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Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Jeffrey Milyo ,
David Primo  and
Timothy Groseclose
Jeffrey Milyo*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago & Stanford University
David Primo
Affiliation:
University of Chicago & Stanford University
Timothy Groseclose
Affiliation:
University of Chicago & Stanford University
*
Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

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There is a vast empirical literature on the allocation of corporate PAC contributions in Congressional elections and the influence that these contributions have on the policy-making process. The attention given to PAC contributions is far in excess of their actual importance. Corporate PAC contributions account for about 10% of Congressional campaign spending and major corporations allocate far more money to lobbying or philanthropy than their affiliated PACs make in contributions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , April 2000 , pp. 75 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2000 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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