Debit and Credit: Double-Entry Bookkeeping in Late Imperial China,” Business History Review (forthcoming).

⁶⁷ For a critical review of the literature on Chinese and European accounting practices and their connections with development, see Keith Hoskin, Ma Debin, and Richard H. Macve, “A Genealogy of Myths about the Rationality of Accounting in the West and in the East,” SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan. 2013); Hoskin and Macve, “Contesting the Indigenous Development of ‘Chinese Double-Entry Bookkeeping’ and Its Significance in China's Economic Institutions and Business Organization before C.1850,” SSRN Electronic Journal (Feb. 2012).

⁶⁸ Zelin, Madeleine, The Merchants of Zigong: Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early Modern China (New York, 2005), xiiiGoogle Scholar. See also Zelin, “Capital Accumulation and Investment Strategies in Early Modern China: The Case of the Furong Salt Yard,” Late Imperial China 9, no. 1 (1988): 79–122; and Zelin, “Rise and Fall.”

⁶⁹ Zelin further documents how new classes of shares were created to differentiate investments of capital, labor, and land and how futures markets developed to facilitate the exchange of said shares. For more detailed descriptions of these institutions, see Zelin, “The Firm in Early Modern China.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71, no. 3 (2009): 623–37; and Zelin, “Deep History.”

⁷⁰ As Zelin shows, there was a complex distribution of rights and obligations among partners, including landowners, investors, and middlemen. Moreover, this distribution evolved in tandem with shifts in the relative importance of capital, technology, and land. Zelin, “Rise and Fall.”

⁷¹ “Semi-colonialism” has been used in recent scholarship as both a term and a theoretical framework that highlights the “incomplete and fragmentary nature of China's colonial structure.” Shu-mei, Shih, The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 1917–1937 (Berkeley, 2001), 34Google Scholar. See also Barlow, Tani E., “Colonialism's Career in Postwar China Studies,” in Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia, ed. Barlow, Tani E. (Durham, 1997): 373–412CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goodman, Bryna, “Improvisations on a Semicolonial Theme, or, How to Read a Celebration of Transnational Urban Community,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 4, (2000): 889–926CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Frost, Shuang and Frost, Adam, “Taxi Shanghai: Entrepreneurship and Semi-Colonial Context,” Business History, ahead of print, (2021): 1–30Google Scholar.

⁷² Quoted in Coble, Parks, The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government, 1927–1937 (Cambridge, MA, 1980), 27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷³ Wu, Shellen Xiao, Empires of Coal: Fueling China's Entry into the Modern World Order, 1860–1920 (Stanford, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁴ Wu, Empires of Coal, 31, 186.

⁷⁵ Reinhardt, Anne, Navigating Semi-Colonialism: Shipping, Sovereignty, and Nation-Building in China, 1860–1937 (Cambridge, MA, 2018), 43Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ For another study that further elaborates on how conflicts between colonialism and nationalism shaped the building of infrastructure, see Chenxiao, Xia, “Foreign Direct Investment in China's Electrification: Between Colonialism and Nationalism, 1882–1952,” Enterprise & Society 22, no. 1 (2021): 1–43Google Scholar.

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⁹⁹ Chinese land reform, which began in 1946 and lasted until 1953, radically altered the political and economic structure of the countryside. Land, property, farming tools, and draft animals were violently expropriated from “landlords” and “rich peasant” households and were transferred to poorer families. See John K. Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA, 1992); and Victor D. Lippit, Land Reform and Economic Development in China (White Plains, NY, 1974).

¹⁰⁰ As Mark Selden and Wu Jieh-min argue, the “genius” of the PRC's developmental strategy “lay precisely in maintaining the vast majority of rural producers on the land during the period of socialist transition while using a combination of collective organization and the price scissors to transfer the surplus to industry and the state.” Selden, and Wu, , “The Chinese State, Incomplete Proletarianization and Structures of Inequality in Two Epochs,” Asia-Pacific Journal 9, no. 5 (2011): 5Google Scholar.

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¹⁰² Jeremy Brown argues that although the CCP rose to power on the back of the claim that it would eliminate the “three differences” in Chinese society—inequality between workers and peasants, cities and the countryside, and mental and manual labor—the party's subsequent actions increased the urban-rural divide. Rural Chinese became second-class citizens who were locked into their “agricultural” classifications; they could “resist in small ways that tweaked the system” but lacked the requisite power to actually threaten it. Brown, City versus Countryside in Mao's China: Negotiating the Divide (Cambridge, U.K., 2012), 6.

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¹⁰⁹ As Antonia Finnane shows, under socialist rule the tailoring business initially boomed as people sought to remake their old clothing in appropriate new styles and waves of sewing school graduates entered the “socially useful” trade. However, tailors also faced unprecedented challenges in a political environment increasingly hostile to bourgeois culture. By 1956 the industry had entered into an inexorable decline, as private firms were reorganized into co-ops, and formerly independent entrepreneurs became rank-and-file workers in the new socialist economy. Finnane, “Tailors in 1950s Beijing: Private Enterprise, Career Trajectories, and Historical Turning Points in the Early PRC,” Frontiers of History in China 6, no. 1 (2011): 117–37.

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¹¹⁴ The abolition of private plots and closure of markets encountered fierce resistance at the local level. See Thaxton, Ralph, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China: Mao's Great Leap Forward Famine and the Origins of Righteous Resistance in Da Fo Village (Cambridge, U.K., 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹¹⁸ Faure, China and Capitalism, 8. For early theorizations of the “cellular” socialist economy, see Donnithorne, Audrey, “China's Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends since the Cultural Revolution,” China Quarterly 52 (1972): 605CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution. See also Nicholas Lardy's challenge to the “cellular economy” framework in Economic Growth and Distribution in China (Cambridge, U.K., 1978).

¹¹⁹ For authoritative accounts of the institutional causes of, and the human and economic devastation wrought by, the Great Famine, see Dikötter, Frank, Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962 (New York, 2010)Google Scholar; Wemheuer, Felix and Manning, Kimberley Ens, Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine (Vancouver, 2011)Google Scholar; and Jisheng, Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962, ed. Friedman, Edward, Jian, Guo, and Mosher, Stacy (New York, 2012)Google Scholar.

¹²⁰ Early scholarship tended to follow Andrew Walder's client-patron model of state-worker relations, which depicted industrial laborers as beneficiaries of socialism whose privileged status was dependent upon the patronage of the CCP. However, successive work revealed that workers were highly agentic actors who expressed divergent interests and frequently exercised autonomy vis-à-vis the state. For example, as Jackie Sheehan has shown, when economic grievances were left unaddressed, workers engaged in political protests against the party-state that were serious enough to be perceived by leaders as a threat to the CCP's legitimacy. Joel Andreas challenges the client-patron model even more explicitly, arguing that permanent job tenure protected political resistance and encouraged loyal dissent. Walder, Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley, 1986); Sheehan, Chinese Workers: A New History (London, 1998); Andreas, Disenfranchised: The Rise and Fall of Industrial Citizenship in China (New York, 2019).

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¹²² For example, Zeng Zhaojin and Joshua Eisenman estimate the intensity of political repression in three major mass campaigns during the Maoist period and demonstrate a negative correlation with economic outcomes after 1982. Bai Liang and Wu Lingwei similarly use surveys to show that the intensity of political violence during the Cultural Revolution was associated with an erosion of interpersonal trust and an enduring loss of human capital, the effects of which could still be observed in local economies four decades later. Zeng and Eisenman, “The Price of Persecution: The Long-Term Effects of the Anti-rightist Campaign on Economic Performance in Post-Mao China,” World Development 110 (2018): 249–60; Bai and Wu, “Political Movement and Trust Formation: Evidence from the Cultural Revolution (1966–76),” European Economic Review 122 (2020): art. 103331; Bai and Wu, “Political Conflict and Development Dynamics: Economic Legacies of the Cultural Revolution” (unpublished draft, 2020).

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¹²⁶ For example, European historian Peter Caldwell offers a favorable review of Gerth's work, arguing that it both illustrates the specificities of the Chinese socialist experience and traces lines of comparison with Eastern European socialism. See Caldwell, “Capital and Consumerism: Reflections on Karl Gerth's New Book,” PRC History Review 5, no. 1 (2020): 1–25.

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¹²⁹ Madeleine Zelin, “Critique of Scholarship on Chinese Business History in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan,” in Gardella, Leonard, and McElderry, Chinese Business History, 95–105.

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¹³⁶ In this regard, this article complements the work of Matthias Kipping, Kurosawa Takafumi, and R. Daniel Wadhwani, who have retraced the divergent evolution of the business histories of the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan. See Kipping, Takafumi, and Wadhwani, “Revisionist Historiography,” 33–49.

¹³⁷ Hao, “Themes and Issues,” 106.

¹³⁸ This was the rather prescient argument presented by Sherman Cochran in two issues of the Chinese Business History Newsletter. See Cochran, “Prospects for Research in Chinese Business History,” Chinese Business History Newsletter 1, no. 1 (1990): 4–5; and Cochran, “To the Editors,” Chinese Business History Newsletter 6, no. 1 (1996): 1–2.

¹³⁹ Reed, Christopher, “Reaching New Audiences: One Purpose of Revision and Discover,” Chinese Business History Newsletter 9, no. 2 (1999) : 1–3Google Scholar.

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