We are currently witnessing the evolution of global accounting standards, as developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This is a remarkable development, not only because accounting standards are relevant for all business operations. Whereas accounting standard-setting has previously been a task of national authorities, the process will now be managed internationally by a London-based organisation whose parent foundation is a private company incorporated in the US state of Delaware and mainly financed by the Big Four accounting firms. Furthermore, the US appear to be willing to accept foreign standards that are quite different from their own Generally Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP). This does not only contradict a widespread perception that equals globalization with Americanization, but also offers a remarkable contrast to US unilateralism in other policy fields. Finally, we are also amidst a major change in the substance of accounting standards, as indicated by a shift from historic cost to fair value accounting within the work of the IASB. This special issue of Business and Politics is devoted to a systematic explanation of these developments, drawing on concepts from International Relations, International Political Economy and Systems Theory.

This article starts by highlighting the significance of two forms of authority'private and technical authority'that are becoming increasingly important relative to public authority, which traditionally has been considered the only relevant form of authority in international affairs. It then suggests that public, private and technical authority are related to one another not by the erasure of one by another, but rather through a process of politicized functional differentiation. Functional differentiation involves the transformation of multi-functional units into a set of more autonomous units that are related to one another in specific limited ways. The article explores differentiation between and within each of the three types of authority in the globalization of accounting, and the role of power as well. It challenges the view that globalization necessarily involves a centralized exercise of power or an elimination of differences.

This article traces the ascent of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) from an obscure group with little influence in the early 1970s to a pre-eminent position as global accounting standard-setter in 2001. I argue that the rise of the IASC can be explained by several factors, including the IASC's ability to build legitimacy through technical expertise, to embed itself in a network of international organizations, and to benefit from rivalries among developed and developing countries and among European and American regulators. But the most important reason for the IASC's success is that its core values aligned strongly with the interests of the most powerful regulator-the US Securities and Exchange Commission.

This paper examines the interplay between leading international and American accounting authorities over the span of a critical four-year period, 2001–2005. Historically, US regulators and private-sector accounting institutions have taken a cautious approach to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), citing the superior rigor and overall quality of their own Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). During the past four years, however, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have each become markedly receptive to the International Accounting Standards Board's (IASB) efforts to harmonize accounting standards worldwide based on IFRSs. Why? This paper offers an explanation that highlights the role of the high-profile American corporate scandals (2001–2002) in precipitating a shift in US accounting authorities' views of the optimal form of accounting rules, an issue that has stood in the way of trans-Atlantic accounting standard convergence. Prior to the accounting scandals, the highly-detailed rules that are characteristic of US GAAP were widely seen to be the most effective form of accounting rule. Since 2002, a normative shift has taken place such that the SEC now endorses objectives-oriented rules that are conceptually aligned with the principles-based standards promulgated by the IASB. The analysis is framed by insights from contemporary International Relations theory which emphasize the influence of scope conditions on patterns of governance.

The article takes a political economy perspective on the current harmonization of accounting standards. It argues that the process not only signals a major shift in the mode of governance (towards private authority), but also in the substance of what is being governed. In political-economic terms, the most significant change which the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) brings to accounting is an increased reliance on market values in the form of so-called Fair Value Accounting (FVA). The FVA paradigm represents a financial perspective on business operations. This perspective is matched by the process and structure of the institutions that govern international accounting standard setting, particularly the IASB and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group which advises the Commission of the European Union on the adoption of IASB standards. A network analysis of the different committees and working groups of these two institutions demonstrates that financial sector actors wield substantially more influence than other categories of business actors within the governance of international accounting standard setting.