Rapid growth in the East Asian newly industrializing countries depended on institutional innovation. Authoritarian governments like Taiwan faced a dilemma: how to assure investors in a policymaking environment that made commitments difficult to sustain? In contrast to both the early developmental state literature and the new literature on authoritarian institutions, this article shows that “small” institutions have had an effect on both the credibility of commitments and the composition of the firms that the Taiwanese state sought to assure. In the 1950–1960s, insulated decision-making bodies with strong participation by foreigners and export-processing zones signaled government intent to both foreign and domestic firms. In the 1970–1980s, democratic decision-making structures were more decentralized and state interventions shifted in a more market-oriented direction. Even so, the Taiwanese government continued to use institutions such as the Hsinchu Science Park to extend assurances to domestic investors engaged in risky high-technology ventures.

Multinational corporations (MNCs) increasingly internationalize research and development (R&D), but the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) in R&D differs from that of general FDI. I use data on US MNC affiliates’ investments abroad (2001–2008) to demonstrate that increasing value added predicts more future R&D FDI, as R&D FDI is an upgrade decision. I then use data on R&D investment incentives to show that, while governments spend resources on R&D incentives, these can be negative predictors of R&D FDI. The findings imply that government efforts are best directed at incremental encouragement of value-added activities, as efforts to jump to R&D FDI are misguided.

What is the nature and extent of corporate leader involvement in American national politics? The results of a mail survey of nearly 100 such individuals show that leaders are quite active, devoting an average of nearly 1 hour per day to national political activity. We also show that corporate leaders engage in a wide range of advocacy activities. Monetary activities loom particularly large in the political lives of American corporate leaders, as large numbers are approached by members of Congress for contributions, and many who are approached answer the call. In addition, we find that corporate leaders, unlike advocacy professionals, do a great deal of their advocacy work in private; for the most part they eschew public activities such as testifying before congressional committees. Speaking to the question of which leaders are most politically active, our data evince a strong relationship between firm political activity and firm leader political activity. In sum, politically active firms have politically active leaders. We thus contribute to the ongoing academic discussion of corporate political activity by showing that the CEO's office is an additional locus of political power within business firms, and that CEO political activity is instrumental rather than consumptive in nature.

The private sector clearly has an increasingly important and well-defined role to play in slowing the flow of technology and preventing the provision of enabling services to states pursuing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and destabilising military capabilities. Exporters of proliferation-sensitive technology are frequently targeted by Iran and other countries. These countries are highly dependent on technology from the international market place to sustain their WMD and military programmes. Compliance with export controls only goes someway to ensuring that proliferation is prevented; a form of “over-compliance” is required to ensure that goods are not transferred to programmes of concern. This paper uses a significant quantity of primary data to consider the costs of compliance and over-compliance, the drivers for such processes, and the relationship between the national authority and firms and how this could be improved.

Professors Gordon Clark and Ashby Monk's “Modernity, Imitation, and Performance: Sovereign Funds in the Gulf” represent a welcome departure from previous studies of Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds by beginning to explore the origins and the changes in Gulf SWFs. However by way of critical commentary on their article, I sketch out a political economy approach to understanding Gulf SWFs and place these institutions within an historical and political setting.

We welcome the opportunity to respond to Pete Moore's comments on our paper. In doing so, we address the central issue raised by Moore concerning our use of the term “modern” in our analysis of the origin, structure, and management of Gulf states’ sovereign wealth funds. As it turns out, our use of the term modern is complex and multifaceted; we hope to show that the issue raised by Pete Moore runs in a variety of directions and is not so easily resolved, as he suggests.