² Times, 6,7, and 15 February 1911; PD, Fifth Series, Commons, 28 March 1911, XXIII, 654; Barclay to Grey, 24 February and 31 March 1911, Cd.6104,23,32–3.

³ Cairns, F.S. to Taft, August 1911, Taft Papers.Google Scholar

⁴ Barclay to Grey, 13 June and 5 July 1911, BD, x, pt.1,762–5, Grey to Buchanan, 6 July 1911, ibid., 766.

⁵ 10 July 1911.

⁶ Mubammad‘Ali was away from Odessa from November 1910 to April 1911. He left Odessa again on 9 June 1911, reportedly for Marienbad for health reasons. The Persian government made frequent complaints about the ex–Shāh’ activities and believed that he was preparing an attempt to regain the throne. On 13 July 1911 Grey instructed Buchanan to call the attention of the Russian Foreign Minister to these reports and also suggested that thte two Powers should give a warning to Muhammad ‘Ali, then at Vienna, againstintriguing. The British ambassdor at Vienna reported; ‘Russian Ambassador some days ago succeeded in delaying action without giving any reasons for doing so, and showed much indifference as to the urgency of carrying out instructions from our Government. From the Ambassador’s attitude and from the language held by Russian Secretary to Mr. Russell, I am inclined to suspect that Russian Embassy were not unaware of the Departue of the ex–Shah from the neighbourhood of Vienna, where he appears to have been’, Cartwright to Grey, 20 July 1911, BD, x, pt.1, 773.

⁷ Barclay to Grey, 21 July 1911, BD, x, pt.1, 773. The Annual Report for Russia for 1911 states: ‘It seems probable that his passage through Russian territory was facilitated owing either to the culpable negligence or connivance of subaltern officials’.

⁸ Buchanan to Grey,19 July 1911, Cd.6104,95–6.

⁹ Grey to Buchanan and editorial notes, 22 July 1911, BD, x, pt.1,774.

¹⁰ Russell to Knox, 27 September 1911, case 891.00/633, ADS decimal file.

¹¹ Guild to Knox, 30 October 1911. This was answered in the nagative by telegram from the State Department, case 891.51/92, ADS decimal file. On 15 December 1911 Guild reported a discussion with Sazonov who said that Shuster’s selection had been ‘particularly disagreeable’ to Russia not only because of his behaviour but also because he was a Jew. ‘I ventured tosay that in this at least I thought he was mistaken, but he insisted upon it with great emphasis’, Case 891.51/123, ADS decimal file.

¹² Grey to Buchanan, 26 July 1911, BD, x, pt.1,778. But see also Grey to Barclay, I August 1911, Cd. 6104, 119.

¹³ Buchanan to Grey and editorial note, 5 August 1911, BD, x, pt. 1, 784.

¹⁴ See PD, Fifth Series, Commons, 21 and 23 March and 27 July 1911, XXIII, 271 ff., 625 ff., and XXVIII, 1831 ff.

¹⁵ O’Beirne to Grey and minutes, 10 October 1911, BD, x, pt.1, 908–10.

¹⁶ O’Beirne to Grey and minutes, 19 October 1911, BD, x, pt. 1, 812.

¹⁷ Russian demands as set out in the Annual Report for Russia for 1911 were:

1 Le démission de Mr. Shuster-Morgan et de M. Lecoffre; quant aux autres fonctionnaries étrangers, nominés par M.Shuster, leur situation doit ėtre réglée d’aprés le point ci–aprés, sub No.2.

2 Engagement du Gouvernment persan de n’inviter à I’avence des étrangers à son service qu’avec le consentement préalable des Légations de Russia et de la Grande-Bretagne à Téhéran.

3 Rem boursement par le Governement persan des frais de I’expédition militaire qui vient d’être envoyée en Perse.

¹⁸ See Annual Report for Russia and Annual Report for Persia for 1911.

¹⁹ As a result of constantly increasing Russian pressure, Grey on 7 August 1911 had telegraphed Barclay not to deliver to Stokes the acceptance of his resignation as an officer in the Indian Army, as the Foreign Office was attempting to find a way to suspend that acceptance. Shuster’s efforts to find a compromise solution were not successful. Nor were the Russians satisfied as Neratov pressed for the outright recall of Stokes and his immediate departure from Persia. In all the negotiations regarding Stokes the Russian minister at tehran remained aloof. He left it to Neratov to storm at Buchanan, the latter to wire alarmingly to the Foreign Office, and the London authorities to instruct Barclay to remonstrate with Shuster and the Persian government. It therefore seemed to be the British minister who was obstructing the regeneration of Persia and the organization of an efficient fiscal service. In the end the British government capitulated completely to pressures from the Russian Foreign Ministry, refused the resignation of their officer, and ordered him to proceed to Simla. After a futile effort to secure reconsideration, Major Stokes left Persia for India in December 1911. This episode is documented in BD, x, pt.1; Cd. 6105. See also PD, Fifth Series, Commons, 8 and 10 August 1911, XXIX, 939,1325; Times,8,9,18 August 1911. For the observations of the American minister see Russell to Knox, 8 November and 14 December 1911, cases 891.51/105 and 130, ADS decimal file.

²⁰ Grey to Buchanan, 16 August 1911, BD, x, pt. 1, 800; cf.ibid., 528–9.

²¹ Grey to Buchanan, 1 and 2 December 1911, ibid., 860–3.

²² See the debates in Parliament for 27 November and 14 December 1911, PD, Fifth Series, Commons, XXXII, 43 ff., 2543 ff.; and Yeselson, op.cit., 122, reporting an interview many years later with Shuster.

²³ Nicolson to Buchanan, 5 December 1911, BD, x, pt.1, 874–5.

²⁴ PD, Fifth Series, Commons, 14 December 1911, XXXII, 2598–9.

²⁵ See also the Times, 11, 14, and 22 November and 1, 4, and 7 December 1911. Of interest, too, is Grey’s speech reported in the Times for 17 February 1912 and E.G. Browne’s comments on this speech in the Times, 22 February 1912.

²⁶ See the Annual Report for Persia and Annual Report for Russia, 1911,1912, and 1913.

²⁷ For summaries of the incident see the Annual Report for Persia and Annual Report for Russia for 1912.

²⁸ 4 May 1912. See also E.G. Browne, The press and poetry of modern Persia, Cambridge, 1914, 335–6; PD, Fifth Series, Commons, 16 April 1912, XXXVI, 168–9.

²⁹ For a brief insight into relations between Britain and Russia with respect to Persia, see conversations between M. Sazonov and Sir Edward Grey at Balmoral, 24 and 25 September 1912, BD, IX, pt, 1, 750 ff.

³⁰ Ahwāz, 3 June 1908, FO 248/923.

³¹ See, for example, Pretyman to Gorst, 10 August 1904; Boyd and Miller to Sanderson, 9 February 1905, FO 60/731. Correspondence, June-August 1905, of Committee of Imperial Defence, Admiralty and India Office, CAB 17/46. Pretyman’s summary in PD, Fifth Series, Commons, 17 June 1914, LXIII, 1190–1. It is noteworthy that in 1905 some destroyers of the ‘Tribal’ class were laid down-the first British naval vessels (excepting submarines) designed to burn oil exclusively.

³² This may have caused to be written a Foreign Office memorandum outlining the major developments. See Gaston de Bernhardt’s memorandum, 3 January 1913. ‘Mr. W.D.D’Arcy’s Oil Concession in Persia’, FO 371/1720.

³³ In December 1911 Lord Strathcona (Chairman of A.P.O.C.) and Mr. Charles Greenway (one of its Directors and later Chairman) gave evidence before the Departmental Committee on Oil Fuel which would seem to have had much the same objective as the earlier Admiralty Petroleum Standing Committee.

³⁴ Cd. 7419, Navy (oil fuel). Agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited. 1914. In these negotiations which are abundantly documented, two features are noteworthy: (1) the possibility of the absorption of the A.P.O.C. by the Shell group; and (2) the relationship of these negotiations with those for control of oil-fields in Mesopotamia. CAB 37/114, FO 371/1486, 1728, 2121. See also letter by E.G. Browne, Times, 30 June 1914.

³⁵ For Churchll’s speech see PD, Fifth Series, Commons, 17 June 1914, LXIII,1121–43.

³⁶ See debates of 17 and 29 June and 10 July 1914. Cf. C. W. Wallace’s letter to the Times, 26 June 1914, and Sir Arnold Wilson, S. W. Persia: a political officer's diary 1907–1914, Oxford, 1941. A memorandum in FO 371/2077, dated 19 June 1914, noted: ‘The oil is conducted to Abadan Island by a pipe line and thought the country in admittedly inhabited by turbulent tribes the amount of trouble during the five years since the Company developed the district has been exceedingly little, and in view of the relations existing between the Oil Company and the tribes there is no ground for anticipating any violent hostility. On eht contrary the work of the Oil Company tends to introduce prosperity and wealth into the district-two elements of order. In this connexion it may be pointed out that a considerable proportion of the lawlessness that of late years has been rife in South Persia some way east of the district in question is due not to any innate characteristic of the inhabitants to take to the road as a means of livelihood’.

³⁷ Minutes on Buchanan to Grey, no.190,20 June 1914, FO 371/2077.

³⁸ 22 July 1914, circulated to the Prime Minister and Mr. Churchill, FO 371/2077.

³⁹ 18 March 1914, BD, x, pt.2, 776–7.

⁴⁰ Grey to Buchanan, tel.no.242,4 June 1914, FO 371/2076.

⁴¹ Enclosure in Grey to Buchanan, no.212,8 June 1914, FO 371/2076.

⁴² Undated draft by Grey in cse 27283, FO 371/2076. In answer to a question in the Commons on 29 April 1913 Grey acknowledged that there were 17,500 Russian troops in Persia ‘as near as can be ascertained’, PD, Fifth Series, Commons, LII,968.

⁴³ BD, x, pt.2, 798–800.

⁴⁴ 16 June 1914, BD, x, pt.2,801–2.

⁴⁵ See cases 27927 and 29082 in FO 371/2076, and BD, x, pt.2, 804–8.

⁴⁶ Case 31801, FO 371/2076. The Russian memorandum is reproduced in BD, x, pt.2, 815–20. It is perhaps significant that the Foreign Office minntes were dated 14 July 1914–16 days after the assassination had taken place at Sarajevo.

⁴⁷ Case 29456, FO 371/2076.

⁴⁸ See documents in FO 371/2076.

⁴⁹ Case 31835, FO 371/2076

⁵⁰ Townley to Grey, no. 180, very confidential, 19 June 191

⁵¹ Memorandum submitted by G.R.C., 23 July 1914, FO 371/2076.

⁵² Minute by Crowe, 23 July 1914. Nicolson recorded his agreement with Crowe's observations, paid tribute to Clerk's ' able memo: ', and gave his own opinion that ' we should not delay any longer in deciding upon a line of policy. The matter is urgent Greys minute, dated 11 (possibly 12) August 1914, stated: This is very ably dealt with by Mr. Clerk and Sir E. Crowe, but it must of course be suspended now '. Case 33484, FO 371/2076. Grey did not carry this point. Further minutes by the Foreign Office staff emphasize their conviction that negotiations with Russia over Persia would have to take place while the war was going on. This indeed happened, culminating in the Constantinople Agreement of 1915. Broadly, this gave Britain a free hand in most of the neutral zone while Russia in return received freedom of action in northern Persia and, in the event of victory by the Entente powers, the right to annex Constantinople and the Straits. The Soviet government repudiated this agreement in 1917, and its te ms were formally abrogated in treaties concluded with Persia and Turkey respectively in 1921. J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Princeton, 1956, n, 7–11,90–7. 63

⁵³ The American minister in Tehran remarked that the British and Russian diplomats ‘ may discover a long memory in the people of Persia. At all events they remind me of what the old diplomat said to his boy, whom he had with him in a foreign capital. “ Behold, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed ” ’ Russell to Knox, 9 August 1911, case 891.00/610, ADS decimal file.

⁵⁴ PD, Fifth Series, Commons, 24 March 1909, II, 1850–1.

⁵⁵ Before the War: studies in diplomacy, London, 1936, II, 92. But so far little evidence seems to show that Grey (and this applies more strongly to the permanent staff of the Foreign Office) had much real sympathy for the Persians. In these years Persia was regarded mainly as an irritant and a nuisance because events there obstructed the achievement of the larger goals of a policy determined by European considerations. See Grey to Spring Rice, 12 August 1906, Gwynn, op. cit., II, 78: Grey to Nicolson, 7 March 1907, BD, IV, 277–9; Grey, op.cit., I, 152–71.