This paper discusses certain problems arising within the treatment of the senses of functions in Alonzo Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation. Church understands such senses themselves to be “sense-functions,” functions from sense to sense. However, the conditions he lays out under which a sense-function is to be regarded as a sense presenting another function as denotation allow for certain undesirable results given certain unusual or “deviant” sense-functions. Certain absurdities result, e.g., an argument can be found for equating any two senses of the same type. An alternative treatment of the senses of functions is discussed, and is thought to do better justice to Frege's original theory.

In this paper we investigate strong logics of first and second order that have certain absoluteness properties. We begin with an investigation of first order logic and the strong logics ω-logic and β-logic, isolating two facets of absoluteness, namely, generic invariance and faithfulness. It turns out that absoluteness is relative in the sense that stronger background assumptions secure greater degrees of absoluteness. Our aim is to investigate the hierarchies of strong logics of first and second order that are generically invariant and faithful against the backdrop of the strongest large cardinal hypotheses. We show that there is a close correspondence between the two hierarchies and we characterize the strongest logic in each hierarchy. On the first-order side, this leads to a new presentation of Woodin's Ω-logic. On the second-order side, we compare the strongest logic with full second-order logic and argue that the comparison lends support to Quine's claim that second-order logic is really set theory in sheep's clothing.

The present paper suggests relative truth definability as a tool for comparing conceptual aspects of axiomatic theories of truth and gives an overviewof recent developments of axiomatic theories of truth in the light of it. We also show several new proof-theoretic results via relative truth definability including a complete answer to the conjecture raised by Feferman in [13].

In this paper, we give a step by step introduction to the theory of well quasi-ordered transition systems. The framework combines two concepts, namely (i) transition systems which are monotonic wrt. a well-quasi ordering; and (ii) a scheme for symbolic backward reachability analysis. We describe several models with infinite-state spaces, which can be analyzed within the framework, e.g., Petri nets, lossy channel systems, timed automata, timed Petri nets, and multiset rewriting systems. We will also present better quasi-ordered transition systems which allow the design of efficient symbolic representations of infinite sets of states.

Around 1989, a striking letter written in March 1956 from Kurt Gödel to John von Neumann came to light. It poses some problems about the complexity of algorithms; in particular, it asks a question that can be seen as the first formulation of the P = ? NP question. This paper discusses some of the background to this letter, including von Neumann's own ideas on complexity theory. Von Neumann had already raised explicit questions about the complexity of Tarski's decision procedure for elementary algebra and geometry in a letter of 1949 to J. C. C. McKinsey. The paper concludes with a discussion of why theoretical computer science did not emerge as a separate discipline until the 1960s.

We suggest a new approach for addressing the problem of establishing an axiomatic foundation for large cardinals. An axiom asserting the existence of a large cardinal can naturally be viewed as a strong Axiom of Infinity. However, it has not been clear on the basis of our knowledge of ω itself, or of generally agreed upon intuitions about the true nature of the mathematical universe, what the right strengthening of the Axiom of Infinity is—which large cardinals ought to be derivable? It was shown in the 1960s by Lawvere that the existence of an infinite set is equivalent to the existence of a certain kind of structure-preserving transformation from V to itself, not isomorphic to the identity. We use Lawvere's transformation, rather than ω, as a starting point for a reasonably natural sequence of strengthenings and refinements, leading to a proposed strong Axiom of Infinity. A first refinement was discussed in later work by Trnková–Blass, showing that if the preservation properties of Lawvere's tranformation are strengthened to the point of requiring it to be an exact functor, such a transformation is provably equivalent to the existence of a measurable cardinal. We propose to push the preservation properties as far as possible, short of inconsistency. The resulting transformation V → V is strong enough to account for virtually all large cardinals, but is at the same time a natural generalization of an assertion about transformations V → V known to be equivalent to the Axiom of Infinity.

We observe that the classification problem for countable models of arithmetic is Borel complete. On the other hand, the classification problems for finitely generated models of arithmetic and for recursively saturated models of arithmetic are Borel; we investigate the precise complexity of each of these. Finally, we show that the classification problem for pairs of recursively saturated models and for automorphisms of a fixed recursively saturated model are Borel complete.

This little gem is stated unbilled and proved (completely) in the last two lines of §2 of the short note Kleene [1938]. In modern notation, with all the hypotheses stated explicitly and in a strong (uniform) form, it reads as follows:

Second Recursion Theorem (SRT). Fix a set V ⊆ ℕ, and suppose that for each natural number n ϵ ℕ = {0, 1, 2, …}, φn: ℕ1+n ⇀ V is a recursive partial function of (1 + n) arguments with values in V so that the standard assumptions (a) and (b) hold with

.

(a) Every n-ary recursive partial function with values in V is for some e.

(b) For all m, n, there is a recursive function : Nm+1 → ℕ such that

.

Then, for every recursive, partial function f of (1+m+n) arguments with values in V, there is a total recursive function of m arguments such that

Proof. Fix e ϵ ℕ such that and let .

We will abuse notation and write ž; rather than ž() when m = 0, so that (1) takes the simpler form

in this case (and the proof sets ž = S(e, e)).

This paper explores the set theoretic assumptions used in the current published proof of Fermat's Last Theorem, how these assumptions figure in the methods Wiles uses, and the currently known prospects for a proof using weaker assumptions.

We present a survey of some results and problems concerning constructions which require a diagonalization of length continuum to be carried out, particularly constructions of almost disjoint families of various sorts. We emphasize the role of cardinal invariants of the continuum and their combinatorial characterizations in such constructions.

This paper is essentially the author's Gödel Lecture at the ASL Logic Colloquium '09 in Sofia extended and supplemented by material from some other papers. After a brief description of traditional reverse mathematics, a computational approach to is presented. There are then discussions of some interactions between reverse mathematics and the major branches of mathematical logic in terms of the techniques they supply as well as theorems for analysis. The emphasis here is on ones that lie outside the usual main systems of reverse mathematics. While retaining the usual base theory and working still within second order arithmetic, theorems are described that range from those far below the usual systems to ones far above.

We carry out some of Galois' work in the setting of an arbitrary first-order theory T. We replace the ambient algebraically closed field by a large model M of T, replace fields by definably closed subsets of M, assume that T codes finite sets, and obtain the fundamental duality of Galois theory matching subgroups of the Galois group of L over F with intermediate extensions F ≤ K ≤ L. This exposition of a special case of [10] has the advantage of requiring almost no background beyond familiarity with fields, polynomials, first-order formulae, and automorphisms.