Historical institutionalist research has long struggled to come to terms with agency. Yet injecting agency into historical-institutionalist accounts is no easy task. If institutions are structuring agents’ actions, while they are simultaneously being structured by these very agents’ behavior, the ontological status of institutions remains unclear. Hence, most historical-institutional accounts, at the conceptual level, tend to downplay the role of agency. However, in this way, they also remain incomplete. Following the “coalitional turn” in historical institutionalism, we develop a new account of institutional change and stability that awards a central role to agency. At the heart of our approach is the notion that both stability and change in institutions presuppose constant coalition building by organized entrepreneurial actors. However, for several reasons, such coalition building is complicated, which ultimately leads to institutional stability. In addition, we argue that relevant state agencies actively shape whether the incumbent coalition or the challenger coalition prevails. We illustrate the potential of our actor-centered approach to institutional change by analyzing the reform of commercial training in Switzerland, tracing developments from the beginning of the 1980s until today.

The global financial crisis of 2008, its following bank bailouts, and associated corporate impunity sparked a renewed interest in the concept of the structural power of business and the question of “who rules?” in capitalist societies. This new wave of scholarship mitigated some of the problems of the original, theory-driven discussions from the 1970s and 1980s. But despite significant advancements in the empirical identification of business power, we lack a unified framework for studying its working mechanisms. So-called hybrid approaches, drawing on instrumental and structural power for their analyses, display high potential for such a unified and easily applicable framework. We build on this hybrid tradition and propose a novel model that integrates instrumental and structural power analysis into a basic framework. With this, we recalibrate the often rigid division between instrumental and structural power forms and emphasize the role of perceptions as key for understanding the dynamics of business power over time. We illustrate this parsimonious framework by an analysis of the plans of the Dutch government to abolish a dividend tax in 2018 that would have benefited a number of large multinationals but collapsed before implementation.

Scholars and politicians in recent years have become concerned with rising levels of inequality among Americans, heightened in the aftermath of the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. F.E.C. The suspicion over an ever larger influence of corporate and elite interest over public policy has brought about significant public backlash, even becoming a key platform of reformist candidates such as Sen. Bernie Sanders. In large part, these fears have yet to be realized, as many corporations have chosen to remain on the sidelines in American elections and have not fully taken advantage of their newfound rights. At the same time, we have observed a stark rise in corporate lobbying expenditures in recent decades. What explains the puzzle of how corporations choose to engage in new or expanded forms of political activity, and even what drives the spread of corporate norms? This study investigates the conditions under which corporations may come to embrace political action.

The international financial crisis was followed by waves of domestic regulatory reforms, first and foremost, in the United States and the European Union. Post-crisis financial regulation was sometimes different across jurisdictions. Moreover, the United States and the European Union sought in various ways to (re)assert their regulatory power not only vis-à-vis the market, but also with regard to other jurisdictions, which often resisted the projection of regulatory power beyond national borders. Consequently, a handful of important post-crisis transatlantic regulatory disputes emerged concerning E.U. rules on hedge funds, U.S. rules on bank structure and E.U. and U.S. rules on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. These disputes mainly involved the terms of access to each other's markets, the equivalence between domestic rules, and the extraterritorial effects of those rules. Some of these disputes were also intra-E.U. disagreements, whenever the preferences of the United Kingdom were different from those of Continental countries and similar to those of the United States. The network structure of the financial industry and the patterns of financial interdependence across the Atlantic amplified the extra territorial effects of domestic reforms, but at the same time triggered an active involvement of the transnational financial industry in the management and, eventually, the settlement of these disputes.

Recent work suggests that the most fruitful approach to accounting for variations in interest system diversity of any type lies in understanding variations in interest system density (Lowery, Gray and Fellowes 2005). We build on this insight by examining the sources of variation in the substantive diversity of health interests in the American states, focusing on how the densities of several sub-guilds of health interest organizations vary in their responses to changes in the sizes of the constituencies that give rise to them and variations in the policy and political energy supporting their mobilization. We discuss the concept of interest system diversity in the first section of the paper, highlighting its multiple meanings and the limits of prior research. This is followed by a close empirical examination of 14 sub-guilds of state health interest organizations. We conclude by discussing the inherent difficulties of understanding interest system diversity.

The complicated and multi-layered policymaking process in the European Union presents private interests, such as business firms, with an interesting strategic choice of whom and how to lobby. As the costs of lobbying at the domestic level increase, firms are expected to, instead, devote their resources to lobbying at the European level. Specifically, this article examines how domestic access points and domestic partisanship affect the costs and benefits of lobbying at the domestic versus European level. Using data on firm-level decisions to lobby the EU, this research finds that in countries where is it more costly (or less beneficial) to lobby domestically, firms are more likely to lobby at the EU level.

Codes of ethics contain a set of rules of conduct and corporate principles concerning the responsibility of a company to its stakeholders and shareholders. These codes help to guide corporate and employee behavior, and constitute verifiable elements of social responsibility. This study examines the Most Admired Companies of the World, ranked by Fortune magazine in 2009 to find out, first, whether their codes of ethics exhibit greater emphasis on social responsibility and strong implementation processes, and second, whether they could be considered codes of the third generation as elaborated by Stohl et al. in their article in the Journal of Business Ethics. Our results indicate that the codes of ethics of the 2009 Most Admired Companies of the World resemble “codes of conduct” rather than strictly codes of ethics or “codes of corporate social responsibility”. These codes continue to be governed by traditional norms related to immediate economic success, normative compliance, internal management and the pressing effects of their sector. This study thus provides empirical support for the idea that the philosophy of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is scarcely present in the codes of the most reputable companies.

The past three decades have witnessed a spectacular evolution in policies toward foreign direct investment (FDI). Whose interests do these policy innovations reflect? While existing theory suggests popular pressure drives openness, I argue reforms occur when shifts in financial access change local economic elites’ policy preferences toward FDI. When large domestic firms no longer have access to cheap credit through political connections, liquidity constraints outweigh firms' preferences to exclude foreigners. Economic elites then pressure governments to pursue liberal FDI policy environments. Using a combination of measures of FDI policy for up to 166 countries from 1973–2015, I find increases in financial constraints are robustly associated with decreases in foreign equity restrictions, and this relationship is strongest when domestic political institutions favor business interests. A financing constraints explanation of FDI policy reform has important implications for explanations of policy change, theories of business power amid increased interdependence, and expectations over the distributive effects of globalization.

The increasing trend towards the internationalization of the world economy coupled with the liberalizing agenda of international institutions and Western governments has profound implications for the delivery of health and other welfare services. As governments pursue policies which extend the scope for the involvement of private companies in the delivery of welfare services, processes of internationalization are likely to become increasingly important to such services as multinational providers emerge. This article begins the process of developing a systematic understanding of the relationships between the structure of welfare states, the social and economic policies of governments and international institutions, and the strategies and interests of private companies. It is argued that it is the particular mix of direct state provision, tax/subsidy, and regulation in the welfare state formation that provides the opportunities for, or barriers to, the expansion of internationalizing private providers of healthcare. This argument is illustrated through a case study of the current process of reform in the British healthcare system, where a relative shift away from direct state provision towards subsidizing and regulating private providers is facilitating a process of internationalization.

This study researches how the arbitrariness and pervasiveness of corruption affect the decision-making process and subsequent operations of firms investing in highly corrupt host locations. The results of the analysis demonstrate that firms headquartered in countries where corruption is high have an advantage when operating in a foreign country with a similar institutional environment. The reason for this advantage is that these firms possess knowledge of how to cope with the arbitrary and pervasive dimensions of corruption. Firms from countries with lower corruption levels than the host country, however, are more affected by corruption in a highly corrupt host country. Finally, though this study finds evidence that all firms operating in a highly corrupt country might participate in corrupt deals, those headquartered in highly corrupt countries are more likely to be willing to do so. This claim is based on 12 in-depth interviews with managers with FDI allocation responsibilities of firms operating in a highly corrupt host country. The results show that firms from less corrupt countries face stronger pressures from their headquarters to not engage in corrupt deals, whereas firms from more corrupt countries do not encounter such pressures.

Currency is the fundamental economic technology that makes promises credible among actors within and across societies. From shells, to metals, to paper, the technology of money has continually evolved to meet the changing needs of human society. The twenty-first century is witnessing yet another evolution in the technology of money: digital currencies. Although political economy scholarship has begun to focus on digital currencies, this research has largely focused on single early examples like Bitcoin. I argue that this generally narrow focus has obscured important degrees of variation among digital currencies and, by extension, has omitted important lines of research on digital currencies as a familiar evolution in the technology of money. In this article, I revisit the history of digital currencies with explicit attention to not only economic inefficiencies but also political power structures and offer a new typology for theoretically organizing digital currencies along dimensions relevant to practitioners of political economy. I illustrate that variation along these typological dimensions produces important differences among different digital currencies and, relatedly, I explore the implications this has for digital currencies’ externalities and governance demands. Drawing on this typology, I conclude with a proposed research agenda for the political economy of digital currencies.

The extent of business support for democracy in Latin America may determine whether the transitions from authoritarian rule since the 1980s lead to the consolidation of democratic regimes. While some analysts see business support for democracy as firm, others regard its as precarious, and still others believe it is contingent upon whether elected governments contest the economic interests or political dominance of the bourgeoisie. The difficulty of generalizing about the political orientations of business underscores the need for well-documented case studies. This study focuses on Peru, a country where democracy has been at grave risk, and it offers insight into the underlying forces and conditions that determine whether business supports or undermines democratic governance.

This article introduces a special issue of Business and Politics on Property Rights, Financial Risk, and the Politics of a Networked Global Financial System. We introduce aspects of the articles in the issue and situate them within existing literatures in financial economics, public policy, political economy, regulation and governance, and network science. We do this through examining four key contributions in the special issue. First, we show that common conceptualizations of property rights in financial markets ignore the multidimensional nature of financial goods; examples of all goods types can be found in modern finance, and this fact has important implications for the politics and regulation of these markets. Second, we argue that models of financial actors as independent, atomistic agents neglect the relational nature of financial markets, and argue that theory and methodology from network science, financial economics and political economy provide useful ways to analyze these interdependent systems. Third, we discuss how the relational nature of risk leads to hierarchical patterns of financial interdependence, which bequeaths substantial amounts of power—within both market and political systems—to those actors that occupy core positions within the structure of interdependence. Fourth, we integrate ideas from papers in this special issue and related literature with concepts from the Ostrom School of political economy to consider how monitoring, self-governance, and polycentric applications might improve financial market governance. This issue's papers thus constitute one of the first combined attempts to bring the Ostrom School into substantive conversation with financial market governance and risk analysis through comparative and international political economy disciplines.

To what extent do national strategic interests influence countries’ distribution of health assistance during a global health crisis? We examine China's global COVID-19 vaccine allocation, focusing on the relationship between its vaccine prioritization and its geopolitical expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). We claim China uses its vaccine diplomacy as a comprehensive tool to promote its grand strategy and expand its global leadership and influence. Employing a newly available dataset on Chinese COVID-19 vaccine deliveries for a cross-section of 108 BRI member countries, our study shows that countries with foreign direct investment flows into BRI projects have received more vaccines from China. Our findings confirm that donor strategic concerns affect bilateral foreign assistance. Our results remain robust to several robustness checks, including endogeneity concerns.

Following the 2007–9 financial crisis, the EU strengthened its institutional apparatus for bank regulation, creating a trio of sectoral bodies, including the European Banking Authority (EBA). Various aspects of this new system have been studied, but to date, little is known about how banks engage with their new supranational regulator. We argue that such engagement fosters an interdependence between banks and regulators, thus contributing to the efficiency and robustness of the overall regulatory regime; but also that it is contingent on the regulator exhibiting the qualities of credibility, legitimacy, and transparency. These qualities are grounded in the domestic regulatory governance literature, but we suggest that they are rendered problematic by the complexities of the EU's multilevel system and, in particular, the overlap in competences between the EBA and the European Central Bank. We examine the EBA in the light of these criteria and find that banks’ engagement remains pitched towards established national regulators and the EU's legislative arena. This poses concerns for the efficacy of agency governance in the EU's regulatory regime for banking.

The recent zero-priced award of $11–70 billion in digital TV (DTV) licenses by the federal government occurred when auctions had been initiated for non-broadcast licenses and when the seven decade-old regime of ‘public trusteeship’ in broadcasting had become famous for licensee reneging on promised obligations. Policymakers nonetheless declined to auction DTV licenses when enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996, rejecting a plea from the Senate Majority Leader. This paper provides an overview of the episode and investigates three basic questions. (1) Why does Congress continue a regulatory system that routinely fails to provide the benefits it is supposed to generate? (2) Why did the National Association of Broadcasters propose high definition television as a way of keeping land mobile operators off an unused spectrum? (3) Why did Congress delegate to the FCC the decision to award licenses for digital television broadcasting?

Democratic consolidation was the top priority of re-democratized Argentina and Brazil. Regional integration was also part of this goal from two perspectives: from the outside, through a treaty that diminished the scope for political manoeuvring by the military and increased international support for the incumbent administrations, and; from within, through encouragement of a proactive role for business in integration that would give it democratic legitimacy, while, at the same time, exercising democratic practices. Argentine and Brazilian political classes expected to combine these two aspects but soon had to face business reluctance. Government-business relations in the construction of Mercosur reflected government attempts to balance the trade-off between the approaches from without and from within. Although business was largely excluded from the strategic formulation of integration, in a democratic context, governments have to accommodate societal interests. This occurred through a significant overlap between powerful business interests and the executive's plans. The achievement of integration helped consolidate democracy and the choices made by political elites drove forward the democratic process.

American political campaigns have become a multi-billion dollar industry. Rather than assume that only political factors affect the campaigns that voters see, scholars must assess the importance of the business incentives associated with political consulting. Economic competition does not match political competition; firms compete for clients within the two major parties, against their political allies. I argue that the supply of firms in each party, the revenue models in the industry, the diversification of client types, and the cooperative structure in each party all may affect political campaigns. The way the industry operates and the different patterns of behavior within each party create incentives and practices that may alter campaigns in response to economic factors having little to do with optimal political strategy. Using two original surveys and a network analysis, I analyze how the industry is changing and how consultants in each party cooperate and compete.

This paper explores the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing in the European Union in the context of its 2004 eastward enlargement. The purpose of the study is to shed light on the connection between outsourcing and the causal logic of regional integration. The conventional view is that the transfer of business operations from Western Europe to low-cost locations to the east represents a process of outsourcing West-European jobs which deprives the EU core of growth opportunities to the exclusive benefit of the new members from Eastern Europe. This analysis posits the systemic functions of EU outsourcing as a mechanism of economic homogenization in the regional market along its three principal dimensions: investment, commodity trade, and labor mobility. At the macro-level, outsourcing complements capital movements and trade, and acts as a substitute for labor mobility. Keeping labor mobility “down” is the main value added of EU outsourcing. Empirically, its relevance to the regional market is established in an input-output framework of relationships with indicators of economic convergence (homogenization effects) and labor mobility (substitution effects) in the EU. Positive correlations with indices of business synchronization and weak negative correlations with measures of labor supply and wages suggest that outsourcing fits well both with strategies fostering market integration and those counterbalancing the politically sensitive labor mobility in the EU. There is no significant evidence to suggest that, at the aggregate level, outsourcing has independent substitution effects with regard to unemployment rates and wages in Western Europe. The geographic expansion of EU integration, therefore, is not a proxy for losses of social welfare in the West. The paper concludes that as the cost efficiency and resource allocation functions of outsourcing facilitate the homogenizing dynamics of regional integration, it is likely to become increasingly subsumed under EU-level regulation and monitoring in a trade-off between the regional interest and domestic sectoral concerns.

Whereas debate about sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) often focuses upon the global significance of their investment strategies, these institutions are also emblematic of the new global order of financial capitalism. SWFs are a mechanism for states to advance their interests through global financial markets and are a switch point for the translation of resource assets into financial assets in global markets. Yet, realising the promise of SWFs is not easy. The form and functions of these institutions are typically conceived in Western terms, so the necessary infrastructure for their effective performance may not exist in non-Western jurisdictions. Nonetheless, these funds have grown increasingly popular throughout the world. As such, this paper examines the process of SWF adoption in non-Western jurisdictions, and, in particular, SWFs' recent rise in popularity amongst the Gulf States. These countries are particularly interesting as they face a variety of challenges due to institutional contradictions between the norms of Western finance and the inherited traditions of the Gulf. While Gulf SWFs may be limited in their effectiveness, these funds still serve as an important symbol for the region, representing a formal gesture towards ‘modernity’ in the context of nation-states' inherited traditions.