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Corporate Lobbying Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Jin-Hyuk Kim
Jin-Hyuk Kim*
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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Abstract

Using a panel data of S&P 500 Index firms covering 1998–2004, this paper compares the determinants of lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions and estimates the returns to lobbying as assessed by the financial market. Lobbying depends more on managerial incentives and protection needs beyond industry structures than contributions do. Lobbying also has a positive effect on the firm's equity returns relative to the market and, to a lesser degree, relative to its industry.

Keywords

corporate lobbyingcampaign contributionsstock returns
Type
Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , August 2008 , pp. 1 - 23
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2008 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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