Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T05:31:45.360Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Are Rawlsian Considerations of Corporate Governance Illiberal? A Reply to Singer

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2016

Sandrine Blanc*
Affiliation:
INSEEC Business School

Abstract:

Singer has recently argued that questions related to corporate governance are beyond the reach of Rawls’s political conception of justice. This is because justice applies to the basic structure of society, understood as society’s legally coercive structures, and because corporate governance cannot be considered part of this structure in political liberalism. This commentary challenges the second part of the argument. First, it suggests that the criterion used to exclude corporate governance from the basic structure—whether employees can exit economic organizations—is not conclusive for corporate governance, notably as institutionalized in corporate law. Second, even if the focus were on corporate governance, it would still be possible to argue that it legally coerces citizens, if not employees, in a relevant way. Thus, the argument is not successful in demonstrating that political liberalism goes beyond its legitimate boundaries when considering that aspects of corporate governance may be matters of justice.

Type
Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Abizadeh, A. 2007. Cooperation, pervasive impact, and coercion: On the scope (not site) of distributive justice.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35(4): 318358.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, E. 2015. Equality and freedom in the workplace. Recovering Republican insights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 31(2): 4869.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arnold, D. 2013. Global justice and international business. Business Ethics Quarterly, 23(1): 125143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blake, M. 2001. Distributive justice, state coercion, and autonomy. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 30(3): 257296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blanc, S. 2014. L’entreprise fait-elle partie de la structure de base rawlsienne ? Revue de Philosophie Economique, 15(1): 167209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blanc, S., & Al-Amoudi, I. 2013. Corporate institutions in a weakened welfare state. A Rawlsian perspective. Business Ethics Quarterly, 23(4): 497525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blanc, S., Boncori, A., & Braune, E. 2014. Démocratiser l’entreprise ? Réflexion critique sur la contribution des sciences de gestion à un argument rawlsien. Revue Française de Gestion, 8(245): 159177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, G. A. 1983. The structure of proletarian unfreedom. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12(1): 333.Google Scholar
Cohen, G. A. 2008. Rescuing justice and equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Easterbrook, F. H., & Fischel, D. R. 1991. The economic structure of corporate law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Heath, J., Moriarty, J., & Norman, W. 2010. Business ethics and (or as) political philosophy. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(3): 427452.Google Scholar
Hsieh, N.-h. 2005. Rawlsian justice and workplace Republicanism. Social Theory and Practice, 31(1): 115142.Google Scholar
Hsieh, N. 2008. Survey article: Justice in production. Journal of Political Philosophy, 16: 72100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hussain, W. 2009. The most stable just regime. Journal of Social Philosophy, 40(3): 412433.Google Scholar
Hussain, W. 2012. Nurturing the sense of justice: The Rawlsian argument for democratic corporatism. In O’Neill, Martin & Williamson, Thad (Eds.), Property-owning democracy: Rawls and beyond: 180200. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laborde, C. 2013. Political liberalism and religion: On separation and establishment.” Journal of Political Philosophy, 21(1): 6786.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moriarty, J. 2010. Participation in the workplace: Are employees special? Journal of Business Ethics, 92: 373384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Néron, P.-Y. 2015. Rethinking the very idea of egalitarian markets and corporations: Why relationships might matter more than distribution. Business Ethics Quarterly, 25(1): 93124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Norman, W. 2011. Business ethics as self-regulation: Why principles that ground regulations should be used to ground beyond-compliance norms as well. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(1): 4357.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Norman, W. 2015. Rawls on markets and corporate governance. Business Ethics Quarterly, 25(1): 2964.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
O’Neill, M. 2008. Three Rawlsian routes towards economic democracy. Revue de Philosophie économique, 9(1): 2955.Google Scholar
O'Neill, M. 2009. Entreprises et conventionnalisme : régulation, impôt et justice sociale. Raison publique, 10: 171200.Google Scholar
Olsaretti, S. 2004. Liberty, desert and the market: A philosophical study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Orts, E. W. 2013. Business persons: A legal theory of the firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rawls, J. 1999. A theory of justice. Revised edition. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Original edition, 1971.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rawls, J. 2001. Justice as fairness. Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rawls, J. 2005. Political liberalism. Expanded edition. New York: Columbia University Press. Original edition, 1993.Google Scholar
Ronzoni, M. 2008. What makes a basic structure just? Res Publica, 14: 203218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. 2003. Rawls on justification. In Freeman, S. (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Rawls: 139167. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Schouten, G. 2013. Restricting justice: Political interventions in the home and in the market.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41(4): 357388.Google Scholar
Singer, A. 2015. There is no Rawlsian theory of corporate governance. Business Ethics Quarterly, 25(1): 6592.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Valentini, L. 2011. Coercion and (global) justice. American Political Science Review, 105(1): 205220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Parijs, P. 2003. Difference principle. In Freeman, S. (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Rawls: 200240. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar