Ministers are very busy and harassed people. Some of them encourage their staff when presenting their work to make what is complex appear to be simple, to draft papers composed of short sentences and cut up into short paragraphs, so that they can be taken in almost at a glance. This process (which has its dangers) is as far removed as it is possible to be from the deliberate and exhaustive methods of formal scholarship. That is why the proceedings of bureaucrats appear to the academic mind to be so superficial.

The ‘October Revolution’ gave Russia a new political elite, manifesting very limited continuity with the elite that preceded it. This article has focused on the characteristics of this elite not at the top leadership level but at the level of the few hundred who were most significantly politically at the national stage and the few thousand who were most significant politically in the provinces. The data show that the Revolution dramatically widened access to the political elite for the following overlapping categories of the population, whose access had been limited or minimal before 1917:

(a) members of revolutionary parties;

(b) very young adults;

(c) persons drawn from lower social strata, notably workers and peasants;

(d) the poorly-educated;

(e) non-Russians;

(f) women.

A survey of the printed word, including local and national papers as well as weekly journals over the past ten years, would show an increasing proportion of column inches devoted to issues arising out of physical planning — those issues involving such concepts as ‘environment’, ‘conservation’, ‘amenity’ and ‘leisure space’. As a society, we are becoming increasingly preoccupied with our physical environment and on the whole this preoccupation takes the form of fears for the future. Such fears must begin with two propositions: that the environment (or at least some of its important aspects) is changing rapidly and that this is a matter which affects our general well-being.

There is a tendency for quantitative research to be undertaken without sufficient consideration being given to its theoretical justification. An interesting field reveals itself, a hypothesis is generated, a means of testing it is devised and then the research begins. Unfortunately research in political socialization has often been of this type. We need to view political socialization in a wider context, to ask, why do we study political socialization? Unless we can answer this question then it is difficult to judge the validity of work done in the field. Such work must be analyzed in the light of its broader purpose.

The role of the electoral system in the political process is one which has long concerned political scientists. Traditionally, the emphasis has been on the ‘mechanical’ effects that such systems have or are assumed to have, on such features as the number and strength of parties in a given political system. More often the debate became of a polemical nature, fought on the respective merits of one or other of the major electoral systems. The culmination of all this effort was that, until recently, research in this area of the discipline consisted almost entirely of a body of material, basically unsystematic in scope and essentially descriptive by nature. More contemporary research has concentrated on discovering the precise nature of the empirical relationship between electoral systems and party systems, with some degree of success. Our concern in this paper however, is not to contribute to the knowledge of the ‘mechanical’ effects of electoral systems but, in a related fashion, to examine some possible theoretical properties that may have an equal importance for democratic theory.

The critical importance of marginal constituencies and wards in determining national and local election results in England leads to the question ‘What makes a ward marginal? ’ The results of research on 384 electoral contests over ten years in Birmingham shows that the social class composition of a ward primarily determines its marginality or safety. The class composition associated with a high degree of marginality is as follows: for every non-manual worker there are likely to be twice as many foremen and skilled manual workers, and for every non-manual worker there are likely to be between one and a half and twice as many semi and unskilled manual workers. The further a ward departs from these ratios the more likely it is to be safe for the Labour or Conservative Party. The ratios are highly reliable in picking out marginal and safe wards in normal political periods involving only small swings of electoral opinion between the parties. During abnormal periods, such as the landslide against the Labour Party between 1965 and 1969, the ratios shift slightly but are nevertheless a good indicator of marginal propensity.

One of the reasons for paying attention to the results of American mid-term elections is the hope that they will tell us something about the standing of the President's party with the electorate. But the electoral verdict is notoriously hard to interpret. Since the President is not himself standing for re-election, the verdict has to be inferred from the results of House and Senate races in which the national mood of the electorate may be obscured by local and temporary factors. This will be especially true in Senate races, with only some 33 seats at risk; but even in House elections, with some 435 seats at risk, a grave problem arises when one comes to compare the results with those of the preceding Presidential election. In every mid-term election since that of 1934, the party of the President, whether it be Republican or Democratic, has lost some of the seats it had won at the previous Presidential election. The net loss has been as low as four seats in 1962 and as high as seventy-one seats in 1938, but it has always occurred. Some loss to the President's party is considered to be ‘normal’ at mid term, and it is only to the extent that the actual loss diverges from the normal loss that implications can be drawn to the President's standing with the electorate.

It has long been fashionable for political scientists to account for the stability of democratic regimes by the sorts of cleavages that occur in the society. One such theory runs that the more cleavages reinforce one another the more unstable the regime will be, whilst the more cleavages overlap the more stable it will be. Unfortunately, up till now

the discussion has been carried on largely in intuitive terms, without a rigorous way of measuring and quantifying the key variables. Rae and Taylor's recent book attempts to start remedying this defect.

Messrs Dennis, Lindberg and McCrone have written an interesting article 1 in which they draw the conclusion that those of us who have written textbooks about British politics should modify some of our generalizations about British attitudes and traditions. But before we all rush to revise our next editions, I should like to raise some critical questions about thearticle. I will enumerate these to meet the editor's request for brevity, (i) Why are we not told anything about the composition of the sample? It has been shown that political attitudes among British children are related both to the social class of their parents and to the type of school attended, 2 and without any indication of the class background or schools of the children interviewed it is rather difficult to assess the results. It would also be helpful to know exactly when the survey was conducted.