Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T00:37:44.088Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

What the Enemy Knows: Common Knowledge and the Rationality of War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2018

Thomas Chadefaux
Thomas Chadefaux*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin. Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Letter
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , October 2020 , pp. 1593 - 1607
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Acharya, A and Grillo, E (2015) War with crazy types. Political Science Research and Methods 3 (2):281–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aumann, RJ (1976) Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics 4 (6):1236–1239.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bas, M and Schub, R (2016a) How uncertainty about war outcomes affects war onset. Journal of Conflict Resolution 60 (6):1099–1128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bas, M and Schub, R (2016b) Mutual optimism as a cause of conflict: secret alliances and conflict onset. International Studies Quarterly 60 (3):552–564.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blainey, G (1988) Causes of war. New York: Simon and Schuster.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chadefaux, T (2011) Bargaining over power: when do shifts in power lead to war? International Theory 3 (2):228–253.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chadefaux, T (2012) War as an investment. Unpublished manuscript.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, VP and Sobel, J (1982) Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50 (6):1431–1451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Debs, A and Monteiro, NP (2014) Known unknowns: power shifts, uncertainty, and war. International Organization 68 (1):1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duelfer, CA and Dyson, SB (2011) Chronic misperception and international conflict: the US-Iraq experience. International Security 36 (1):73–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farrell, J and Gibbons, R (1989) Cheap talk can matter in bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory 48 (1):221–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, JD (1994) Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review 88 (3):577–592.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, JD (1995) Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49 (3):379–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, JD (1997) Signaling foreign policy interests: tying hands versus sinking costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1):68–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferris, J (2007) Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays. Abingdon: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fey, M and Ramsay, KW (2007) Mutual optimism and war. American Journal of Political Science 51 (4):738–754.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Filson, D and Werner, S (2002) A bargaining model of war and peace: anticipating the onset, duration, and outcome of war. American Journal of Political Science 46 (4):819–837.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fromkin, D (2009) Europe’s Last Summer. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Fudenberg, D and Tirole, J (1991) Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Garthoff, RL (2015) Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary During the Cold War. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.Google Scholar
Gartzke, E (1999) War is in the error term. International Organization 53 (3):567–587.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, JC (2004) Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, I–III: Part I. The basic model. Management Science 50 (12):1804–1817.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holsti, OR (1962) The belief system and national images: a case study. Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 (3):244–252.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jervis, R (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jervis, R (2002) Signaling and perception: drawing inferences and projecting images. In Monroe K, (ed.), Political Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 293–314.Google Scholar
Jervis, R (2015) Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Kahn, D (2000) Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.Google Scholar
Koblentz, GD (2018) Saddam versus the inspectors: the impact of regime security on the verification of Iraq’s WMD disarmament. Journal of Strategic Studies 41 (3):372–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kübler, D and Weizsäcker, G (2004) Limited depth of reasoning and failure of cascade formation in the laboratory. The Review of Economic Studies 71 (2):425–441.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kydd, AH (2005) Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lai, B (2004) The effects of different types of military mobilization on the outcome of international crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2):211–229.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lake, DA (2010) Two cheers for bargaining theory: assessing rationalist explanations of the Iraq war. International Security 35 (3):7–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
May, ER (2014) Knowing one’s enemies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
McMeekin, S (2013) July 1914 Morrow. Countdown to War. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Mercer, J (2010) Emotional beliefs. International Organization 64 (1):1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milgrom, P and Stokey, N (1982) Information, trade and common knowledge. Journal of Economic Theory 26 (1):17–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrow, JD (1989) Capabilities, uncertainty, and resolve: a limited information model of crisis bargaining. American Journal of Political Science 33 (4):941–972.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrow, JD (2014) Order Within Anarchy: The Laws of War as An International Institution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, R (1995) Unraveling in guessing games: an experimental study. The American Economic Review 85 (5):1313–1326.Google Scholar
Pfiffner, JP (2004) Did President Bush mislead the country in his arguments for war with Iraq? Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 (1):25–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, R (1996) Bargaining in the shadow of power. Games and Economic Behavior 15 (2):255–289.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, R (2004a) Bargaining and learning while fighting. American Journal of Political Science 48 (2):344–361.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, R (2004b) The inefficient use of power: costly conflict with complete information. American Political Science Review 98 (2):231–241.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Prunckun, H (2012) Counterintelligence Theory and Practice. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Reed, W (2003) Information, power, and war. American Political Science Review 97 (4):633–641.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reiter, D (2003) Exploring the bargaining model of war. Perspective on Politics 1 (1):27–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubinstein, A (1989) The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under ‘almost common knowledge’. The American Economic Review 79 (3):385–391.Google Scholar
Sartori, AE (2002) The might of the pen: a reputational theory of communication in international disputes. International Organization 56 (1):121–149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sartori, AE (2013) Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Schelling, TC (1980) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schilling, MF (1925) How the War Began in 1914. London: George Allen.Google Scholar
Schub, R (2015) Are you certain? Leaders, overprecision, and war. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Schultz, KA (1998) Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. American Political Science Review 92 (4):829–844.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shore, Z (2005) What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Slantchev, BL (2003) The principle of convergence in wartime negotiations. American Political Science Review 97 (4):621–632.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slantchev, BL (2004) How initiators end their wars: the duration of warfare and the terms of peace. American Journal of Political Science 48 (4):813–829.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slantchev, BL and Tarar, A (2011) Mutual optimism as a rationalist explanation of war. American Journal of Political Science 55 (1):135–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, A and Stam, A (2004) Bargaining and the nature of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6):783–813.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Snyder, J and Borghard, ED (2011) The cost of empty threats: a penny, not a pound. American Political Science Review 105 (3):437–456.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Toft, MD (2006) Issue indivisibility and time horizons as rationalist explanations for war. Security Studies 15 (1):34–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trager, RF (2010) Diplomatic calculus in anarchy: how communication matters. American Political Science Review 104 (2):347–368.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wagner, R (2000) Bargaining and war. American Journal of Political Science 44 (3):469–484.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wittman, D (1979) How a war ends: a rational model approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution 23 (4):743–763.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woods, KM, Pease, MR, Stout, ME, Murray, W and Lacey, JG (2006) Iraqi perspectives project. A view of operation Iraqi freedom from Saddam’s senior leadership. Technical report, United States Joint Forces Command.Google Scholar
Yarhi-Milo, K (2013) In the eye of the beholder: how leaders and intelligence communities assess the intentions of adversaries. International Security 38 (1):7–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Chadefaux supplementary material

Appendix

Download Chadefaux supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 213.9 KB