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Voters, Responsibility Attribution and Support Parties in Parliamentary Democracies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2017
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Department of Political Science, Rice University (emails: [email protected], [email protected]); Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University (email: [email protected]). Data replication sets are available in Harvard Dataverse at: doi:10.7910/DVN/HG0YSS and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123417000096.
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