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Comparative Economic Organization—Within and Between Countries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Witold J. Henisz  and
Oliver E. Williamson
Witold J. Henisz*
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
Oliver E. Williamson*
Affiliation:
University of California at Berkeley
*
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2021 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104–6370, USA. E-mail: [email protected]
University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper explores the implications of going beyond transaction cost theory's implicit focus on domestic investors to include multinational actors. As developed herein, the discriminating alignment between the level of hazards (contractual and/or political) and the mode of governance carries over. In the open-economy context, such an alignment reflects the hazards that arise from the nature of the transaction and those that arise from the nature of the political and regulatory environment.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , November 1999 , pp. 261 - 277
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 1999 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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