^{page 43 note 1} Based on a paper read to the SOAS Buddhist Seminar in February 1953. Acknowledgments are due to Dr. F. R. Allchin, Dr. A. L. Basham, Professor J. Brough, and Dr. D. Friedman for criticisms and suggestions.

^{page 43 note 2} An interesting study of this kind is to be found in Th. Stcherbatsky's Buddhist logic, Leningrad, 1, 1932, 15 ff., where he considers the influence of various non-Buddhist systems on the development of Buddhist philosophy down to Dignāga. On the problems of the ‘method of gradual regression’ within Buddhism see Schayer's ‘Precanonical Buddhism’, Archiv Orientální, VII, 1935Google Scholar, 121 ff., and for notes on various speculations about original Buddhism see his ‘New contributions to the problem of pre-Hīnayanistic Buddhism’ Polski Biuletyn Orientalistyczny, I, 1937Google Scholar, 8 ff.

^{page 44 note 1} For the early history of seeJohnston, E.H.: Early Sāṃkhya. London, Royal Asiatic Society, 1937.Google Scholar

^{page 46 note 1} It would seem preferable, however, to regard this conversion as an effect of the problems which confronted the empire-builder rather than as a cause of such problems.

^{page 49 note 1} The date of the Āj‛vaka Council is uncertain. Basham (p. 74) gives 485 or 484 B.C. as the most probable date of Gosāla's death. According to the Bhagavatī Sūtra the Council took place not long before his death (Basham, 51, 56 ff.). The minimum interval would be about a year (allowing for the events described between the Council and Gosāla's death), giving 486 B.C. for the Council, but it may well have taken place earlier. In any case it preceded the Buddhist Council, which was probably suggested by it. As a broad council, representing ‘hundreds’ of Ājīvaka views propounded by a large number of teachers from various countries, and collecting many ancient astrological traditions and methods of divination, it must have been much more impressive than the subsequent rehearsing at Rājagaha of the doctrine of a single teacher.

^{page 49 note 2} Some Pali Buddhist terms, etc., which appear in their Ardhamāgadhī forms with similar meanings as Jaina (and Ājīvaka ?) terms:—

A series (24, etc.) of incarnations of teachers, associated with particular animals, trees, and with cakkavattin kings—with whom they may be interchangeable (i.e. one possessing the special bodily marks may at will become either).

’Three jewels’ (ratana)—but the three are different in Jainism.

The four elements.

Generally speaking, the Jainas conceived such terms as ‘āsava’ in a material, physical sense, whereas the Buddhists tended to make them all mental, moral tendencies; even the four elements they conceived in a more abstract manner as properties of matter: ‘earth’ = extension, ‘water’ = cohesion, ‘fire’ = heat, ‘air’ = motion. It follows from the same outlooks that the Jainas sought to wear out bad kamma, etc., by the physical means of strenuous asceticism whereas the Buddhists believed that the mind trained by purely mental culture had the power to annihilate bad kamma by the mental act of understanding. One result of the Buddhist conception was that groups of terms such as āsava-gantha-yoga-ogha-nīvarana-kilesa-samyojanaparāmāsa-upādāna tended to fall together and lose all distinction of meaning.

^{page 51 note 1} e.g. the development of metal working: six metals known in the Pali Canon, and the tempering of iron to make steel. The Commentary on the Vibhanga lists 20 metals and alloys (PTS ed., p. 63), showing the development in the immediately following centuries. Linguistics: Yāska and Pāṇini. Astronomy and mathematics (including geometry and trigonometry): see Thibaut, , ‘Grundriss der indo-arisehen Philologie und Altertumskunde’, III, 9, Strassburg, 1899.Google Scholar Medicine developed especially at Takṡaśilā: various references in the older Upaniṡads (‘5 winds’, etc.), and Jīvaka Komārabhacca of several Pali stories, who was trained there; physiology is illustrated in the stock list of 32 organic substances in the body (Khp. III and elsewhere in the Pali Canon), to which the brain is appended—apparently a recent addition—as 33rd (‘thirty-two’ persisted as standard figure even when 33 were in fact listed). Chemistry is applied in the Arthaśāstra and Kāmasūtra as we now have them and may have formed a department of the former science, at least, in the early Buddhist period. For the later history of Indian science (i.e. from Caraka, c. A.D. 100, to Bhāskara, c. A.D. 1150) there is plenty of material awaiting systematic study.

^{page 52 note 1} The Theravāda tradition connects the Lokāyata with all kinds of worldly speculations (lokakkhāyikā) and with sophistry (vitaṇḍa) concerning such natural philosophy. See e.g. 90–1.

^{page 52 note 2} The ordinary Lokāyata (Bṛhaspati) rejected inference and allowed only perception as a means of cognition. See, e.g., Tattvasangraha, 1456 ff.

^{page 52 note 3} And in part to Kambalāśvatara ? See TS, 1860–4 and Pañjikā.

^{page 53 note 1} Who says (p. 1) that Bṛhaspati's statements about the four elements, etc., were merely a concession to the popular view.

^{page 53 note 2} However, in the Lokāyata Sūtra as quoted by later writers (TS and SDS) both Bṛhaspat and Kambalāśvatara are named as teachers of the school.

^{page 54 note 1} It may be noted that according to the Sarvadarśanasangraha the Lokāyata quote the Bṛhadāraḥyakopaniṡad (II, 4, 12) for the materialist or hylozoist view that consciousness (vijñāna) is simply a compound of bodily elements which is destroyed with the body. However, this statement is attributed to Yājñavalkya (perhaps wrongly) and the sequel suggests that vijñāna here is only the illusory dualistic consciousness, that all things are in fact one, which is oneself (ātman) but also ‘brahman’, and that after death this ātman returns to brahman. The question in the Upaniṡads is whether the primary principle in this monist system is matter, as Uddālaka seems to maintain, or brahman (spirit), following Yājñavalkya. It seems that the Upaniṡad philosophers themselves were as yet barely conscious of the implications of the distinction, in this dawn of philosophical speculation, so that it was not difficult for to ignore it.

In the Jātaka (IV, 300–3) Uddālaka is represented as attacking the Vedas and caste (six varṇas) and as a clever sophist. This gives some support to Ruben's characterization of him and further places him, from the Buddhist point of view, in the same unfavourable light as the later Lokāyata or ‘vitanda’ (sophist) philosophers, suggesting that he belonged to the same tradition. Uddālaka's son Śvetaketu is stated by Vātsyāyana (KS I, 1, 9) to have been one of the founders of the Kāmaśāstra (after the Creator Prajāpati himself and the legendary Nandin) and to have composed a Kāmasūtra in 500 lessons, which is apparently quoted from at KS II, 1, 31. This would be peculiarly appropriate for a precursor of the Lokāyata, which maintained that kāma is the highest aim in life (see below). (Vātsyāyana as an orthodox Brahman rejects this view and subordinates kāma to dharma and artha, thus seeking to reform the science and to incorporate it in the orthodox system.)

^{page 55 note 1} It may be seen, however, to have something in common with Stoicism, which equally developed astrology as as means of understanding fate or providence, and an authentic Ājīvaka text might stress as the Stoics did the advantages of thus reconciling oneself with providence.

^{page 55 note 2} On causality and free will in Buddhism see Stcherbatsky, Buddhist logic, I, 131–4: ‘a freedom inside the limits of ecessity’. To the materialists of the ‘yadṛcchāvāda’ this must have seemed little better than Āīvakism.

^{page 55 note 3} cf. ‘adhītya samutpāda’ and ‘yadṛcchāvāda’ Buddhist logic, I 122. At present it is not clear whether the materialista admitted causality in natural phenomena, and if so to what extent. They were primarily concerned to deny supernatural causality (karma) as the basis of their opponents' ethics.

^{page 56 note 1} cf. the quotations in the Netti (PTS ed., 1902), p. 52: ‘bhuñjitabbā kāmā … bahulīkātabbā kāmā ti kāmehi veramaṇī tesaṃ adhammo’, ‘since they hold that (sense) pleasures should be enjoyed … and multiplied, to them abstention from pleasures is immoral’; and p. 110: ‘yo kāme paḝisevati so lokaṃ vaḍḍhayati, yo lokaṃ vaḍḍhayati so bahuṃ puññaṃ pasavati’, ‘he who resorts to pleasures enriches (increases) the world, he who enriches the world produces much merit’.

^{page 56 note 2} According to Mādhava the majority of living beings hold by this refrain. Not, presumably, as philosophical materialists consciously following Cārvāka, otherwise his works must have been preserved, but as following ordinary worldly objects—wealth and pleasure—and disregarding philosophy and religion.

^{page 56 note 3} cf. the Netti quotation, p. 110: ‘n' atthi sukhena sukhaṃ, dukkhena nāma sukhaṃ adhigantabbaṃ’, ‘pleasure (ease, bliss) is not attained by pleasure (easily) but by trouble (with difficulty)’.

^{page 57 note 1} As an example (from the long passage in J VI already mentioned) we may take J IV, p. 208: ‘sace hi so issaro sabbaloke, brahmā bahūhbūtapatī pajānaṃ kiṃ sabbaloke vidahī alakkhiṃ, kiṃ sabbalokaṃ na sukhiṃ akāsi’— ‘If he is indeed the Ruler throughout the world—Brahmā Lord of the many beings and of Creation—why has he produced misfortune throughout the world ? Why does he not make the whole world happy ?’.

^{page 57 note 2} e.g. Udāna 34 ff. (story of Meghiya). See also A III, 310, and several similar passages on the importance of the influence of friends, good or bad.

^{page 58 note 1} cf. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist logic, I, 146–7: ‘For them [the Buddhists] the characteristic feature of all our conceptual knowledge and of language, of all nameable things and of all names, is that they are dialectical. Every word or every conception is correlative with its counterpart and that is the only definition that can be given’. This applies as much to Early Buddhism as to Dignāga's system.

^{page 59 note 1} That these ancient antinomies were not forgotten is shown by Nāgārjuna's application of the same quadrilemma method, in denying causality in the world, as is used in the old antinomy of whether the Tathāgata exists after death: (i) A not B, (ii) B not A, (iii) both A and B, (iv) neither A nor B. Stcherbatsky has suggested the parallel with Kant in Buddhist logic, including the quadrilemmas and antinomies, and he has further compared the ‘apoha’ dialectical method of Dignāga with Hegel's ‘negation’ (I, 459 f., 553, etc.). Since Hegel knew something of Indian philosophy this is not a mere coincidence, and Hegel's investigation of the nature of concepts may have been inspired by his Indian predecessors.

^{page 59 note 2} The Kṛṡṇrsna legend was later incorporated into Jaina mythology. Here we find another Yaśodā, suggesting interactions on this side too.

^{page 59 note 3} But as against the materialists they maintain a stream of momentary consciousnesses passing over at death to a fresh birth according to moral causality.

^{page 62 note 1} cf.: ‘Sabbam atthī ti kho Kaccāyana ayaṃ eko anto. Sabbaṃ natthī ti ayam dutiyo anto. Ete te Kaccāyana ubho ante anupagamma majjhena Tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti’. S II, 17.