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Determinants of Access to Legislative and Executive Branch Officials: Business Firms and Trade Policymaking in the U.S.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Douglas A. Schuler  and
Kathleen Rehbein
Douglas A. Schuler
Affiliation:
Rice University
Kathleen Rehbein
Affiliation:
Marquette University
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Abstract

We examine the characteristics of business firms that gain access to legislative and executive branch officials in the trade policymaking area. Our empirical analysis of over 1200 manufacturers reveals that legislators were most attracted to firms with foreign market expertise, firms which actively participated in politics with outside lobbyists and campaign contributions, and firms with significant employment in the state and/or district. Executive branch officials were responsive to firms with foreign market expertise, firms from industries that had previously received tariff protection, firms using in-house government affairs specialists and outside lobbyists to convey information, and firms making campaign contributions to members of the trade oversight legislative committees. Our results largely support the political market framework and provide insights about the attractiveness of certain demanders to suppliers of trade policies from the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. federal government.

Keywords

corporate political activitylobbyingcampaign contributionsaccesspolitical markets
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 13 , Issue 3: Special Issue: The Domestic Foundations of IPE: The U.S. Case in Current and Historical Perspective , October 2011 , pp. 1 - 30
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2011 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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