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Corporate governance reforms and political partisanship: an empirical analysis in 16 OECD countries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Thibault Darcillon
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Abstract

This paper explores the determinants of pro-minority shareholder corporate governance reforms. Using a Cox conditional model in gap time, this paper provides new empirical evidence on the linkages between the adoption of pro-minority shareholder corporate governance reforms at the firm level and government ideological affiliation in 16 OECD countries over the period 1970–2009. I find strong evidence linking rightward shifts in government ideological orientation with the adoption of minority shareholder protection legislation. This result supports our argument that changes in the composition of the coalition of heterogeneous interests and/or a change in the expectations of the parties’ constituency will affect government strategy on the adoption of pro-minority shareholder corporate governance reforms. I also find that the macroeconomic context at the international level may influence the adoption of these reforms. Our findings suggest that international economic integration has resulted not in the convergence of corporate governance regimes to the Anglo-Saxon model, but rather the emergence of hybrid corporate governance systems.

Type
Research Articles
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 661 - 696
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2015 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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