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The politics of bank structural reform: Business power and agenda setting in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2019

David Howarth  and
Scott James
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Abstract

Following the financial crisis, the United Kingdom introduced major structural reforms to address concern about Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) banks, while France and Germany adopted much weaker reforms. This is puzzling given the presence of large universal banks engaged in market making activities in all three countries, which suffered significant losses during the international financial crisis, and given the commitments to reform made by political leaders in all three countries. The paper explains this policy divergence by analysing how dynamics of agenda setting contributed to the emergence of policy windows on structural reform. We explain the United Kingdom's decision to delegate the process to an independent commission as an example of venue shifting which helped to insulate the process from industry framing, and resulted in “conflict expansion” by mobilizing a wider coalition of actors in support of bank ringfencing. By contrast, in France and Germany the agenda was tightly managed through existing institutional venues, enabling industry to resist the framing of the issue around TBTF and limiting the role of non-business groups—a process we label as “conflict contraction.” We argue that analysis of agenda setting dynamics provides new insights into the cross-national variability of business power.

Keywords

Bank structural reformbank regulationbanking systemsagenda settingvenue shiftingIndependent Commission on Banking
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 22 , Special Issue 1: Ten Years of Regulatory Reform Since the International Financial Crisis: Understanding Bank Influence in the European and International Context , March 2020 , pp. 25 - 51
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2019 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press

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