¹ Destel, Willoughby, The Ethical Basis of Political Authority, (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1930), p. 6.Google Scholar

² Amitai, Etzioni, The Moral Dimension, (New York: The Free Press, 1988), p. 9.Google Scholar

³ While “moral” and “ethical” may have somewhat different meanings, in this article the terms are used interchangeably.

⁴ Schein, E.H., Organizational Culture and Leadership, (San Francisco: Josey-Bass and Co., 1986), p. 8.Google Scholar

⁵ See, for example, Stanley, Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).Google Scholar

⁶ Howard, Schwartz, “Narcissism Project and Corporate Decay: The Case of General Motors,” Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 1 (July, 1991), p. 248.Google Scholar

⁷ Id., pp. 260-261.

⁸ Plato, The Republic, (338c-339a).

⁹ See, for example, Felix, Oppenheim, The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1991).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Walter, Lippmann, The Good Society, (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1943), p. 332.Google Scholar

¹¹ Id, at 333.

¹² Standard usage in international law uses the term “state” with reference to nations capable of international relations with other nations. The “sovereign,” while formerly indicating a particular “head” of state, now means simply “the government” of a particular state. Sovereign immunity is thus another way of referring to governmental immunity.

¹³ Christoph, Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1988), esp. pp. 1–43.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Michael, Singer, “Abandoning Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe,” Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 26 (1985), pp. 17–30.Google Scholar

¹⁵ 28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1332(a) (2) - 1332(a) (4), 1602-1611, 1391(f), 1441(a) (1982), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 2892, 2897 (1976).

¹⁶ 28 U.S.C. §2671 et. seq,

¹⁷ Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, U.S. Supreme Court, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).

¹⁸ The United States terminated compulsory jurisdiction at the International Court of Justice in the case of paramilitary operations against Nicaragua's Sandanista regime. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 86 (1986), p. 67.Google Scholar

¹⁹ There are such precepts, or peremptory norms, although definitions are elusive. A discussion of such norms, comprehended in international law under the term jus cogens is reserved for Part III.

²⁰ United States v. Stanley, U.S. Supreme Court, 483 U.S. 669 (1986).

²¹ Feres v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).

²² United States v. Stanley, pp. 694-95. Italics in original.

²³ Id., p. 687. Italics in original.

²⁴ Congress is clogged with bills for special relief. As of this writing, Congress was considering a bill to compensate Stanley some $625,000, but the Pentagon has objected to the amount. Of the 1,000 or so soliders in the Army's 1950's LSD experiments, only one has been compensated. Phillips, “Award in sight for LSD victim,” USA Today (July 11, 1991). p. 2A.

²⁵ Schreuer, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁶ Leon, Hurwitz, The State as Defendant, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 6.Google Scholar

²⁷ Thomas, Hobbes, Leviathan, (Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).Google Scholar

²⁸ Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

²⁹ Id. pp. 17-18.

³⁰ Jules, Lobel, “The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law,” in Virginia Law Review, vol. 71 (1985), pp. 1071Google Scholaret. seq.

³¹ Edwin, Dickenson, The Equality of States in International Law, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1920), p. 41.Google Scholar The natural law component of the law of nations could not be altered unilaterally by one state or by agreement with other nations. As Vattel described it, “[T]he necessary Law of Nations consists in applying the natural law to States, and since the natural law is not subject to change, being founded on the nature of things and particularly upon the nature of man, it follows that the necessary Law of Nations is not subject to change.” Emer, de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Scott, J.B. ed. 1916), p. 4.Google Scholar

³² See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.

³³ Immanuel, Kant, “The Principles of Political Right,” in Frederick, Olafson, Society, Law, and Morality (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961), pp. 160–172.Google Scholar The extract is a selection from Kant's essay, Concerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But Does Not Apply in Practice, translated by W. Hastie in 1891).

³⁵ Immanuel, Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1969), p. 44.Google Scholar

³⁶ Sir, Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States,” British Yearbook of International Law., vol. 27 (1951), pp. 232–35.Google Scholar

³⁷ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, reprinted in American Journal of International Law, vol. 63 (1969), p. 875CrossRefGoogle Scholaret. seq.

³⁸ Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals, tr. Beck, L.W. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1959), p. 19.Google Scholar

³⁹ 28 U.S.C. §1610(a) (1982).

⁴⁰ Adam, Belsky, Mark, Merva, Naomi, Roht-Arriaza, “Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law,” California Law Review, vol. 77 (1989), p. 405.Google Scholar

⁴¹ For example, Argentina had signed the Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the Pan-American Maritime Neutrality Convention, both of which pledged the signatories to honor freedom of navigation in international waters. But it was not clear to the Supreme Court in Amerada Hess that Congress intended such signatories to have waived their traditional right to the defense of sovereign immunity without an express statement to that effect.

⁴² Richard, Barnet, “The Disorders of Peace,” The New Yorker, Jan. 20, 1992, p. 62.Google Scholar

⁴³ Brian, Barry, “Can States be Moral? International Morality and the Compliance Problem,” in Ethics and International Relations, Anthony, Ellis, ed. (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 67.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Lauterpacht traced similar developments in France, Germany, and England, noting that they followed “the direction of putting the state and the individual on a footing of equality before the law.” Lauterpacht, op cit., p. 235. This direction, he noted, represented the reversal of “the rules of medieval common law,” where citizens-subjects had no rights against the crown, and a “curbing” of the “chronic dislike of sovereigns (however democratic) to pay for wrongs done.”

⁴⁵ See Lobel, op. cit., pp. 1110-1113.

⁴⁶ “The Nuremburg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise,” Southern California Law Review, vol. 63, (1990), p. 904.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Wallace, McClure, World Legal Order: Possible Contributions by the People of the United States, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1960).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 234-35.

⁴⁹ Etzioni, op. cit., at ix.

⁵⁰ Id., p. 7.

⁵¹ Id., at x.

⁵² Id.

⁵³ Id., op. cit., p. 9.