Preferences over jurisdictional architecture are the product of three irreduciblelogics: efficiency, distribution and identity. This article substantiates thefollowing claims: (a) European integration has become politicized in electionsand referendums; (b) as a result, the preferences of the general public and ofnational political parties have become decisive for jurisdictional outcomes; (c)identity is critical in shaping contestation on Europe.

This article tests the applicability of the democratic peace thesis tosub-Saharan African states by examining a ‘politicalinversion’ thesis. This suggests that the domestic politicalframework of African states compels their leaders to engage in internationalconflict, contrary to what the democratic peace thesiests: namely, politicallyopen African states are more likely to fight each other. This conclusion raisesthe issue of the universality of the democratic peace thesis; therefore, theextent to which the democratic peace is evident across other regions of theworld is examined. Empirical analyses of state dyads 1950–2001demonstrate that politically open African states are more likely to fight eachother and, moreover, the democratic peace does not hold in any region outside the West. These findings supportthe political inversion thesis of African conflicts and challenge the suggestionthat the spread of democracy will occasion international peace throughout theworld.

Despite decades of research, our understanding of how institutional contextsinfluence urban political participation remains muddled. It is argued here thatthis confusion arises from the diversity of competing hypotheses, failures toconceptualize the causal processes underlying these hypotheses thoroughly, andthe use of inadequate controls for rival hypotheses. A more comprehensivespecification of the relationship between metropolitan jurisdictional contextsand two modes of participation is provided. After a presentation of atheoretical framework organizing the many extant hypotheses, these are tested,using survey data collected by the Knight Foundation from 2002 in twenty-fiveurban counties. Contrary to prior work, it is found that the size of localgovernments is positively associated with participation, while governmentalfragmentation diminishes the propensity for political action.

Governing parties generally win fewer votes at European Parliament elections thanat national electionsmost common explanation for this is that European electionsare ‘second order national elections’ acting as mid-termreferendums on government performance. This article proposes an alternative,though complementary, explanation: voters defect because governing parties aregenerally far more pro-European than the typical voter. Additionally, the morethe campaign context primes Eurosceptic sentiments, the more likely voters areto turn against governing parties. A multi-level model is used to test thesepropositions and analyse the effects of individual and contextual factors at the1999 and 2004 European Parliament elections. Both European and domestic concernsmatter to voters; moreover, campaign context plays an important role in shapingvote choices.

The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislativepowers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance ofpresidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model toexplain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it isproposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-pluralityrules of presidential elections when the number of parties necessary to passconstitutional changes increases. It is also proposed that the makers ofconstitutions are likely to strengthen the legislative powers of the presidentwhen the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increasesand when parties are decentralized. The argument is supported by a statisticalanalysis of the determinants of constitutional choice in Latin America.

While a substantial literature explores gender differences in participation inthe United States, Commonwealth countries and Western Europe, little attentionhas been given to gender’s impact on participation in the developingworld. These countries have diverse experiences with gender politics: some havebeen leaders in suffrage reforms and equal rights, while, in others, divorce hasonly recently been legalized. This article examines the relationship betweengender and participation in seventeen Latin American countries. Many coreresults from research in the developed world hold in Latin America as well.Surprisingly, however, there is no evidence that economic development providesan impetus for more equal levels of participation. Instead, the most importantcontextual factors are civil liberties and women’s presence among thevisible political elite.

EC directives must be transposed into the national legal order of the memberstates within a specified deadline. Although member states are obliged to notifytheir transposition measures, they often fail to comply with these deadlines.Distinguishing between domestic and EU-related factors, this study examinestransposition failure and delay of EC directives from 1986 to 2002. Notificationfailure is found to be more likely when there is conflict between the memberstates during the EU legislative process. National patterns of transpositiontimeliness are shown to vary significantly, and higher levels of complexity andincreased use of parliamentary legislation, as well as more federalist andpluralist structures, contribute to delayed compliance.

Three important books have recently been published in the long shadow of WilliamH. Riker (1920–93). Norman Schofield declares himself a friend ofRiker; Gerry Mackie, an enemy; Anthony McGann, a mere acquaintance. However,Riker’s legacy gives shape to all three. The main elements of theRiker programme are explained in this article, and then how far each book underreview advances or undermines it is examined.