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Transforming Justice: A Conceptualization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Abstract:

Rights, justice, and power raise many interesting questions. Why do such basic concepts as rights and justice have such different points of concern—equality, proportionality, medium rei (moderation or the middle of the thing itself without reference to the person using it)? Why are there such different perspectives in philosophy, theology, and law? Why is the notion of power in business ethics so isolated from the general discussion of applied justice in treatises on business contracts, employee relations, and in other related topics? Discussions of power seemed parallel with discussions of justice. The two did not seem to intersect.

In this paper I shall argue that rights, power, and justice are interrelated. While natural rights are the basis for justice, rights cannot be realized nor justice become operative without power. I shall call this relationship and the theory underlying it “Transforming Justice.” One of the basic concerns of this article is to notice the lack of interaction between rights and power in the traditional theories of justice. Granted that for many philosophers it is sufficient to determine what is just. But the notion of justice as an active virtue that persons are to exercise in their dealings with others goes further. It touches the realities of life that every person experiences. Life does not separate rights from power. Reflection upon the current separation of rights from power both in theory and in action is analogous to the separation of the “sensory” from the “imaginative” in art and in life. The urge to devise a framework of justice that brings out the wholeness of its existential being is the underlying rationale for developing a theory of transforming justice. Another purpose for developing a theory of transforming justice is to suggest a conceptual framework of business ethics and corporate social responsibility that incorporates values, rights, power, and virtue. Authors and teachers approach these issues either from a value (or rights/justice) perspective or from the view that institutions respond only to those who exercise power (apart from legitimate claims). Thus, it is necessary for a conceptual framework to incorporate the dynamics of power and the qualifying aspects of rights or claims. A natural law approach to justice and rights argues that humans have certain basic rights that others, whether humans or institutions (regardless of source), are required to respect. Natural rights theory places the burden or duty on each individual to respect the rights of every other person. In addition, justice is usually defined by natural law theorists as “giving each person his or her due,” what is required by natural rights, what is owed, earned, or deserved. But its applications fall short of reality. It raises other questions. How does one person get another to give him what is “his due”? How are duties and claims entailed by natural rights enforced in practice? The notion of transforming justice attempts to answer these questions.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1999

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References

Notes

1 Amiela Jaffe, “Symbolism in Visual Arts,” in Man and His Symbols, ed. Carl Jung (Gardon City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1964), p. 240.

2 Thomas M. Garrett and Richard J. Klonoski, Business Ethics, 2d edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1986), p. 11.

3 David T. Ozar, “Rights: What They Are and Where They Come From,” in Philosophical Issues in Human Rights: Theories and Applications, ed. Patricia H. Werhane, A. R. Gini, and David T. Ozar (New York: Random House, 1986). p. 5.

4 Patricia H. Werhane, Persons, Rights and Corporations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985), pp. 6ff.

5 Alan Gewirth, “The Epistemology of Human Rights,” Social Philosophy and Policy 1, no. 2 (1983): 3.

6 For a full discussion of these three theories, see Otto A. Bird, The Idea of Justice (New York: Frederick A. Paraeger, 1967).

7 Steven Lukes, “Power,” in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence A. Becker, Garland Reference Library of the Humanities, Vol. 925 (New York: Garlanding, Inc., 1992), p. 995; Harvey C. Cox, “Power,” in Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. John Macquarre (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967), p. 265.

8 Everett L. Shostrom, Man the Manipulator (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 11.

9 Adolf A. Berle, Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969), p. 413.

10 Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, 129b30, trans. J. A. K. Thomson (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 174.

11 This is known as the medium rei. The moderation that is necessary for a moral virtue of justice comes from the object itself, not from the person or agent.

12 Aristotle, Ibid.

13 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II–II. Q 58, a.3 ad 3, p. 1437. (New York: Bezinger Brothers, 1947). (Eng. trans. English Dominican Province: Vol. II, p. ). Also, see 5. Bonaventure. In Lib. II Sent. Dist. VIII, p.2, a.I, q.6 ad arg.

14 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). p. 16.