Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2015
Corporate moral agency is an important philosophical issue with significant implications for corporate law scholarship. While some legal scholars have recognized the significance of this issue for the analysis of corporate law, legal scholars generally have yet to give it the kind of attention and thorough examination it deserves. In this regard, Michael Phillips makes a valuable contribution to the debate, exploring how theories of the corporation prevalent in legal scholarship bear on the question of corporate moral agency. His analysis provides us with many insights. Still, I wish to raise some questions regarding his approach. Raising these questions, I believe, will help us to recognize more fully the possibilities the issue of corporate moral agency holds for corporate law scholarship.
1 Keeley, M., A Social-Contract Theory of Organizations 10 (1988).Google Scholar
2 Samuels, “The Idea of the Corporation as a Person: On the Normative Significance of Judicial Language,” in Corporations and Society: Power and Significance 127 (Samuels, W. & Miller, A., eds. 1987).Google Scholar