1.Bryce, James, “James Wilson: An Appreciation,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LX (1936), 361.Google Scholar

2.Smith, Charles Page, James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742 – 1798 (Chapel Hill, 1956).Google Scholar

3.Jensen, Merrill, in a review of Smith, James Wilson, in Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXX (1956), 522–523. The same view is expressed by Glenn W. Jacobsen, James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742 – 1798. LXXXVII (1963), 108. It accords with the general impression of Wilson among historians.Google Scholar

4.See e.g. McMaster, J. B. and Stone, F.D., Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787 – 1788 (Philadelphia, 1888), 183–184. “Mr. W… is a man of sense, learning and extensive information; unfortunately for him, he has never sought the more solid frame of patriotism… The whole tenor of his political conduct has always been strongly tainted with the spirit of high aristocracy; he has never been known to join in a truly popular measure, and his talents have ever been devoted to the patrician interest.”Google Scholar

5.It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss Wilson's theories of democracy, the basis of which was that all power was derived from the people, and that the end of government was the happiness of the people. For evidence of Wilson's theoretic concepts see Andrews, J.D., Works of James Wilson (2 vols.; Chicago, 1896); R.G Adams, Selected Political Essays of James Wilson (New York, 1930); and A.B. Leavelle, “James Wilson and the Relation of the Scottish Metaphysics to American Political Thought,” in Political Science Quarterly, LXVII (1942).Google Scholar

6.R. G. Adams, op.cit., 57.Google Scholar

7.R. G. Adams, op.cit. 51–52. On withholding the vote from the poorer classes Wilson writes:” All those are excluded from voting, whose poverty is such, that they cannot live independant, and must therefore be subject to the undue influence of their superiors. Such are supposed to have no will of their own; and it is judged improper that they should vote in the representation of a free state. What can exhibit in a more striking point of view the peculiar care which has been taken in order to render the election of members of Parliament entirely free?”.Google Scholar

8.Library of Congress, Pennsylvania Miscellaneous, Vol. 4, Jan. 7, 1776 – July 15, 1776. Copy of a statement by Thomas Jefferson, John Hancock, Robert Morris, John-Adams, and others, regarding Wilson's attitude towards independence, dated Jun 20, 1776.Google Scholar

9.Selsam, J. P., The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776; A Study in Revolutionary Democracy (Philadelphia, 1935), 110. Selsam cites as his main source B.A. Konkle, George Bryan and the Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1731 – 1791 (Philadelphia, 1922).Google Scholar

10.During this period Wilson developed the view, which later he was to urge so strongly, that effective government depended on relating representation in the central government to population. See Boyd, J. P., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, 1950–) I, 326–327.Google Scholar

11.Farrand, M., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven, 1911) I, 253.Google Scholar

12.Farrand, I, 179. Wilson contended vigorously for “proportional representation” in the Senate as well as in the House of Representatives, and it was with the greatest reluctance that he accepted the decision to base representation in the Senate on the principle of equality of the States.Google Scholar

13.Farrand, I, 359.Google Scholar

14.Farrand, I, 57.Google Scholar

15.Farrand, I, 365.Google Scholar

16.Farrand, I, 132 – 133. Yates's version of the same statement reads: “Mr. Wilson is of opinion that the national legislative powers ought to flow immediately from the people, so as to contain all their understanding, and to be an exact transcript of their minds. ” (Farrand, I 141).Google Scholar

17.Farrand, I, 185.Google Scholar

18.Farrand, I. 375.Google Scholar

19.Farrand, II, 201. In opposing the proposal, Wilson pointed out the difficulty of devising “any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States,” and maintained that “It would be very hard ”Google Scholar

20.Farrand, I, 361.Google Scholar

21.Farrand, I, 375.Google Scholar

22.See Farrand, II, 217–218, 230–231, 237, 251, 268–269, 272.Google Scholar

23.Farrand, I, 605.Google Scholar

24.Farrand, I, 605.Google Scholar

25.Farrand, II, 540.Google Scholar

26.Farrand, II, 548.Google Scholar

27.Farrand, II, 538.Google Scholar

28.The democratic impulse behind this is hardly vitiated by his adding an argument based on expediency: “Besides as this is a clause in the existing confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a pretext by which week (sic) ” (Farrand, II, 260).Google Scholar

29.Farrand, I, 69.Google Scholar

30.Farrand, I, 68.Google Scholar

31.Farrand, I, 80.Google Scholar

32.Farrand, II, 30.Google Scholar

33.Farrand, II, 30.Google Scholar

34.Farrand, II, 32.Google Scholar

35.Farrand, II, 56.Google Scholar

36.Farrand, II, 106.Google Scholar

37.Farrand, II, 402.Google Scholar

38.Farrand, II, 502.Google Scholar

39.Farrand, II, 523.Google Scholar

40.Wilson Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.Google Scholar

41.McMaster and Stone, op. cit., 340.Google Scholar

42.For a most penetrating and perceptive examination of the antifederalist position see Main, J.T., The Antifederalists; Critics of the Constitution, 1781 – 1788 (Chapel Hill, 1961). The closeness of Wilson's premises to those of his opponents on this issue is clearly evident.Google Scholar

43.McMaster and Stone, 341. It was an assumption of most antifederolists that only the state governments would safeguard individual rights and liberties. Wilson was therefore perhaps distorting their attitudes (though not their arguments) in implying that they were intent on preserving state sovereignty for its own sake. But this does not invalidate Wilson's own contention that the national government was equally a sufficient safeguard of the rights and interests of the people.Google Scholar

44.McMaster and Stone, 301–302. Wilson continued: “When the principle is once settled that the people are the source of authority, the consequence is that they may take from the subordinate governments powers with which they have hitherto trusted them, and place those powers in the general government, if it is thought that there they will be productive of more good. They can distribute one portion of power to the more contracted circle called State governments: they can also furnish another proportion to the government of the United States. Who will undertake to say as a state officer that the people may not give to the general government what powers and for what purposes they please? how comes it, Sir, that these State governments dictate to their superiors? — to the majesty of the people?” (McMaster and Stone, 302). Again, in reply to a complaint of Findley's, “that the State governments were kept out of this government altogether,” Wilson asserted: “The truth is, and it is a leading principle in this system, that not the States only but the people also shall be here represented. And if this is a crime, I confess the general government is chargeable with it; but I have no idea that a safe system of power in the government, sufficient to manage the general interest of the United States, could be drawn from any other source or rested in any other authority than that of the people at large, and I consider this authority as the rock on which this structure will stand. If this principle is unfounded, the system must fall. If honorable gentlemen, before they undertake to oppose this principle, will show that the people have parted with their power to the State governments, then I confess I cannot support this constitution.” (McMaster and Stone, 303. See also 305, 316–317, 320–321, 384, 389, 411–412 for different expressions of the same point).Google Scholar

45.McMaster and Stone, 265.Google Scholar

46.McMaster and Stone, 302.Google Scholar

47.McMaster and Stone, 318.Google Scholar

48.McMaster and Stone, 321.Google Scholar

49.McMaster and Stone, 384.Google Scholar

50.McMaster and Stone, 389. Wilson continued: “The power both of the general government, and the State governments, under this system, are acknowledged to be so many emanations of power from the people. The great object now to be attended to, instead of disagreeing about who shall possess the supreme power, is to consider whether the present arrangement is well calculated to promote and secure the tranquility and happiness of our common country. These are the dictates of sound and unsophisticated sense, and what ought to employ the attention and judgment of this honorable body.”Google Scholar

51.McMaster and Stone, 395.Google Scholar

52.Wilson, Bird, Works of James Wilson (3 vols.; Philadelphia, 1804), III, 281. In expounding his view of the nature of representation, Wilson was fond of the similes of the pyramid and the chain. “A free government,” he stated in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, “has often been compared to a pyramid. This allusion is made with peculiar propriety in the system before you; it is laid on the broad base of the people; its powers gradually rise, while they are confined, in proportion as they ascend, until they end in that most permanent of all forms. When you examine all its parts, they will invariably be found to preserve that essential mark of free governments, a chain of connection with the people.” (McMaster and Stone, 412).Google Scholar

53.Bird Wilson, III, 280.Google Scholar

54.McMaster and Stone, 344.Google Scholar

55.McMaster and Stone, 344. Original italicised.Google Scholar

56.McMaster and Stone, 345. Though Wilson's argument has a touch of speciousness, it does not seem to have been insincere: “In this system it is declared that the electors in each state shall have the qualification requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. This being made the criterion of the right of suffrage, it is consequently secured, because the same constitution guarantees to every state in the union a republican form of government. The right of suffrage is fundamental to republics.” Elsewhere Wilson defines a “republican” government as one which is firmly based on the people.Google Scholar

57.McMaster and Stone, 395. He went on “The larger therefore the district is, the greater is the probability of selecting wise and virtuous characters, and the more agreeable it is to the constitutional principle of representation.”Google Scholar

58.McMaster and Stone, 395.Google Scholar

59.See below, pp. 18 – 19.Google Scholar

60.McMaster and Stone, 351. Wilson expanded his argument in a Fourth of July Oration in 1788. “Allow me,” he said, “to direct your attention, in a very particular manner, too momentous part, which, by this constitution, every citizen will frequently be called to act. All those in places of power and trust will be elected either immediately by the people, or in such a manner that their appointment will depend ultimately on such immediate election. All the derivative movements of government must spring from the original movement of the people at large. If to this they give a sufficient force and a just direction, all the others will be governed by its controlling power. To speak without a metaphor, if the people, at their elections, take care to choose none but representatives that are wise and good, their representatives will take care, in their turn, to choose or appoint none but such as are wise and good also. The remark applies to every succeeding election and appointment. Thus the characters proper for publick officers will be diffused from the immediate elections of the people over the remotest parts of the administration.” (Bird Wilson, III, 308).Google Scholar

61.In reply to Findley's accusations of insincerity, Wilson declared: “At some time it has been said, that I have not been at the pains to conceal my contempt of the people; but when it suits a purpose better, it is asserted that I cajole them. I do neither the one nor the other… No, Sir, I go practically into this system; I have gone into it practically when the doors were shut, when it could not be alleged that I cajoled the people; and I now endeavour to show that the true and only safe principle for a free people, is a practical recognition of their original and supreme authority.” (McMaster and Stone, 320–321).Google Scholar

62.Graydon, Alexander, Memoirs of a Life Chiefly Passed in Pennsylvania within the last Sixty Years (Edinburgh, 1822), 361.Google Scholar

63.Pennsylvania Convention, First Session (Committee), December 31, 1789 and January 1, 1790.Google Scholar

64.See Smith, op. cit., 301; Graydon, op. cit., 362–363.Google Scholar

65.Graydon, op. cit., 361 et seq. Graydon was one of the few conservative members of the Convention who supported Wilson on this issue. He did so “not so much from the arguments adduced, though appearing to me both ingenious and sound, as from my conviction of its being wholly immaterial, so far as a check was contemplated, whether the Senate was brought together through the intervention of electors or not; and I was, of course, adverse to a measure at once circuitous, useless, and unpopular.” (See Smith, op. cit., 301; Graydon, op. cit., 363) Graydon, in consequence of having supported Wilson on this issue, had to endure a degree of ostracism by those who opposed him. “I was,” he wrote, “considered by them as an apostate from my principles; as a deserter of the federal standard; and at tables, where I occasionally fell in with my federal acquaintance, was treated by them with much unpleasant coldness and neglect.” (See Smith, op. cit., 301; Graydon, op. cit., 366).Google Scholar

66.Wilson Papers, II, Speech in the Pennsylvania Convention regarding the Senate, December 31, 1789; Bird Wilson, III, 315– 336.Google Scholar

67.Bird Wilson, III, 318–319.Google Scholar

68.Bird Wilson, III, 330. Wilson based much of his argument on what seems to have been a genuine faith in the natural identity of political interests. Arguing that the people would not be less solicitous than electors of the common advantage he stated: “If every individual among the people attends to his own advantage; the common advantage, which is the joint result of the whole, will be provided for. But every elector may be very attentive to his own advantage; and yet the common advantage may be left wholly unprovided for.” (Bird Wilson, III, 330–331).Google Scholar

69.Bird Wilson, III, 330. It will be observed that the validity of this argument, as Wilson could not have failed to have realised, depended on the existence of a very broad franchise.Google Scholar

70.Bird Wilson, III, 331.Google Scholar

71.Bird Wilson, III, 332. “For if, upon the whole, the balance shall hang in equilibrio; the predilection… will certainly be in favour of a choice by the people themselves, and not by electors.”Google Scholar

72.Bird Wilson, III, 333.Google Scholar

73.Bird Wilson, III, 333–334.Google Scholar

74.See Williamson, C., American Suffrage: From Property to Democracy, 1760–1860 (Princeton, 1960), 133–136.Google Scholar

75.Pennsylvania Convention, First Session (Committee), January 16, 1790, 49. Wilson's motion was rejected by 14 – 48.Google Scholar

76.Pennsylvania Convention, Second Session, August 28, 1790, 193. Wilson's amendment (to the Schedule for the organization of the government) was defeated. The mitigation proposed was slight, but Wilson's action is characteristic of his stubborn determination never to cease to press his objectives within the limits of practicability. It is hardly the act of one who was insincere in his professions.Google Scholar

77.Wilson Papers, Paper headed ‘Pennsylvania Convention, 1790, Of the Unity of the Executive Department,1 dated January 13, 1790. Wilson goes on: “Besides, it is the Execution of the Laws that brings them home to the fortunes and farms and houses and business and bosoms of the people. Ought he, then, who is entrusted with the execution of them, to be considered as unconnected with the people? Ought he to be treated with a chilling indifference, or with a disgusting jealousy?”.Google Scholar

78.Pennsylvania Convention, Second Session, August 20, 1790, 171.Google Scholar

79.Pennsylvania Convention, First Session (Committee), December 23, 1789, 9–10. Here, however, Wilson voted with a very small minority (the vote was 7 – 58) with radical leaders like Whitehill, Findley and Smilie on the opposite side. It would have been inconsistent with his previous actions and with his principles to have voted otherwise; he believed no artificial impediment should limit the availability of the most able men.Google Scholar

80.Pennsylvania Convention, First Session (Committee), January 19, 1790, 52–53.Google Scholar

81.Graydon, op.cit., 363. Graydon comments further: “Wilson was truly great, but enthusiastically democratic. The symptoms of returning reason, evinced in the adoption of the federal constitution, had probably put him in good humour with the people, and made him more than ever in love with ‘free and independent man.” (Pennsylvania Convention, First Session (Committee), January 19, 1790, 371 –372).Google Scholar

82.William Bradford, Jr., to Boudinot, January 10, 1790. Quoted in Brunhouse, R. L., The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776–1790 (Harrisburg, 1942), 298. On this matter there is an interesting, if ambiguous, statement by William Maclay: “After dinner this day I read a letter to the Speaker from John Montgomery, of Carlisle, not much in favor of Mr. Morris. He then gave me the following intelligence: That Fitzsimons' arid Mr. Morris’ adherents, fearful that he could not be carried by a popular election, were determined to change the mode to electors. But all the difficulty was to know how Wilson could save his credit in convention and carry his party over with him after what had already happened, this being one of the pillars on which his late popularity was supported.” (E.S. Moclay, Journal of William Maclay New York, 1927, 327, July 20, 1790). As late as August 19, 1790, McKean and Lewis were still trying to secure a reversal of the decision on direct election of Senators. (Pennsylvania Convention, Second Session, August 19, 1790, 165–166). The proposal to revert to indirect election was defeated 13 – 51.Google Scholar

83.See Brunhouse, op.cit., 225–226; Tinkcom, H.M., The Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania, 1790–1801 (Harrisburg, 1950), 11–13.Google Scholar

84.See above, p. 21.Google Scholar

85.Wilson, James, An Introductory Lecture to a Course of Law Lectures; to which is added a Plan of the Lectures (Philadelphia, 1791), 20.Google Scholar

86.Wilson, James, op.cit., 18. He went on: “… the public Duties and the public Rights of every Citizen of the United States loudly demand from him all the Time, which he can prudently spare, and all the means which he can prudently employ, in order to learn that Part, which it is incumbent on him to act. “(Ibid. 19) He recommended also that every citizen acquaint himself with the general principles of law: “The Knowledge of those rational Principles on which the Law is founded, ought, especially in a free Government, to be diffused over the whole Community. ”(Ibid. 18) This he did not regard as Utopian, since: “Happily, the general and most important Principles of Law are not removed to a very great Distance from common Apprehension.” (Ibid. 17) In the Pennsylvania Convention of 1789–90, Wilson urged citizens to prepare themselves properly to exercise the vote in a responsible manner, by faking an interest in the selection of candidates and then discussing with friends the qualities needed for the various offices in the light of the character and background of the candidates. (Bird Wilson, III, 327). He believed that a broadly-based, but well-informed and responsible electorate, would choose men of character and ability. He did not think in terms of representation for classes or interests. His complaint against existing attitudes was that: “At a general Election, too few attend to the important Consequences of voting or not voting; and to the Consequences, still more important, of voting right or voting wrong.” (Wilson, op.cit., 20). He believed, however, that this indifference was the result of the former restricted influence of the electorate, who before the Revolution elected only the lower house, with both the Governor and the upper house having a veto, and that the new system would stimulate new Interest in political activity: “Indifference to elections, once less important, has continued, though their importance has been amazingly increased. But this, we hope, will not be the case long. The magnitude of the right will, we trust, secure, in future, the merited attention to the exercise of it.” (Bird Wilson, III, 324). Graydon made the following comment on Wilson's extolling of the right of suffrage: “He drew, to be sure, a picture of a free citizen in the act of disposing of his suffrage, little answerable to the sad realities which are found upon an election ground. Royalty, with its most splendid regalia, was made to hide its diminished head. Nevertheless, it was a pretty fiction; and I will not deny, that I did not listen to it with perhaps somewhat more than a demi-conviction. Ces pauvres Savoyards sont si bonnes gens! as Jean Jacques says. And who could say less of the good souls of Pennsylvania?” (Graydon, op.cit., 372).Google Scholar

87.See Wilson, Bird, III, 334. Wilson asserts that in the judicial department “a very important share of the business should be transacted by the people themselves.” But it is not clear what he means — he is probably merely referring to a jury system — and there is no evidence that he would subject, for instance, a Supreme Court to any kind of democratic control.Google Scholar

88.Farrand, I, 147.Google Scholar

89.Farrand, II, 429.Google Scholar

90.Farrand, I, 94–95, 98, 138; II, 73 (“Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary power, and they will have an opportunity of taking notice of these characters of a law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the improper views of the Legislature.”)Google Scholar