Article contents
Comment on Daniel A. Crane: A Premature Postmortem on the Chicago School of Antitrust
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2020
Abstract
- Type
- Article Commentary
- Information
- Business History Review , Volume 93 , Issue 4: New Perspectives in Regulatory History , Winter 2019 , pp. 777 - 779
- Copyright
- Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2020
References
1 See, for example, Ganesh Sitaraman, Taking Antitrust Away from the Courts: A Structural Approach to Reversing the Second Age of Monopoly Power, Great Democracy Initiative, Sept. 2018 (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 19–02, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278415).
2 See, for example, Rohit Chopra and Lina M. Khan, “The Case for Unfair Methods of Competition Rulemaking,” University of Chicago Law Review (forthcoming); and Vaheesan, Sandeep, “Resurrecting ‘A Comprehensive Charter of Economic Liberty’: The Latent Power of the Federal Trade Commission,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 19, no. 3 (2018): 645–99Google Scholar.
3 See, for example, Sanjukta Paul, “Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights,” UCLA Law Review 67 (forthcoming); and Vaheesan, Sandeep, “Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two Gilded Ages,” Maryland Law Review 78 (2019): 766–827Google Scholar.
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