Drawing a framework from strategic stakeholder theory and using 1999 to 2010 panel data from the United Kingdom’s (UK) non-life insurance industry, we examine the effect of reinsurance on the decisions to donate to charities, and the amount given. We find that reinsurance substitutes for charitable giving as it optimizes the interests of multiple stakeholders. We further note that corporate giving is directly related to the size and age of insurers, proportion of female directorships and insider ownership, but generally inhibited by chief executive officer (CEO) bonus plans, dominant shareholders, and financial experts on the board. Interestingly, when reinsurance interacts with board-level variables we find that the donations decision is positively related to CEO bonus plans, and negatively linked with inside ownership and the proportion of female board members. Our research results could have important implications for stakeholders.

The multitude of corporate scandals has prompted research that examines factors that influence an individual’s engagement in unethical behavior. This article extends previous research by examining the psychological processes through which unethical behavior may occur. We develop and test a model that uses self-regulation theory to explain and predict how and under what circumstances individuals are likely to engage in unethical behavior. Results from data collected from 107 professionals at two points in time and 205 employees from various industries confirm that job insecurity increases emotional exhaustion, which subsequently impairs an employee’s ability to activate self-regulating processes to avoid engaging in unethical behavior. However, the link between job insecurity and emotional exhaustion as well as the mediated relationship between job insecurity and unethical behavior through emotional exhaustion are weaker for employees who have high adaptability and stronger for employees who are highly embedded in their organization.

How does the state influence stakeholder legitimacy? And how does this process affect an industry’s ethical challenges? Stakeholder theory adopts a forward-looking perspective and seeks to understand how managers can address stakeholders’ claims to improve the firm’s ability to create value. Yet, existing work does not adequately address the role of the state in defining the stakeholder universe nor the implications this may have for subsequent ethical challenges managers face. This article develops a political stakeholder theory (political ST) by weaving together the political economy, stakeholder theory, and legitimacy literatures. Political ST shows how state policies influence stakeholder legitimacy and, in turn, affect an industry’s ethical challenges. This article integrates the concept of agonism to address the perennial tension between markets and states and its implications for firms and their managers. Political ST is then applied to the case of microfinance, followed by a discussion of the contributions of this approach.

We explore the essential contestedness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) by framing the interplay between CSR activities and stakeholder evaluations as a contest for jurisdiction over what it means to be socially responsible. This contest arises because firms and stakeholders are often guided by incompatible sensemaking systems. To show why context matters we show how stakeholders evaluate the authenticity of CSR activities on the basis of schemas for responsible behavior on one hand and their perceptions of firm identity on the other. This process can generate complex evaluations whose meaning depends on the distribution of power in fields and the extent to which pluralistic sensemaking systems are compatible. By positioning authenticity evaluations within a framework that describes the state of power and pluralism within which they are produced, we are able to present a systematic explanation of how and why stakeholder responses to CSR vary over a range of settings.

The articles in the special issue of Business Ethics Quarterly (2015), “Normative Business Ethics in a Global Economy: New Directions on Donaldsonian Themes,” were written by a set of outstanding scholars: Margaret M. Blair, Joseph P. Gaspar, Nien-hê Hsieh, Peter L. Jennings, Marietta Peytcheva, Andreas Georg Scherer, Amy J. Sepinwall, Andrew Stark, Danielle E. Warren, and Manuel Velasquez. In this commentary I reply to my colleagues, arranging my reply around the following themes: 1) the corporate moral agent; 2) the idea of a social contract for business; 3) managing ethics within corporations; and 4) values in business. I discuss each in turn. However, I reflect first on my idiosyncratic approach to business ethics.