¹ For a recent assessment of this episode, see Weinstein, Allen, “Was There a ‘Crime of 1873’?: The Case of the Demonetized Dollar,” Journal of American History, LIV (September 1967), 307–326.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Among the earliest references to this belief in mine owner responsibility for raising the silver issue, see the following: New York Tribune, Feb. 18, 1876; Congressional Record, 44th Cong., vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 1764–1771 (Mar. 16, 1876); Nation, April 20, 27, 1876; New York Graphic, Mar. 17, 1876.

³ For historical skepticism concerning the “Crime of 1873,” see Weinstein, op. cit., 309–310. Historians who have accepted the notion of basic mine owner involvement in the silver drive include the following: Nichols, Jeannette P., “John Sherman and the Silver Drive of 1877–1878: The Origins of the Gigantic Subsidy,” Ohio State Archeological and Historical Quarterly, XLVI (1937), 149, 154, 160–61Google Scholar; Unger, Irwin F., The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance, 1865–1879 (Princeton, 1964), 335CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harvey, W. H., Coin's Financial School, edited by Hofstadter, Richard (Cambridge, 1963), 86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Carothers, Neil, Fractional Money (New York, 1930), 253Google Scholar; Coletta, Paolo E., “Greenbackers, Goldbugs, and Silverites,” in Morgan, H. Wayne (ed.), The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal (Syracuse, 1963), 123.Google Scholar

⁴ See, for example, Studenski, Paul and Kroos, Herman E., Financial History of the United States (New York, 1963), 187–88Google Scholar; Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna Jacobson, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, 1963), 115Google Scholar; and Current, Richard N., Williams, T. Harry, and Freidel, Frank, American History: A Survey (New York, 1966), 559.Google Scholar

⁵ The fullest treatment of the colorful careers of the four Bonanza Kings can be found in Lewis, Oscar, Silver Kings: the Lives and Times of Mackay, Fair, Flood, and O'Brien, Lords of the Nevada Comstock Lode (New York, 1947).Google Scholar See also Paul, Rodman W., Mining Frontiers of the Far West, 1848–1880 (New York, 1963), 56–86Google Scholar; Smith, Grant H., History of the Comstock Lode, 1850–1920 (Reno: University of Nevada Bulletin, XXXVII, No. 3, 1947 [Geology and Mining Series No. 37])Google Scholar; Greever, William S., The Bonanza West, The Story of the Western Mining Rushes, 1848–1900 (Norman, 1963)Google Scholar; Lord, Eliot, Comstock Mining and Miners (Washington, 1883)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ostrander, Gilman M., Nevada: The Great Rotten Borough, 1859–1964 (New York, 1966)Google Scholar; and Merrivale, Robert B., “Nevada, 1859–1881; The Impact of an Advanced Technological Society Upon a Frontier Area” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1957).Google Scholar

⁶ Lewis, passim.; Paul, op. cit., 77–80; Greever, op. cit., 123–24. The classic narratives of the exploration and discovery of the Consolidated Virginia and California mines are found in William Wright (Dan DeQuille, pseud.), The Big Bonanza (New York [reprint of the 1876 ed.], 1947)Google Scholar, and in Shinn, Charles Howard, The Story of the Mine (New York, 1896).Google Scholar See also Glasscock, C. B., The Big Bonanza (New York, 1934), 242–54Google Scholar, and King, Joseph L., History of the San Francisco Stock and Exchange Board by the Chairman (San Francisco, 1910), 73–83.Google Scholar The term “bonanza,” in its most general sense, referred to any exceptionally rich ore deposit or pocket in veins carrying gold and silver. On the Comstock Lode, the term was applied only to a handful of mines. Of these, the Consolidated Virginia and California were commonly acknowledged to contain the richest “bonanzas” on the Lode.

⁷ Lewis, passim.

⁸ See Paul, op. cit., 79–80, for a concise, excellent summary of the Bonanza firm's swift rise to economic power in Nevada and California.

⁹ Nichols, op. cit., 149; Unger, op. cit., 335. Other recent economic histories or special studies which accept this view of mine owner involvement in early silver politics include the following: Studenski and Kroos, op. cit.; Kirkland, Edward C., Industry Comes of Age: Business Labor, and Public Policy, 1860–1897 (New York, 1961), 37Google Scholar; Friedman and Schwartz, op. cit.; and Harvey, op. cit.

¹⁰ Unger, op. cit. Unger qualifies this opinion somewhat by suggesting that “ambiguities in the mine operators' attitudes [existed] that make all generalization dangerous.” He quotes without further investigation a telegram from James W. Simonton of the Associated Press to Rutherford B. Hayes' Treasury Secretary, John Sherman, in which Simonton portrayed the Bonanza Kings as “against unqualified remonetization” and favorable only to a “moderate coinage” of silver. Unger remains uncertain, however, both about the accuracy and the general validity of this single piece of evidence, calling it “only one case, perhaps, [which] underscores the dangers of accepting uncritically the familiar stereotypes.” Thus, he can still observe: “Needless to say, the miners and their friends in Congress supported remonetization.” Ibid., 335–36. The question which Unger raises concerning mine owner involvement, however, is the starting point of this present article. See also James W. Simonton to John Sherman, Dec. 29, 1877, Sherman MSS (Library of Congress), cited in Unger, ibid.

¹¹ The dominant leadership of Bonanza firm mines in total ore production compared with Comstock mines owned by other banks and companies from 1876 to 1878, the period of the silver drive, is detailed in the Annual Report of the Director of the Mint for 1878 (Washington, 1878), 52–53.Google Scholar See also Paul, op. cit., 78–80, and Greever, op. cit., 127–30.

¹² Henry Richard Linderman to F. F. Low (Manager, Anglo–Californian Bank of San Francisco), March 29, 1877, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, Record Group 104 (National Archives), hereafter designated as “RG.”

¹³ San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 20, 1877.

¹⁴ Ibid. The Chronicle never succeeded in smoking out the views of the Bonanza firm on the silver issue, and when one of its reporters toured the city's financial district again after passage of the Bland–Allison Act seeking the opinion of local bankers concerning the legislation, he found only that “Louis McLane, of the Nevada Bank, had, as usual, little to say.” Ibid., Mar. 3, 1878.

¹⁵ Ibid., Oct. 29, 1877, Jones, himself, denied that he had ever communicated with the Bonanza Kings on the silver question “either collectively or individually, personally or through correspondence or otherwise on this subject.” He told the Senate at one point that, although he had no personal knowledge of their views concerning remonetization, “public rumor” suggested that Fair and Mackay, both close to Nevada mining life, favored restoration of bimetallism while the two San Francisco stockbrokers in the firm, Flood and O'Brien, opposed it. Congressional Record, 45th Cong., 2nd Sess., vol. 7, pt. 2 (Feb. 14, 1878), p. 1025. In a curious case of historical parallelism, the amount which gold–standard advocates charged the Bonanza Kings with raising to insure passage of the Bland bill by Congress, $500,000, was identical to the amount silverites claimed Emest Seyd had used to bribe legislators earlier in the decade to insure demonetization. The vision of a conspiracy operating to influence government coinage policy haunted all sides in the monetary wars of the Gilded Age. Jones, the only major Nevada mine owner active politically during the silver drive of the 1870's, supported the campaign for political and ideological motives which were probably more important than his economic stake in silver mining. Weinstein, Allen, “Origins of the Silver Question: Myths, Politics, and Policies of a Monetary Issue, 1867–1878” (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1967), 116–58.Google Scholar

¹⁶ “Do cats like cream?,” the New York Weekly Journal of Commerce asked its readers in an allusion to the Bonanza Kings' reputed desire for a guaranteed government market for their bullion. For belief in Bonanza King involvement in the silver drive on the part of gold standard journalists, bankers and businessmen, see the following: New York Weekly Journal of Commerce, Jan. 17, 1878 (above) and Feb. 21, 1878; Iron Age, XVIII, July 20, Aug. 3, 1876; Nation, July 13, Aug. 17, 1876; August Belmont to Thomas F. Bayard, Nov. 18, 1877, W. G. Deshler to John Sherman, Jan. 13, 1877, G. L. Foote to H. C. Fahnestock, Nov. 8, 1877, all in Sherman MSS; John Curtis to James A. Garfleld, Feb. 7, 1878, Garfield MSS (Library of Congress); Morris H. Cook to Thomas F. Bayard, Dec. 29, 1877, Bayard MSS (Library of Congress).

¹⁷ For John Percival Jones' view, see Record, op. cit. See also San Francisco Bulletin [n.d.], cited by New York Graphic, Feb. 5, 1878; ibid., Feb. 16, 1878; G. K. Fitch to J. W. Simonton, Dec. 17, 1877, in Simonton to John Sherman, Dec. 29, 1877, op. cit.

¹⁸ For a diametrically opposed perspective, which argues that the Bonanza Kings did have difficulty disposing of their bullion and pressed the government constantly for additional purchases, see Nichols, op. cit., 153–54. Despite disagreement over the precise role played by mine owners in the first silver drive, the author acknowledges appreciatively the valuable contributions of Professors Nichols and Unger to his own understanding of monetary politics in the 1870's.

¹⁹ On the economic and political background of the Resumption Act of 1875, Unger, op. cit., 249–85. See also Sherman, John, Recollections of Forty Years In The House, Senate and Cabinet (Chicago, 1896), 507–518.Google Scholar

²⁰ Henry Richard Linderman to John Sherman, March 31, 1877, Letterbrooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104.

²¹ For government purchases from companies owned by the Bonanza Kings, see the list of silver purchases in Table 1, covering the period from January 1875 to April 1876.

²² Linderman to Thomas C. Action, Feb. 13, 1875, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104. For the Director of the Mint's earliest dealings with the Bonanza firm, see the following: Linderman to O. H. LaGrange (Superintendent, San Francisco Mint), May 17, 25, 29, June 1, 7, 1875, Linderman to Consolidated Virginia Mining Company, May 29, June 7, 1875, Linderman to Thomas C. Action, May 29, 1875, ibid.

²⁸ See also Linderman to Messrs. Flood and O'Brien, Oct. 4, 1875, ibid.

²⁴ For a record of these negotiations, see Linderman to Flood and O'Brien, Oct. 4, 21, 1875, Linderman to J. C. Flood, Nov. 2, 1875, Linderman to O. H. LaGrange, May 25, Oct. 10, Nov. 3, Dec. 18, 1875, ibid.

²⁵ For a review of this Treasury policy, see John Sherman's interview as Secretary of the Treasury with the House Committee on Banking and Currency, April 1, 1878, republished in Resumption of Specie Payments, 45th Cong., 2nd Sess., Misc. Doc. No. 62 (Washington, 1878), 24.Google Scholar See also Bankers' Magazine (August 1875), 2, “Notes on the Money Market.”

²⁶ Linderman to John Sherman, Mar. 3 1, 1877, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104. “On a sale of silver made to the government in exchange for 5–per–cent bonds, the price of the former was fixed at the equivalent of the London quotation, and of the latter by taking the average of the New York and London markets on day of sale.” Louis McLane (President, Nevada Bank), sworn affidavit, in “Testimony of leading bankers and others before the United States Treasury Commission in relation to purchase of silver bullion for the fractional coinage…”, Director of the Mint, Annual Report, 1877 (Washington, 1877), 56–57.Google Scholar

²⁷ Linderman to F. F. Low, Mar. 29, 1877, Linderman to Sherman, Mar. 31, 1877; op. cit.

²⁸ Louis McLane, sworn affidavit, in Director of the Mint, Annual Report, 1877; op. cit.

²⁹ Linderman to Louis McLane, Aug. 26, 1876, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104, op. cit.

³⁰ Louis McLane, sworn affidavit, Director of the Mint, Annual Report, 1877, op. cit. See also Linderman to Sherman, Mar. 31, 1877, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104.

³¹ Linderman to James Crawford (Superintendent, Carson City Mint), April 18, 1876, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104. See also Linderman to the following Mint officials: O. H. LaGrange (Supt., San Francisco Mint), James Pollock (Supt., Philadelphia Mint), James Crawford (Supt., Carson City Mint), all April 20, 1876, and Linderman to N. K. Masten (Cashier, Nevada Bank), April 20, May 17, 1876, ibid.

³² For a record of government silver purchases from the Bonanza firm, through the Nevada Bank and other Bonanza–owned companies, see Table 2 for all purchases from April to August 1876.

³³ Linderman to James G. Fair, July 27, 1876, Linderman to Louis McLane, July 29, 1876, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104.

³⁴ Linderman to Louis McLane, August 11, 1876, ibid.

³⁵ Linderman to Louis McLane, May 16, Aug. 11, 1876, ibid.

³⁶ Louis McLane, sworn affidavit, Director of the Mint, Annual Report, 1877, op. cit.

³⁷ Linderman to John Sherman, Mar. 31, 1877, op. cit., Director of the Mint, Annual Report, 1876 (Washington, 1876), 295Google Scholar, “The Silver Market at San Francisco.”

³⁸ Linderman to McLane, April 5, 1876, Director of the Mint, Letterbooks, RG 104. For a sampling of subsequent Mint transactions with the Nevada Bank based on the sale of silver for 5 per cent government bonds, see the following: Linderman to Louis McLane, April 5, 17, 18, 19, May 27, June 19, August 23, 26, Sept. 5, 1876, Linderman to Superintendent, Carson Mint, April 17, 19, 1876, Linderman to O. H. LaGrange, April 19, 1876, Linderman to N. K. Masten, July 1, Aug. 20, 1876, Linderman to James Pollock, April 19, 1876, Linderman to Benjamin H. Bristow (Secretary of the Treasury), May 25, June 8, 1876, Linderman to Lot M. Morrill (Secretary of the Treasury), Aug. 18, 1876, Fred Eckfeldt (Acting Director, Bureau of the Mint) to Louis McLane, Aug. 8, 1876, Charles Conant (Acting Secretary of the Treasury) to John C. New (Treasurer of the United States), May 26, 1876, all ibid.

³⁹ For a record of government bonds acquired by the Bonanza Kings in 1876, see Table 3. Also see Linderman to Benjamin Bristow, May 25, June 8, 1876, Linderman to Louis McLane, May 27, Aug. 26, Sept. 5, 1876, Linderman to N. K. Masten, July 1, Aug. 20, 1876, Linderman to Nevada Bank, June 19, Aug. 23, 1876, Charles F. Conant to John C. New, May 26, 1876, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104. On activity in the silver market late in 1876, see Linderman to Acting Director of the Mint Preston, Dec. 4 and 11, 1876, in Letters Received “T,” RG 104.

⁴⁰ Linderman to LaGrange, April 5 and 19, 1877, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104. Linderman to Sherman, April 5, 1877, ibid., discusses the proposed reduction in the Treasury's rate paid for silver purchases. Linderman outlined the newly reduced rates and the policy underlying them in two memoranda to Mint officials on April 2 and April 18, 1877, in Letters Received “T,” ibid. Also see Linderman to J. S. Cronise, Feb. 9, 1877, ibid.

⁴¹ On Nevada Bank sales to the United States Mint in March 1877 see Recordbook, Silver Purchases, United States Mint, RG 104.

⁴² San Francisco Chronicle, May 11, 1877.

⁴³ Linderman to F. F. Low, Mar. 29, 1877, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 104.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Linderman to Louis McLane, Mar. 31, May 16, 1877, Linderman to Nevada Bank, May 15, 1877, ibid. The San Francisco Chronicle kept up a steady barrage of criticism directed at Linderman's Treasury Department investigating commission, suggesting repeatedly throughout 1877 that the Mint Director might begin his work by investigating, among other abuses, the favoritism he had allegedly shown toward the Nevada Bank in silver purchases. Chronicle for 1877: May 16, July 1 and 2, Sept. 22, and Dec. 21.

⁴⁵ Linderman to Sherman, July 2, 1877, Sherman MSS.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Flood purchased the following amounts in 4½ per cent government bonds during June and July 1877 as personal investments: June 28, $1,000,000; June 29, $3,000,000; July 5, $250,000; July 21, $750,000; total, $5,000,000. Recordbook, 4½ per cent 15 Year Funded Loan of 1891 (due date), Individual Accounts, Bureau of the Public Debt, RG 53 (National Archives).

⁴⁸ Sherman to Linderman, July 26, 1877, Sherman MSS.

⁴⁹ In 1877, the Treasury Department renegotiated an earlier contract for the sale of 4½ per cent bonds with a syndicate composed of leading American and European private banking houses — August Belmont & Company acting on behalf of the Rothschilds; J. & W. Seligman & Company; Drexel, Morgan & Company, acting for J. S. Morgan of London; and Morton, Bliss & Company — and a group of New York national bankers attempted either to enlarge the old syndicate or, instead, to fund the entire new 4 per cent bond loan themselves. This new syndicate included the First National Bank of New York, the Merchants' Bank of New York, the United States Trust Company, and the Bank of New York National Banking Association, the last–named firm representing its own interests and those of the Nevada Bank of San Francisco. After quiet and apparently unsuccessful overtures to Treasury Secretary Sherman, the latter turned aside the national bankers' bid for the new bond contract and signed an agreement instead with the older syndicate led by Belmont. As an obvious concession to the New York national bankers, however, Belmont's new group included the First National Bank in its arrangement for funding the 4 per cents. The Nevada Bank's agents, the Bank of New York, however, found itself completely shut out of the new syndicate, a fact which troubled Sherman. Ibid. For the details of this complex bond sale negotiation, see the following: “Specie Resumption and Refunding of National Debt,” House Exec. Doc. No. 9, 46th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted (Washington, 1879), 36–37, 61–62Google Scholar; Warner M. Bateman to John Sherman, July 23, 1877, Sherman MSS; Unger, op. cit., 351; and especially Redlich, Fritz, The Molding of American Banking: Men and Ideas, Vol. 2, Part II (Ann Arbor, 1951), 367–68.Google Scholar The author's discussion of the episode follows essentially Redlich's discussion and the Bateman letter.

⁵⁰ Sherman to Linderman, July 26, 1877, Sherman MSS.

⁵¹ Linderman to Sherman, July 5, Sept. 14, 1877, Sherman to Linderman, July 26, 1877, Sherman MSS.

⁵² Linderman to Sherman, Aug. 3, 7, 1877, ibid.

⁵³ Linderman to K. E. Preston (Acting Director of the Mint), Aug. 21, 22 (two dispatches each day), 1877, Letters Received “L,” RG 104. See also Preston memorandum, Aug. 22, 1877, ibid.

⁵⁴ On August 29, 1877, ten $50,000 bonds were purchased for “Louis McLane, President, Nevada Bank, San Francisco” and ten other $50,000 bonds in the name of “J. C. Flood, San Francisco.” Ledgerbook, Bonds Purchased, United States 5 per cent Funded Loan of 1881, Bureau of the Public Debt, RG 53.

⁵⁵ Linderman to Sherman, Aug. 31, 1877, “Specie Resumption and Refunding of Public Debt,” op. ctt., 138.

⁵⁶ King, op. cit., 96, 105, 112, 213. Of the Nevada Bank's four principals, only Flood and O'Brien purchased seats on the San Francisco Stock & Exchange Board (at $25,000 each) according to King. Ibid., p. 325.

⁵⁷ Linderman to Sherman, Aug. 31, 1877, op. cit. Flood had purchased privately 4 per cent $50,000 bonds on each of the following occasions: April 6, 7, 11 (twice), 13, 1877; Ledgerbook, Bonds Purchased, United States 5 per cent Funded Loan of 1881, RG 53.

⁵⁸ Sherman to Linderman, Sept. 8, 1877, “Specie Resumption and Refunding of National Debt,” op. cit., 141.

⁵⁹ For the record of negotiations between the Treasury Department and the Nevada Bank surrounding these two major purchases, one for 150,000 ounces of silver and the other for almost 1,500,000 ounces, see the following: K. E. Preston to Linderman, Sept. 10, 1877, Preston to John Sherman, Sept. 12, 13, 1877, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, and Letters Received “L,” RG 102; Sherman to Linderman, Sept. 13, 1877, Mint letters of the Secretary of the Treasury, ibid.

⁶⁰ Linderman to Sherman, Sept. 14, 1877, op. cit.

⁶¹ For a detailed record of Bonanza King bond holdings through February 1878, see Table 4.

⁶² Ibid. See also Sherman to Linderman, Sept. 14, 17, 1877, Sherman MSS; San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1877; Linderman to Sherman, Sept. 14, 1877, op. cit. Most San Francisco bankers and bullion dealers publicly opposed the Bland bill as a threat to specie resumption, something which Linderman presumably knew through his intimate friend F. F. Low of the Anglo–California Bank, a strong critic of bimetallism. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 20, 1877. See also New York Tribune, Feb. 18, 1876, on the opposition of San Francisco bankers toward Senator Jones' reported plan to remonetize silver.

⁶⁸ San Francisco Chronicle, May 23, 1878, “Mining Stock News.”

⁶⁴ United States bonds registered in the names of the Bonanza Kings in various forms by December 1877 included the following amounts: John W. Mackay (for Nevada Bank), $4,000,000 (5 per cent); Louis McLane (for Nevada Bank), $9,328,650 (5 per cent); James C. Flood (private?) $3,750,000 (5 per cent); James C. Flood (for Nevada Bank?), $5,000,000 (4½ per cent); Total, $22,078,650. Ledgerbooks, 4½ per cent and 5 per cent Funded Loans, Bureau of the Public Dept., op. cit., RG 53.

⁶⁵ Linderman to Louis McLane, Jan. 28, 1878, Linderman to Nevada Bank. Jan. 28, 1878, Letterbooks, Director of the Mint, RG 102; Recordbook, Silver Purchases, op cit.; Linderman to McLane, Dec. 8, 1877, op. cit.

⁶⁶ Linderman to Sherman, Aug. 3, 1877, ibid.

⁶⁷ Linderman to Nevada Bank, Feb. 22, 1878, Memorandum of the Director of the Mint to the Secretary of the Treasury regarding proposed silver purchases, Feb. 25, 1878, Linderman to McLane, Feb. 25, 1878, Linderman to Superintendent Carson Mint, Feb. 26, 1878, ibid.

⁶⁸ “The total amount of silver bullion purchased by the government for coinage into fractional coins from January 1875 to February 28, 1878, at which time this coinage was intermitted, was 31,603,905.87 fine ounces, for which $37,517,148.04 was paid in gold coin, an average of 118.881 cents per ounce fine.” Director of the Mint, Annual Report, 1878 (Washington, 1878), 7.Google Scholar During this same period, the government purchased at least $21,000,000 worth of silver from the Nevada Bank and other Bonanza firm companies. Recordbook, Silver Purchases, op. cit. For a detailed record of government silver purchases from the Bonanza Kings during this period, see Table 5.

⁶⁹ Upshur, George Lyttleton, As I Recall Them: Memories of Crowded Years (New York, 1936), 84.Google Scholar Upshur, later an important New York banker and associate of J. P. Morgan, worked for the Nevada Bank from 1876 to 1880, serving as James C. Flood's personal clerk, assistant, and confidential messenger. From this vantage point, he observed most of Flood's spectacular business transactions as general manager of the Bonanza firm. See also King, op. cit., 96, 105, 213; Lewis, op. cit., 149–50, 157–58, 256–57.

⁷⁰ On the Bonanza firm's efforts to expand its investment range and, especially, on its transformation of the Nevada Bank from being primarily a clearing house for Bonanza bullion to a financial institution performing a wide range of speculative and brokerage functions for the Silver Kings, see the following: Smith, op. cit., 203ff; Bankers' Magazine, Supplement (December 1876), 9, and ibid. (June 1877), 991; Wright, Benjamin C., Banking in California, 1849–1910 (San Francisco, 1910), 52–53Google Scholar; Upshur, op. cit., 103; San Francisco Chronicle, May 23, 1877; Angel, Myron (ed.), History of Nevada (Oakland, Cal., 1881), 595.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Upshur, op. cit., 111–12. See also “Biographical sketch of James Clair Flood,” typescript, Hubert Howe Bancroft Collection (Bancroft Library).

⁷² Smith, op. cit., 199.

⁷³ Ibid., 209.

⁷⁴ Lewis, op. cit., 165–66.

⁷⁵ Smith, op. cit., 262.

⁷⁶ Ibid. The death of William Shoney O'Brien in 1878 left Flood in sole command of the Bonanza firm's San Francisco business affairs.