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Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Earl W. Spurgin
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Abstract:

In recent years, many business ethicists have raised problems with the “ethics pays” credo. Despite these problems, many continue to hold it. I argue that support for the credo leads business ethicists away from a potentially fruitful approach found in Hume’s moral philosophy. I begin by demonstrating that attempts to support the credo fail because proponents are trying to provide an answer to the “Why be moral?” question that is based on rational self-interest. Then, I show that Hume’s sentiments-based moral theory provides an alternative to the credo that points toward a more fruitful approach to business ethics. Along the way, I examine a recent social contract alternative to the credo that, despite many appealing features, is less effective than is the Humean alternative. Finally, I develop a Humean approach to business ethics and demonstrate why it is a desirable alternative that business ethicists should explore.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 293 - 313
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 2004

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