This paper provides a model of integrated market and nonmarket strategies in the context of an industry facing regulation that differentially affects the firms in the industry. The regulation is chosen in a majority rule institution, and to affect the stringency of the regulation, the firms in the industry can take nonmarket action in the form of providing support to legislators based on how they vote. The nonmarket action is considered in the context of client and interest group politics, where the latter involves competition with an environmental interest group. An integrated strategy is composed of the firm's strategy for its market environment and its strategy for its nonmarket environment. Also the integrated strategies of the firms must constitute an equilibrium in their market competition and an equilibrium for their nonmarket competition, including that with the environmental interest group. Collective action in the form of coalition building and rent chain mobilization is also considered.

Globalization is often said to lead to convergence among firm strategies. Significant differences existed in the organization of the production networks of Japanese and US firms in electronics in East Asia at the beginning of the 1990s. The sources of these differences lie in part in the relative newness of the export-orientation of Japanese companies, in weaknesses in Japanese corporate governance, in the geographical proximity of East Asian plants to Japan, and in the product mix of Japanese firms. An opening of Japanese production networks occurred in the first half of the 1990s in part in response to pressures associated with various forces of globalization, including the diffusion of capabilities, changes in technology, and the internationalization of the Japanese economy. This opening of Japanese networks caused them to converge towards their American counterparts. Partial convergence, however, coexisted with persistent diversity relative to the behavior of US networks. While nationality continued to matter, other factors affecting firms have to be incorporated into the analysis to explain the persistent diversity of firm behaviors.

With increasing regularity managers must address nonmarket as well as market problems. A common U.S. manifestation of this often-unwelcome reality is the abrupt emergence of a “Washington problem,” such as a piece of hostile legislation gathering momentum in the Congress. Although most business leaders today realize that doing nothing is rarely a viable response many activist nonmarket strategies are likewise problematic. For example even in the rare instances in which companies have the resources to devote to last-minute cover-the-Capitol blitzes such strategies are rarely effective and invariably wasteful. On any given issue a significant minority of legislators will oppose the lobbying manager's recommendations no matter what and a sizeable minority will favor them no matter what. Effective nonmarket strategies in contrast consist of knowing enough about governmental processes to ascertain who are the likely pivotal voters. This article presents a theory that provides a parsimonious way to think about pivotal voters in separation-of-power situations. Ultimately the theory provides guidance for the formation of more efficient and effective nonmarket strategies.

Although the influence of economic factors has long dominated the analysis of corporate political action, the role of organizational factors is increasingly seen as important in explaining the phenomenon. Building upon a recent study (Martin 1995) that emphasizes the prominence of organizational factors in political decision-making, we revisit a previously used literature, reconceptualize the relationship between economic and organizational factors and corporate political action as one of mediation, and employ new data and methods to test this relationship. Our findings demonstrate emphatically the importance of organizational factors in understanding corporate political action.

Beginning in the early 70s, ACME, a highly innovative and successful U.S. chemical firm, began commercializing an important and versatile polymer invention. This case study chronicles the many travails faced by ACME in obtaining patent protection for its innovations in major developed economies. ACME's experiences suggest that international differences in patent regimes that stem from ideological, historical, and institutional differences are pervasive, and need to be accounted for in a company's patenting approach. International strategy in the patent area is thus inherently multi-domestic. Further, we also observe that in global industries, obtaining a modicum of exclusivity through strong patent protection in certain key markets may be adequate to preserve a firm's competitive advantage versus multinational rivals. Moreover, a firm's patent strategy seems intrinsically integrated with its continuing innovative and commercial performance.