This paper outlines an approach for understanding the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in global governance. We develop a typology of regime types with two dimensions, the goal of the regime, which can be market enabling or regulatory, and the location of authority, which can be national, regional, or international, with public and private elements. MNCs tend to support the creation of market enabling regimes at the international level, and prefer to keep social or environmental regulation under national or private authority. However, these are only generalizations and MNCs develop preferences based on their relative influence in various arenas, the costs of political participation, and competitive considerations. We argue that institutions of global governance represent the outcome of a series of negotiations among corporations, states, and non-state actors. The preferences and power of MNCs vary across issues and sectors, and from one negotiating forum to another, accounting for the uneven and fragmented nature of the resulting system. Our approach differs from the traditional FDI bargaining framework in that it recognizes the multi-party nature of negotiations and multiple sources of power. Moreover, the complexity and dynamic nature of the process results in a somewhat indeterminate process.

The key objective of this paper is to highlight the interconnectedness between China's political and economic system and its weak enforcement of accounting and auditing standards. The institutional analysis shows that the prevailing political and economic priorities constituting China's “socialist market economy” create a framework, that basically relies on state-led enforcement with weak supplementary private safeguard mechanisms. The resulting policy-mix is characterized by a mismatch of incentives and available devices to effectively enhance enforcement. While the state bureaucracy has little incentive to effectively fight financial misreporting because of both blurred policy–economy boundaries and the coexistence of multiple and even non-economic goals, shareholders and creditors do not have sufficient and effective private safeguard mechanisms at hand. Findings lead to the conclusion that China's recent harmonization move of accounting and auditing standards urgently needs to be backed up by stronger efforts to create effective enforcement mechanisms. Sound reforms would have to center on a rigorous upgrading and restructuring of the responsible bodies supervising auditing quality and financial disclosure. Parallel to these measures, the increasing integration into the global economy may provide incentives and competitive pressure to comply with globally accepted standards.

This paper examines the development of EU regulations in the car distribution sector. In the span of approximately fifteen years, the sector has shifted from being regarded by its critics as being one of the most protected havens of European industry to one faced with open competition. The paper claims that the inability of the car industry to resist liberalization in this sector is related to several factors. First, there was declining support from member states for their national producers, in part explained by global shifts in ownership and production which rendered concepts of “national producer” problematic. Second, technological changes combined with the impact of globalization on in the industry undermined the case for a link between sales and service of cars. Third, DG competition, led by Mario Monti, wished to push through the ability of consumers to make cross-border purchases of cars. Fourth, a more general logic embedded in the Single European Market programme (SEM) had led to several decisions to prosecute EU car producers for infringing SEM rules and thereby undermining the ability of EU member states to protect their “national producers.” This has implications more broadly: will increasing globalization of industrial ownership further undermine the state-firm nexus in the EU, thus reducing the propensity of national industries to resist liberalization? In this context, will member states be prepared to give the EU Commission a freer hand in forcing through liberalization in the remaining sectors that remain problematic?

The problems of rent seeking and state captured by business associations have been prominent among the concerns of economic development theory. This paper argues that firms and the state can make possible the building of new institutions that foster improvements in economic performance through arrangements that emphasize goal setting, problem solving, and continual evaluation of progress toward defined goals. The paper reviews key ideas on the learning-centered approach and builds on them to analyze the kinds of government–business relations that contribute to economic development. It uses case study material based on Chile's agro-industry business association FEPACH. It illustrates how innovative state policy coupled with private firms' efforts led to the discovery of group-based coordination that fostered rapid diffusion of new technology and production organization among Chilean enterprises. This work discusses the institutional reshaping of the business association and business–state relations to encourage learning and advance a process of development.