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Organizational Ontology and The Moral Status of the Corporation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Mark A. Seabright  and
Lance B. Kurke
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Abstract:

This paper explores an ontological approach to the issue of whether corporations, like individuals, are morally responsible for their actions. More specifically, we investigate the identity of organizations relative to the individuals that compose them. Based on general systems theory, the traditional assumption is that social collectives are more complex, variable, and loosely coupled than individuals. This assumption rests on two premises. The first is a view of the individual as simple, stable, and tightly coupled (i.e., unitary). The second premise is that the relationship between social collectives and their members is characterized by the complete inclusion of individuals in higher order systems.

We examine the social science literature that bears on these premises and conclude that they are false. The differences between organizations and individuals in the magnitude of complexity or variability appear to be minimal or nonexistent. An implication of our analysis is that individuals and organizations are coterminous and, therefore, inseparable as moral agents.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , October 1997 , pp. 91 - 108
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1997

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