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Business and Judicial Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Frank B. Cross*
Affiliation:
University of Texas at Austin

Extract

Recent years have seen a recognition of the importance of government action to business and a rapidly developing path of research on business and politics, but this research has focused overwhelmingly on the legislative and executive branches and too often ignored the judiciary.1 A failure to consider a role for the courts is a substantial lacuna in the research. The judicial branch plays a substantial role in politics and governance. In most cases, the passage of a statute or even the promulgation of a regulation has legal effect only through the courts. A business's success (or failure) in lobbying the legislative or executive branches for a particular policy program may be entirely counteracted in the courts. At the extreme, such an action might be declared unconstitutional, making it legally null and ineffective, and perhaps eliminating the possibility of any future attempt to revive the action.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2003 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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